STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRAINE SANCHEZ BYERS
No. 69A06-4
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
Filed 25 September 2020
263 N.C. App. 231, 822 S.E.2d 746 (2018)
MORGAN, Justice.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, reversing an order entered on 3 August 2017 by Judge W. Robert Bell in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 19 November 2019.
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Wyatt Orsbon, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.
This matter mandates our consideration of the requirements which a pro se defendant who seeks postconviction testing of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence derived from biological material must fulfill in order to qualify for appоinted counsel to assist such a defendant in an effort to obtain this type of scientific evaluation as provided in
I. The Trial Phase
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary on 3 March 2004. These convictions arose from the 22 November 2001 stabbing death of Shanvell Burke, a person with whom defendant had a romantic relationship before Burke ended it. On that autumnal night in Charlotte, North Carolina, Burke was in her apartment watching television with an individual named Reginald Williams. Williams testified at trial that he and Burke heard a loud crash at the back door of the apartment. When Burke went to see what had caused the sound, Williams heard her yell “Terraine, stop.” This development prompted Williams to leave the apartment immediately and to find someone to cоntact law enforcement for assistance. Williams explained in his testimony that he fled from Burke‘s residence because she had allowed him to hear a recorded telephone message that defendant had left for Burke in which defendant said that “when he found out who [was dating Burke], he was gonna kill them.” Williams also related at trial that Burke had told him that “she was afraid [defendant] was going to do something to hurt her bad.”
Evidence presented at trial tended to show that local law enforcement officers were already familiar with Burke‘s home because after she had terminated her romantic relationship with defendant, Burke had called upon law enforcemеnt for help on multiple occasions due to her fear of defendant. On one such occasion, Burke reported that defendant had struck her in the face and on her head while stating that he was going to kill her, and then defendant brandished a knife toward Burke‘s aunt, who was also present. Another emergency call by Burke to law enforcement involved her account that defendant had thrown bricks at Burke‘s apartment window.
In response to the emergency call to law enforcement in light of the circumstances which were occurring on 22 November 2001, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department arrived at Burke‘s apartment to discover defendant leаving the apartment through a broken window of the door. Defendant, who was described by officers as nervous and profusely sweating, told the officers that Burke was inside her home and had been injured. Defendant attempted to flee, but officers quickly apprehended and arrested him. Defendant had a deep laceration on his left hand.
Upon entering Burke‘s apartment, officers discovered her body lying in a pool of blood. Burke was already deceased due to the infliction of eleven stab wounds which she had suffered. A knife handle with a broken blade was recovered by investigating officers. One of the officers who responded to the 22 November 2001 emergency call identified Burke based upon his response to an emergency call at her residence eleven days earlier. On a
During the investigation of Burke‘s death, fingernail scrapings from defendant‘s hands, a bloodstain from a cushion on Burke‘s couch, a swab from the handle and a swab from the blade of the broken knife found inside Burke‘s apartment on the night of 22 November 2001, and various other bloodstains throughout the apartment were analyzed by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Crime Laboratory. The DNA obtained from these sources matched either defendant, Burke, or both of them. Additionally, one of Burke‘s neighbors testified that she saw defendant near Burke‘s apartment about 8:00 p.m. on the night that Burke was killed.
Defendant stipulated during trial that the blood found on the shirt that he was wearing at the time of his arrest was Burke‘s. Defendant offered no evidence at trial. Upon being found guilty by a jury of the offenses of first-degreе murder and first-degree burglary, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder conviction and a term of 77–102 months in prison for the burglary conviction, which would be served consecutive to the life imprisonment for murder. Upon defendant‘s appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgments entered upon defendant‘s convictions and denied defendant‘s post-trial pro se motion for appropriate relief. See State v. Byers (Byers I), 175 N.C. App. 280, 623 S.E.2d 357 (2006), disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 485, 631 S.E.2d 135 (2006).
II. Defendant‘s Request for Postconviction DNA Testing
On 31 July 2017, defendant filed a pro se motion in the trial court for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to
In his motion, defendant stated that his struggle with the man in the plaid jaсket would explain the presence of defendant‘s DNA throughout Burke‘s apartment and asserted that DNA testing of defendant‘s and Burke‘s previously untested clothing could reveal the identity of the actual perpetrator, noting that the State‘s DNA expert witness had reported, but not testified to, the presence of human blood in various locations in Burke‘s apartment that did not match the blood of either defendant or Burke. Defendant requested that the items of clothing be preserved and that an inventory of the evidence be prepared. Defendant also asked for the appointment of counsel to assist defendant in his postconviction DNA-testing process pursuant to
(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction against the defendant for performance of DNA testing . . . if the biological evidence meets all of the following conditions:
(1) Is material to the defendant‘s defense.
(2) Is related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in the judgment.
(3) Meets either of the following conditions:
a. It was not DNA tested previously.
b. It was tested previously, but the requested DNA test would provide results that are significantly more accurate and probative of the identity of the perpetrator or accomplice or have a reasonable probability of contradicting prior test results. (b) The court shall grant the motion for DNA testing . . . upon its determination that:
(1) The conditions set forth in subdivisiоns (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (a) of this section have been met;
(2) If the DNA testing being requested had been conducted on the evidence, there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant; and
(3) The defendant has signed a sworn affidavit of innocence.
. . . .
(c) . . . [T]he court shall appoint counsel for the person who brings a motion under this section if that person is indigent. If the petitioner has filed pro se, the court shall appoint counsel for the petitioner . . . upon a showing that the DNA testing may be material to the petitioner‘s claim of wrongful conviction.
On 3 August 2017, the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, entered an order denying defendant‘s motion for postconviction DNA testing on the grounds that “the evidence of his guilt is overwhelming” and that defendant has “failed to show how conducting additional DNA testing is material to his defense.” Defendant appealed the trial court‘s order denying his motion to the Court of Appeals.
III. The Court of Appeals Decision
In the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion (1) before “obtaining and reviewing the statutorily required inventory of evidence” sought to be tested and (2) before appointing counsel to assist defendant upon showing in his motion that he was indigent and “the testing may be material to his defense.” State v. Byers (Byers II), 263 N.C. App. 231, 234, 822 S.E.2d 746, 748 (2018). The majority of the Court of Appeals panel reversed the triаl court‘s order denying defendant‘s motion. Id. at 243, 822 S.E.2d at 753. Although the lower appellate court saw no error in the trial court‘s determination of defendant‘s motion prior to ordering the requested inventory of evidence, the majority concluded that defendant sufficiently pleaded the materiality of his requested postconviction DNA testing so as to be entitled to the appointment of counsel in order to assist him in obtaining the testing. Id.
With regard to the issue of materiality, the majority noted that “[t]he level of materiality required under subsection (a)(1) to support a motion for post-conviction DNA testing has been frequently litigated and has been a high bar for pro se litigants.” Id. at 240, 822 S.E.2d at 751 (citing, inter alia, State v. Lane, 370 N.C. 508, 809 S.E.2d 568 (2018)). In Lane, this Court stated that in order to obtain postconviction DNA testing, DNA evidence is considered to be material when
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The determination of materiality must be made in the context of the entire record and hinges upon whether the evidence would have affected the jury‘s deliberations.
Lane, 370 N.C. at 519, 809 S.E.2d at 575. In applying our guidance in Lane to the instant case, the Court of Appeals majority acknowledged the substantial evidence of defendant‘s guilt but further opined that “[t]he weight of the evidence indicating guilt must be weighed against the probative value of the possible DNA evidence. Our Supreme Court has found DNA [evidence] to be ‘highly probative of the identity of the victim‘s killer.’ ” Byers, 263 N.C. App. at 242, 822 S.E.2d at 753 (quoting State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 512, 459 S.E.2d 747, 759 (1995)). In the present case, the lower appellate court‘s majority then observed the following:
In enacting
N.C.G.S. § 15A-269 , our General Assembly created a potential method of relief for wrongly incarcerated individuals. To interpret the materiality standard in such a way as to make that relief unattainable would defeat that legislative purpose.See Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 216, 388 S.E.2d 134, 140 (1990) (“[A] statute must be construed, if possible, so as to give effect to every provision, it being presumed that the Legislature did not intend any of the statute‘s provisions to be surplusage.“). A recent dissent in an opinion in [the Court of Appeals] highlighted the position in which our previous interpretation of materiality has placed pro se defendants, stating “we are requiring indigent defendants to meet this illusory burden of materiality, with no guidance or examples of what actually constitutes materiality. Under our case law, therefore, it would be difficult for even an experienced criminal defense attorney to plead these petitions correctly.” State v. Sayre, . . . 803 S.E.2d 699 (2017) (unpublished) (Murphy, J., dissenting)[,] aff‘d per curiam, 371 N.C. 468, 818 S.E.2d 282 (2018). We hold Defendant in the present case has satisfied this difficult burden.
Id. at 242–43, 822 S.E.2d at 753 (first alteration in original) (second emphasis added). With this reasoning, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court‘s order and remanded for the entry of an order appointing counsel to assist defendant in the proceeding in which defendant would attempt to establish the level of materiality required to obtain DNA testing. Id. at 243, 822 S.E.2d at 753.
In the view of the dissenting judge on the Court of Appeals panel, defendant did not sufficiently establish that he was entitled to the appointment of counsel to assist him in obtaining postconviction DNA testing. Id. at 243, 822 S.E.2d at 753 (Arrowood, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge noted that under the pertinent statute, the movant “has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence every fact essential to support the motion for postconviction DNA testing, which includes the facts necessary to establish materiality,” Id. at 244, 822 S.E.2d at 754 (quoting Lane, 370 N.C. at 518, 809 S.E.2d at 574), and then concluded that
in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant‘s guilt and dearth of evidence pointing to a second perpetrator, defendant did not meet his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence every fact necessary to establish materiality, and the trial evidence was sufficient to dictate the trial court‘s ultimate conclusion on materiality, as in Lane.
Id. at 248, 822 S.E.2d at 756. Accordingly, the dissenting judge would have held that “the trial court did not err by denying defendant‘s motion for DNA testing because the allegations in his motion were not sufficient to establish that he was entitled to the appointment of counsel.” Id. at 243, 822 S.E.2d at 753. In light of this position, the dissenting judge deemed it unnecessary to address the issue of the trial court‘s ruling before having obtained and reviewed the inventory of еvidence. Id. at 248, 822 S.E.2d at 756.
On 15 January 2019, the State filed a notice of appeal on the basis of the Court of Appeals dissent, along with a motion for a temporary stay and a petition for writ of supersedeas. We allowed the petition for writ of supersedeas on 16 January 2019. The appeal was heard in the Supreme Court on 19 November 2019.
IV. Analysis
The primary question presented in this appeal dictates that we set forth the threshold level which a pro se defendant must reach through a sufficient allegation of facts so as to establish materiality as required by
The materiality of evidence in a criminal case was addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the opinion which it rendered in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In identifying “where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,” the nation‘s highest tribunal determined that evidence is material if it is “evidence . . . which, if made available [to an accused], would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty.” Id. at 87–88. Citing Brady, in Lane we expressly (1) recognized “the similarities in the Brady materiality standard
Pursuant to
The ability to conduct the requested DNA testing is material to the Defendant‘s defense on actual innocence and to show another commit [sic] thе crime for which he is wrongly convicted. Also, it shows the victim‘s blood was never on the defendant which would be consistent with him not being the perpetrator. See Defendant‘s MAR Argument and exhibits. THE DNA IS NEEDED AND NECESSARY TO PROVE THAT THE D.A. FABRICATED THE BLOOD ON THE DEFENDANT‘S CLOTHES.
(Emphasis in original.) Pursuant to
In applying the pertinent statutory law and case law to the present case, we conclude that defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence every fact essential to support his motion for postconviction DNA testing, has failed to establish that the biological evidence is material to his defense, has failed to meet the condition that the requested DNA test would provide results that are significantly more accurate and probative of the identity of the perpetrator or accomplice or have a reasonable probability of contradicting prior test results regarding previous DNA testing of some items, and has failed to demonstrate that there
As this Court said in Lane, a defendant has the burden as the moving party under
The specific issue which this Court is charged to resolve regarding defendant‘s qualification for the appointment of counsel in the instant case to assist his efforts, upon defendant‘s pro se motion filed in the trial court, to obtain postconviction DNA testing, is governed by subsection (c) of
In this case of first impression, we discern that the Legislature‘s use of the phrase “is material to the defendant‘s defense” in
It is important to note, in light of the higher standard that a defendant must satisfy to show that postconviction DNA testing “is material to the defendant‘s defense” under
In utilizing this Court‘s construction of the term “material” in our Lane, Tirado, and Kilpatrick decisions—all of which addressed the evaluation of materiality of evidence under the rubric of the approach to the subject by the Supreme Court of the United States as enunciated in Brady—we conclude that defendant has not made the prescribed “showing that the DNA testing may be material to the petitioner‘s claim of wrongful conviction” as required for the appointment of counsel by the trial court under
. . . in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant‘s guilt and dearth of evidence pointing to a second perpetrator, defendant did not meet his burden to prove by a preponderance оf the evidence every fact necessary to establish materiality, and the trial evidence was sufficient to dictate the trial court‘s ultimate conclusion on materiality, as in Lane.
Indeed, while this Court has defined the term “material” found in
The total absence of any production of evidentiary proof by defendant at his trial or in his subsequent motion for postconviction DNA testing under
As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Brady and as applied by this Court to the instant case, while evidence is material when, if made available to an accused, it would tend to exculpate the defendant or to reduce the penalty, defendant here is not in such a position. In considering whether the evidence for which defendant fails to demonstrate materiality would have affected the jury‘s deliberations and in assessing the context of the entire record pursuant to the direction provided by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bagley and which we embraced in Allen, we do not discern that there is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome upon our determination that the trial court did not err in finding that the evidence of defendant‘s guilt “is overwhelming” and in concluding that defendant has “failed to show
In Lane, we concluded, despite the defendant‘s contentions that the requested postconviction DNA testing was material to his defense, that the overwhelming evidence of defendant‘s guilt presented at trial and the dearth of evidence at trial pointing to a second perpetrator, along with the unlikely prospect that DNA testing of the biological evidence at issue would establish that a third party was involved in the crimes charged, together created an insurmountable hurdle to the success of the defendant‘s materiality argument. 370 N.C. at 520, 809 S.E.2d at 576. We adopt this analysis, as we find it to be directly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case in determining defendant‘s failure to satisfy the reduced burden of proof to qualify for the appointment of counsel to assist defendant‘s efforts to obtain postconviction DNA testing upon a showing that the DNA testing may be material to defendant‘s claim of wrongful conviction. Defendant here fails to meet the required condition of
V. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the order of the trial court.
REVERSED.
Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.