State of Missouri v. Pierre Clay
481 S.W.3d 531
Mo.2016Background
- Pierre Clay was stopped for a traffic violation, found with a revolver, and arrested when police discovered a prior felony conviction (a nonviolent unlawful-use-of-a-weapon conviction).
- Clay was charged under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.070.1 (prohibiting firearm possession by persons previously convicted of a felony) and moved to dismiss, arguing Article I, § 23 (as amended by Amendment 5, Aug. 2014) barred criminalizing firearm possession by nonviolent felons.
- The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the firearm count; the State appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court (exclusive jurisdiction because a state statute s validity was challenged).
- The Missouri Supreme Court reversed: Amendment 5 did not bar the legislature from regulating firearm possession by nonviolent felons; § 571.070.1 survives constitutional scrutiny.
- The court reasoned Amendment 5 (1) was declarative of existing law, (2) explicitly permits laws limiting rights of convicted violent felons and those adjudicated dangerous by reason of mental disorder, and (3) is silent as to nonviolent felons, so the legislature retains authority to regulate them subject to strict scrutiny.
- Justice Teitelman dissented, arguing the categorical, permanent ban on nonviolent felons is not narrowly tailored: the State s evidence was insufficient, the scope of nonviolent felonies is broad and expanding, and comparable precedents relied on different, narrower statutory schemes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Amendment 5 to Mo. Const. art. I, § 23 prohibits the legislature from criminalizing firearm possession by nonviolent felons | Clay: Amendment 5 s explicit authorization for laws limiting rights of convicted violent felons implies nonviolent felons are excluded from legislative regulation | State: Amendment 5 is silent as to nonviolent felons; it declared existing law and set strict-scrutiny standard but did not prohibit regulation of nonviolent felons | Court: Amendment 5 did not substantially change § 23 or bar regulation of nonviolent felons; legislature may regulate them subject to constitutional scrutiny |
| Whether § 571.070.1 (ban on firearm possession by persons previously convicted of a felony) violates Article I, § 23 when applied to nonviolent felons | Clay: The statute permanently strips nonviolent felons of a fundamental right and is not narrowly tailored to serve public safety | State: The statute furthers a compelling interest in public safety; prior decisions applying strict scrutiny (Merritt, McCoy) held § 571.070.1 is narrowly tailored and constitutional | Court: § 571.070.1 is constitutional as applied to nonviolent felons; it survives strict scrutiny per prior decisions |
| Whether Amendment 5 changed the level or character of judicial review applicable to firearm regulations | Clay: Addition of terms like "unalienable" and explicit strict-scrutiny language requires a more "robust" review that invalidates § 571.070.1 | State: Amendment 5 codified existing strict-scrutiny analysis applied by this Court; it did not alter substance of review or preclude regulation | Court: Amendment 5 declared the existing strict-scrutiny standard but did not alter its application or invalidate prior holdings that § 571.070.1 passes strict scrutiny |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808 (Mo. banc 2015) (applied strict scrutiny and held § 571.070.1 narrowly tailored to compelling public-safety interest)
- State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892 (Mo. banc 2015) (same conclusion as Merritt regarding § 571.070.1 under strict scrutiny)
- Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190 (Mo. banc 2015) (held Amendment 5 did not substantially change Article I, § 23 and was largely declarative)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognized individual right to bear arms and observed longstanding prohibitions on felons possession)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporated Second Amendment rights against the states)
- Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844 (Mo. banc 2004) (interpreted prior Article I, § 23 language regarding concealed weapons and legislative authority)
- Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (discussed context-sensitive application of strict scrutiny)
- Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (explained that strict scrutiny s application depends on context and is a framework for courts)
- State v. Eberhardt, 145 So.3d 377 (La. 2014) (upheld a time-limited firearms ban for certain dangerous felons; relied on history, consensus, and tailoring)