346 Conn. 238
Conn.2023Background:
- On April 1, 2016 police stopped Wayne King; Breathalyzer readings ~0.18% and he was convicted under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-227a(a).
- At a subsequent part B proceeding the trial court enhanced his sentence as a third-time offender based on two prior Florida DUI convictions under Fla. Stat. § 316.193(1).
- The Appellate Court affirmed; King sought review arguing Florida’s phrase “actual physical control” is broader than Connecticut’s “operating,” so the Florida convictions cannot serve as priors under § 14-227a(g).
- The Connecticut Supreme Court addressed three statutory interpretive questions: what are the “essential elements,” what does “substantially the same” mean, and whether Florida’s elements match Connecticut’s.
- The Court defined “essential elements” to include the actus reus, mens rea, and causation; construed “substantially the same” to mean the elements must be the same to a considerable degree; and held Florida’s “actual physical control” is substantially the same as Connecticut’s “operating.”
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What are the “essential elements” for § 14-227a(g) comparison? | Elements = basic, necessary parts of the crime (actus reus, mens rea, causation). | King disputed application to Florida convictions only by disputing later similarity analysis. | Court: "essential elements" = actus reus, mens rea, causation (basic and necessary parts). |
| What does “substantially the same” mean? | Should be read as degree-based: elements same to a considerable degree. | King: means "same in substance" (virtually identical elements). | Court: adopt degree test — "same to a considerable degree," not exact equivalence. |
| Are Fla. Stat. § 316.193(1) elements (driving or actual physical control) substantially the same as § 14-227a(a)’s (operating)? | State: Florida case law requires some act placing defendant in capability to operate; parallels CT definition of operation. | King: "actual physical control" criminalizes mere possibility (e.g., sitting in driver’s seat) and is broader. | Court: Florida "actual physical control" and CT "operation" are substantially the same — both require action/indicia beyond mere sitting; keys and other facts probative but not required. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Cyr, 291 Conn. 49 (Conn. 2009) (defines "operation" as acts that alone or in sequence will set vehicle in motion; temporary impediments do not defeat operation)
- State v. Haight, 279 Conn. 546 (Conn. 2006) (operation can be satisfied when defendant is in parked vehicle with indicia of preparatory acts)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932) (elemental test for double jeopardy discussed by the Court)
- State v. Young, 186 Conn. App. 770 (Conn. App. 2019) (Appellate Court analysis that elements may differ in wording but still be substantially the same)
- In re Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d 403 (N.Y. 1990) (comparison approach: examine elements and related case law to assess substantial similarity)
- Fieselman v. State, 537 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (Florida: keys in ignition and other indicia support inference of actual physical control)
- Hughes v. State, 943 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (Florida: actual physical control = present ability/capability to operate; consider totality of circumstances)