State v. Byers, 375 N.C. 386

Background

Byers was convicted in 2004 of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary for the 2001 stabbing death of Shanvell Burke; he received life without parole plus a consecutive term.
At trial, physical and DNA evidence (fingernail scrapings, bloodstains, and knife swabs) linked Byers and Burke to the scene; Byers stipulated the blood on his shirt was Burke’s. No defense evidence was presented.
In July 2017 Byers filed a pro se motion under N.C.G.S. § 15A-269 seeking postconviction DNA testing of untested clothing and other items, claiming a third-party (a man in a plaid jacket) attacked him and that retesting might contradict prior results. He also requested court-appointed counsel under § 15A-269(c).
The trial court denied the motion, finding the evidence of guilt overwhelming and that additional testing was not shown to be material to his defense. Byers appealed.
The Court of Appeals (majority) reversed as to appointment of counsel, concluding Byers’ pro se allegations sufficiently showed the testing “may be material” and remanded for appointment of counsel; a dissent disagreed. The North Carolina Supreme Court granted review and reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the trial court’s denial.

Issues

Issue	Byers' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Standard to obtain court‑appointed counsel under §15A‑269(c) for postconviction DNA testing	Byers argued his pro se allegations showed testing "may be material" to a claim of wrongful conviction and thus entitled him to appointed counsel.	The State argued that §15A‑269(c) requires a showing of materiality sufficient to justify appointment, and Byers failed to meet that showing.	The Court held that a movant seeking counsel must show the DNA testing may be material, i.e., satisfy the statute’s materiality concept (reasonable probability evidence could affect the outcome); Byers failed to meet this showing.
Burden of proof on a pro se movant under §15A‑269	Byers contended his allegations sufficed without evidentiary proof at the pleading stage to obtain counsel.	The State maintained the movant bears the burden to prove materiality by a preponderance of the evidence for testing and must at least plausibly show materiality to get counsel.	The Court reiterated that the movant bears the burden by a preponderance to support postconviction testing; for counsel under (c), the movant must show testing may be material. Byers’ conclusory assertions were insufficient.
Whether the trial court erred by ruling before ordering an inventory of evidence	Byers argued the court should have compiled an inventory and preserved items before ruling.	The State argued the court may deny the motion on the merits without ordering an inventory if materiality is not shown.	The Court did not find error in denying appointment on the merits; lack of materiality justified denial without inventory.

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (evidence is material if it would tend to exculpate or reduce punishment)
State v. Lane, 370 N.C. 508 (2018) (materiality for postconviction DNA testing requires a reasonable probability the result would have been different)
State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488 (1995) (DNA is highly probative of identity)
State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297 (2006) (reasonable probability means probability sufficient to undermine confidence in outcome)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard and reasonable probability guidance)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (clarifies "reasonable probability" standard in prejudice analysis)
State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551 (2004) (applies Brady/materiality principles)
State v. Kilpatrick, 343 N.C. 466 (1996) (discusses materiality/Brady framework)
State v. Byers, 175 N.C. App. 280 (2006) (prior appeal affirming convictions)