State v. J.M., 148 Ohio St. 3d 113

Applicant J.M. sought to seal a 24-year-old third-degree felony (receiving stolen property) under Ohio's record-sealing statute, R.C. 2953.31–.32.
J.M.'s record also included a third-degree misdemeanor (negligent assault) and a fourth-degree misdemeanor for failing to register a motor vehicle under R.C. 4503.11(A) (convicted in 2013).
The State objected, arguing the 4503.11(A) conviction must be counted, making J.M. ineligible under R.C. 2953.31(A)'s limits on prior convictions.
The trial court relied on Tenth District precedent (In re Mooney) and ordered sealing; the Tenth District affirmed in a fractured opinion and certified a conflict with a Fourth District decision (State v. Clark).
The Ohio Supreme Court accepted the certified question: whether a fourth-degree-misdemeanor conviction under R.C. 4503.11(A) counts as a conviction for eligible-offender status under R.C. 2953.31(A).
The Court held that, under the plain language of R.C. 2953.31(A), the fourth-degree-misdemeanor for failure to register does count as a conviction for sealing-eligibility purposes (rejecting retroactive application of 2015 amendment that made the offense a minor misdemeanor).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a conviction under R.C. 4503.11(A) (fourth-degree misdemeanor) must be counted when determining eligible-offender status under R.C. 2953.31(A)	J.M.: record-sealing statutes are remedial and should be liberally construed; post-2015 amendment made R.C. 4503.11 a minor misdemeanor, and the offense is substantially similar to traffic/admin offenses excluded from counting	State: plain text of R.C. 2953.31(A) does not except R.C. 4503.11(A); therefore the 2013 fourth-degree-misdemeanor must be counted; 2015 amendment was not made retroactive	The Court held that the fourth-degree-misdemeanor under R.C. 4503.11(A) counts as a conviction for R.C. 2953.31(A) eligibility; J.M. was not an eligible offender; judgment reversed and remanded

State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543 (1996) (statutory construction begins with legislative intent and plain language)
Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221 (2010) (apply unambiguous statutory language as written)
Cecearelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231 (2010) (questions of law reviewed de novo)
State v. Boykin, 138 Ohio St.3d 97 (2013) (expungement is a statutory act of grace and a privilege, not a right)
State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81 (2013) (context on sealing/expungement terminology and standards)
State v. Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d 636 (1996) (sealing is an act of grace and should be granted only when statutory eligibility is met)