410 F.Supp.3d 39
D.D.C.2019Background:
- Wilton Rancheria applied in 2013 for BIA to take land into trust for a casino; initial proposal was a 282-acre Galt site but the Final EIS and Record of Decision (ROD) approved a 36-acre Elk Grove site in December 2016–January 2017.
- Stand Up for California! and Elk Grove residents sued to block the trust acquisition; earlier decision (Stand Up I, 298 F. Supp. 3d 136) resolved Counts I–II for defendants; Counts III–V remained (tribal recognition, IGRA/gaming status, NEPA/APA compliance).
- Wilton had been subject to termination under the 1958 California Rancheria Act but a 2009 stipulated judgment in federal court restored Wilton’s federal recognition; the Department listed Wilton as a recognized tribe thereafter.
- The Department relied on the Indian Reorganization Act (fee-to-trust), IGRA’s restored-lands exception (25 C.F.R. Part 292), and completed a Draft and Final EIS; it also conducted a title examination process regarding encumbrances.
- The court held plaintiffs have Article III standing generally but lack standing to challenge the Department’s internal title-examination process; it granted summary judgment to the Department and Wilton on Counts III–V and denied plaintiff summary judgment.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing (Article III) | Plaintiffs (Elk Grove residents/Stand Up) claim concrete injury from trust decision and environmental effects. | Defendants do not contest general standing to challenge trust decision but say plaintiffs lack standing to challenge title-examination/encumbrances. | Plaintiffs have Article III standing to sue over the trust acquisition; but they lack standing to challenge the Department’s title-examination process or encumbrances. |
| Count III — Federal recognition / effect of Rancheria Act (CRA) | CRA bars application of Indian statutes to Indians who received rancheria assets, so BIA lacked authority to acquire trust land for Wilton. | A 2009 stipulated judgment restored Wilton to its pre-CRA status; the List Act authorizes restoration and supersedes CRA where inconsistent. | Wilton is a federally recognized tribe; the stipulated judgment (and List Act) removed the CRA bar; grant defendants summary judgment on Count III. |
| Count IV — IGRA / encumbrances & "restored lands" exception | Encumbrances on Elk Grove render title unmarketable and the site does not qualify as "Indian lands" or as restored lands under IGRA. | Title-review addresses U.S. interest (marketable title); plaintiffs have no property interest in encumbrances; Elk Grove meets restored-lands criteria (location, historical and temporal connections). | Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge encumbrances; Elk Grove satisfies the IGRA restored-lands exception; grant defendants summary judgment on Count IV. |
| Count V — NEPA / APA (EIS sufficiency, supplement, predetermination, public participation) | EIS failed to adequately analyze water supply, public safety, and traffic impacts; a rushed ROD shows predetermination; public was deprived of information. | Draft and Final EIS addressed alternatives including Elk Grove; water, traffic, and other impacts were analyzed and mitigated; no significant new information required a supplemental EIS; timing alone does not prove bad faith; public notice was sufficient. | The Department took the requisite "hard look" under NEPA; no supplemental EIS required; timing did not show impermissible predetermination; public participation was adequate; grant defendants summary judgment on Count V. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stand Up for Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 298 F. Supp. 3d 136 (D.D.C. 2018) (prior decision resolving Counts I–II and framing remaining claims)
- Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (standing and review principles under Article III)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary and capricious standard under the APA)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency statutory interpretation deference)
- Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (deference to reasonable agency interpretations of their own rules)
- Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) (rule of reason for supplemental EIS requirement)
- Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (NEPA requires a "hard look," not a particular substantive outcome)
- Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (NEPA's informational role and scope)
- Amador County v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (standing and review in trust-acquisition/IGRA contexts)
- Upstate Citizens for Equal. v. United States, 841 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing injuries from land-into-trust decisions versus title-examination procedures)
- WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (courts should not "flyspeck" an agency EIS for minor deficiencies)
- Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (supplemental EIS review focuses on whether new information undermines informed decisionmaking)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (injury-in-fact requirement for standing)
- Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (later statutes control over earlier inconsistent statutes)
- Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, 572 U.S. 118 (2014) ("concrete and particularized" injury requirement for standing)