State v. Bruno Gibson (072257), 219 N.J. 227

Background

At a municipal suppression hearing, Officer Mueller testified he smelled alcohol, the defendant performed poorly on two field sobriety tests, and resisted arrest; video of the stop was reviewed.
The municipal court denied the suppression motion, then — without obtaining counsel's express consent to incorporate the motion record or asking if defense wanted further cross-examination — proceeded to accept closing arguments and convicted Gibson of DUI and failure to signal based solely on the suppression hearing evidence.
Defense counsel did not object at trial and argued on the merits relying on the suppression hearing record; the municipal court later formally admitted the videotape.
On de novo review, the Law Division upheld the conviction, finding the observational evidence (officer testimony and video) sufficient and noting defense counsel had not objected or sought further examination.
The Appellate Division reversed and entered an acquittal, holding a trial may not rely on suppression-hearing evidence without defendant’s consent because suppression hearings and trials serve different functions and standards.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and reversed the Appellate Division: it held the better practice is separate proceedings, that incorporation of the motion record requires counsel’s stipulation and broad cross-examination, and that the appropriate remedy for improper incorporation is remand for a new trial (not acquittal).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether testimony/exhibits from a suppression hearing may be used as the trial record without consent	State: incorporation is permissible where evidence was before the court and prosecutor intended to rely on the officer’s observations; remedy should be new trial if error	Gibson: suppression and trial are distinct; incorporation without notice deprived him of confrontation rights and required exclusion/acquittal	Court: Best practice is separate proceedings; incorporation allowed only if both counsel stipulate and defense given wide cross-examination; here no stipulation, so error occurred
Appropriate remedy when suppression-hearing evidence was improperly used to convict	State: remedy is reversal and remand for new trial; double jeopardy does not bar retrial for trial error	Gibson: exclusion of the suppression-hearing evidence would leave insufficient proof and thus require acquittal	Court: Remedy is reversal and remand for a new trial (procedural error remediable by retrial), not an acquittal
Whether error implicated confrontation/due process and was structural (barred retrial)	State: confrontation right was not so impaired as to preclude retrial; prosecutor could have called officer at trial	Gibson: incorporation deprived him of full cross-examination and violated due process/confrontation	Court: Error implicated confrontation but was not structural that precludes retrial; prejudice was assessable, so new trial appropriate
Effect of lack of objection below on remedy	State: defendant’s failure to object and argument on incorporated record weighs against extraordinary relief	Gibson: absence of contemporaneous objection does not waive right to proper procedure/relief	Court: Failure to object is relevant but does not cure the procedural error; remedy remains new trial rather than acquittal

Key Cases Cited

State v. Allan, 283 N.J. Super. 622 (Law Div. 1995) (advises best practice of separate suppression and trial proceedings; allows incorporation only with counsel consent and broad cross-examination)
Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988) (permits retrial where conviction reversed for trial error from erroneously admitted evidence)
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (reversal for insufficiency bars retrial; distinguishes insufficiency from trial error)
State v. Koedatich, 118 N.J. 513 (1990) (insufficiency reversal prohibits retrial under double jeopardy)
State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440 (2008) (reversal and remand for new trial appropriate when error deprived defendant of a fair trial)