State v. Hanna
305 Ga. 100
| Ga. | 2019Background
- Tina Marie Hanna (IQ 58) pled guilty to two counts of felony murder and two counts of first-degree cruelty to children for the death of her infant son, Mombera, who medical examiner opined died of starvation.
- The felony-murder counts were predicated on first-degree cruelty by depriving necessary sustenance and failing to seek medical attention.
- At plea and sentencing defense counsel argued the rule of lenity required sentencing under the lesser statute for contributing to deprivation of a minor leading to death (former OCGA § 16-12-1), not felony murder.
- The trial court pronounced conviction on felony murder but applied the lesser statute's penalty, sentencing Hanna to 10 years (first 4 in confinement, balance on probation) and a concurrent 5-year term for one child-cruelty count.
- The State appealed, arguing the trial court illegally imposed a sentence for an offense not charged or convicted; the Supreme Court of Georgia found the sentence void and vacated it.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court could apply rule of lenity to impose sentence for a different, lesser offense than the one of conviction | State: sentencing must follow the statute of conviction; court lacked authority to impose sentence for uncharged offense | Hanna: overlapping statutes (felony murder v. deprivation statute) create ambiguity; lenity allows lesser penalty | Court: cannot sentence for an offense not charged/pled; sentence was illegal/void; vacated |
| Whether rule of lenity required reducing felony murder conviction to lesser deprivation offense without dismissal or plea amendment | State: lenity cannot be used to rewrite conviction; defendant should have moved prior to or during trial | Hanna: overlapping statutes criminalize same conduct so lesser statute should control | Court: lenity might require reversal of a conviction if statutes duplicate, but court cannot leave felony murder conviction intact and impose a different sentence; proper remedy is dismissal/challenge of conviction, not resentencing on uncharged crime |
| Whether the trial court’s practice of allowing post-sentencing plea withdrawal is permissible | State: practice is improper and conflicts with rules limiting withdrawal after sentence | Trial court: standard practice permitting withdrawal if sentence vacated | Court: issue not ripe because Hanna did not seek withdrawal; noted authority allowing withdrawal when sentence is void and vacated (but Uniform Rule limits withdrawal absent manifest injustice) |
| Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear State’s appeal of a void sentence | State: appeal authorized under OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(6) because sentence void | — | Court: affirmed jurisdiction; void sentence reviewable by State under statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Banta v. State, 281 Ga. 615 (discussion of rule of lenity and when it applies)
- von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569 (a sentence is void if it imposes punishment the law does not allow)
- Gee v. State, 225 Ga. 669 (lenity applied where statute ambiguously permitted lesser penalty)
- Dixon v. State, 278 Ga. 4 (duplicative statutes: defendant cannot be convicted under provision carrying greater penalty)
- Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63 (where sentence is void, defendant may withdraw plea prior to resentencing)
- Pierce v. State, 294 Ga. 842 (approval of Kaiser approach re: withdrawal after vacated sentence)
- Pope v. State, 301 Ga. 528 (void sentence on one count does not automatically allow withdrawal of pleas on affirmed counts)