Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.
131 S. Ct. 2653
| SCOTUS | 2011Background
- Vermont Act 80 § 4631(d) prohibits sale, disclosure, or use of prescriber-identifiable information for marketing absent prescriber consent.
- Prescriber-identifying data are generated in prescription processing and sold to data miners who aid pharmaceutical marketing.
- Petitioners (pharmaceutical manufacturers and data miners) allege the statute violates First Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.
- District Court found data are effective marketing tools; Second Circuit held § 4631(d) violates First Amendment by burdening speech.
- The Court grants certiorari to resolve whether the statute is content- and speaker-based and whether it can survive heightened scrutiny.
- Majority upholds the statute, applying heightened scrutiny to content- and speaker-based regulation of speech in the commercial context.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 4631(d) is content- and speaker-based regulation | Respondents argue it burdens marketing speech and targets speakers (pharma/marketers). | Vermont contends it is a neutral regulatory measure with privacy/public-health aims. | Yes, it is content- and speaker-based and subjected to heightened scrutiny |
| Whether heightened scrutiny applies to commercial regulation | Respondents urge ordinary commercial-regulation scrutiny suffices; heightened scrutiny unnecessary. | Vermont argues heightened scrutiny is warranted due to targeted, viewpoint-based burdens on speech. | Heightened scrutiny applies to the content- and speaker-based burden |
| Whether § 4631(d) directly advances substantial government interests | Respondents say the law is not necessary to protect physician privacy or public health. | Vermont asserts privacy, cost containment, and unbiased information objectives are advanced by the law. | The statute directly advances substantial interests in privacy and public health |
| Whether the statute is narrowly tailored (fit) to those interests | Respondents claim the law is overbroad and targets disfavored speech without neutral justification. | Vermont argues there are no equally effective, more limited restrictions; narrow exceptions exist. | The statute is tailored to achieve interests with a sufficient fit under heightened scrutiny |
Key Cases Cited
- Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech protections; unbiased information importance)
- Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech; burden on truthful information)
- United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (test for government regulation of conduct signaling expressive content)
- R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (content-based regulation; strict scrutiny when targeting disfavored speech)
- Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (value of in-person solicitation; commercial speech context)
- Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (content-based and viewpoint considerations in regulation; scope of scrutiny)
