State v. Acosta, 164 A.3d 672

In 2009 A (age 12) was sexually assaulted by her uncle, Roberto Acosta; she later disclosed the assault in 2012 and Acosta was charged with first‑degree sexual assault and two counts of risk of injury to a child.
The state sought to admit prior uncharged sexual misconduct: incidents involving family members occurring in 1990, 1997, and 2006; defendant did not object to the 2006 evidence but objected to 1990 and 1997 evidence.
The 1997 proffer: Acosta blindfolded his nine‑year‑old niece J, placed her hand on his penis, J pulled away and ran to report it; the trial court admitted J’s testimony as relevant and its probative value outweighed prejudice.
Trial jury convicted Acosta; he appealed arguing the 1997 incident was too remote (12 years) and insufficiently similar under State v. DeJesus to be admissible.
The Appellate Court affirmed; the Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification limited to the remoteness question and affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of 1997 uncharged sexual misconduct under DeJesus	Evidence was relevant to show common plan, pattern, and bolster victim credibility; probative value outweighs prejudice	1997 incident is too remote (12 years) and not sufficiently similar to charged 2009 conduct	Admitted: not too remote when viewed with other evidence (2006 incident) and sufficiently similar in conduct and victim characteristics
Remoteness standard under DeJesus	No bright‑line; trial court should weigh remoteness with similarity and victim factors	Argues 12 years exceeds acceptable temporal limit and thus should be excluded	No bright‑line rule; temporal gap assessed with other factors; 12‑year gap acceptable here due to sequence (1997→2006→2009)
Similarity of conduct (charged vs. uncharged)	Prior acts showing hand placed on penis support inference of pattern/propensity	Differences in escalation (contact vs. intercourse) and manner (trick vs. grooming) undermine similarity	Similarity satisfied: both involved placing victim’s hand on penis and jury could infer escalation stopped in 1997 because victim rebuffed defendant
Victim similarity and access	Familial relationship and prepubescent age support similarity and opportunity	Differences irrelevant; similarities matter more than identity	Victims sufficiently similar: both prepubescent nieces, giving defendant access; supports admissibility

State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418 (2008) (establishes relevancy factors for admitting prior uncharged sexual misconduct: not too remote, similar conduct, similar victims; probative value must outweigh prejudice)
State v. Romero, 269 Conn. 481 (2004) (applies three‑factor test for prior sexual misconduct evidence)
State v. Jacobson, 283 Conn. 618 (2007) (remoteness is not determinative; similarity can offset temporal gaps)
State v. McKenzie‑Adams, 281 Conn. 486 (2007) (differences in severity do not preclude admissibility when a prior victim rebuffed defendant)
State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166 (1984) (earlier articulation of admissibility where prior offenses show common design or plan)
State v. Snelgrove, 288 Conn. 742 (2008) (long temporal gaps ordinarily problematic but may be excused by intervening incarceration or other factors)
State v. George A., 308 Conn. 274 (2013) (victim and conduct need only be similar, not identical)