406 F.Supp.3d 940
D. Or.2019Background
- The DOJ’s Byrne JAG formula grant program awards states/localities funds for criminal-justice purposes; awards are statutorily apportioned and the Attorney General has limited, enumerated authority to adjust or withhold small percentages in specific circumstances.
- Beginning in FY2017–2018 the Attorney General attached immigration-related conditions to Byrne JAG awards: Notice (advance notice of release to DHS), Access (DHS access to detention facilities/meet detainees), Compliance (certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. §1373 and §1644), and a broad Disclosure restriction. Grantees must agree before drawing funds.
- Oregon and the City of Portland receive formula Byrne JAG shares and declined to accept funds subject to those conditions because of Oregon law (Or. Rev. Stat. §181A.820 and related policies) forbidding local enforcement/assistance with federal immigration enforcement. DOJ delayed or conditioned awards.
- Plaintiffs sued seeking declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief, arguing DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the Notice/Access/Disclosure conditions, §§1373/1644 are facially unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment (anti-commandeering), and therefore the Compliance condition based on those statutes is invalid.
- The court found Plaintiffs had Article III standing and ripeness (financial injury and sovereign interests), denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, and granted summary judgment in part for Plaintiffs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiffs' Argument | Defendants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing / Ripeness | Oregon/Portland suffer concrete budgetary and sovereign injuries from withheld/delayed Byrne funds and coercive conditions, so claims are ripe and justiciable. | Injuries are speculative until funds are actually clawed back or conditions enforced; some relief sought is overbroad for future, hypothetical conditions. | Plaintiffs have standing and claims are ripe as to existing FY2017–2018 conditions and funds; lack standing for injunctions against unspecified future conditions. |
| Statutory authority to impose Notice & Access conditions | DOJ lacks an express delegation in Byrne statutes to impose such sweeping immigration-related conditions on formula grants. | DOJ may rely on 34 U.S.C. §§10153(a)(4)-(5) (reporting/coordination) or §10102(a)(6) (duties/functions) to condition awards. | DOJ lacks delegated authority; Byrne statute’s text, structure, and limited reallocation/penalty clauses show Congress did not grant that power. |
| Statutory authority to impose Disclosure condition | Similar to above: unconstitutional or unauthorized conditioning; exceeds any ministerial/liaison authority. | DOJ points to §10102(a)(2) (maintain liaison) and (a)(6) to support authority. | Disclosure condition also unauthorized; §10102’s text and context do not support a broad, punitive condition. |
| Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. §§1373 & 1644 (Tenth Amendment) and Compliance condition | §§1373/1644 commandeer state policymaking by forbidding state/local restrictions on information-sharing; thus facially invalid and cannot underpin a funding condition. | The statutes are valid preemption/information-sharing measures that do not commandeer states; voluntary spending cannot be used to evade federal goals. | §§1373 and 1644 violate the anti-commandeering principle and the Tenth Amendment as applied to states/localities; the Compliance condition fails because it rests on unconstitutional laws. |
| Remedies (injunctive relief / mandamus) | Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, a permanent injunction directed at DOJ and relief ordering disbursement of funds (mandamus). | DOJ contends nationwide relief is inappropriate and mandamus is improper because some discretion exists and injunction suffices. | Court grants declaratory relief re: FY2017–2018 conditions, issues a permanent injunction limited to plaintiffs and their political subdivisions (not nationwide), and grants a writ of mandamus requiring disbursement of FY2017 and FY2018 Byrne JAG funds without the challenged conditions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (agency deference framework)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requirements)
- Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (anti-commandeering and limits on federal direction of states)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (anti-commandeering principles / information-sharing discussion)
- City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir.) (similar challenge to executive conditions on Byrne grants)
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir.) (holding DOJ lacked authority to impose notice/access conditions)
- City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General of the United States, 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir.) (analysis rejecting DOJ’s claimed delegations)
- United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (Tenth Amendment/limits on federal power)
- Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (clear statement rule for significant delegations)
- Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (Spending Clause/limits on conditional spending)