939 F.3d 457
2d Cir.2019Background
- John Derek James Junior Singh, a Guyanese-born lawful permanent resident (admitted 1994), pled guilty in 2003 to second-degree assault under NYPL § 120.05(2) and was sentenced to one year; he had a prior 2000 youthful-offender adjudication for attempted robbery and was on probation when the assault occurred.
- In 2013 Singh was placed in removal proceedings as removable for committing an aggravated felony (a crime of violence); he conceded removability before the IJ and sought withholding of removal and CAT relief.
- The IJ relied on the police report (describing a machete slash), Singh’s guilty plea, and the PSR to find the offense a "particularly serious crime," deny withholding, and make an adverse credibility finding as to a proffered country-conditions witness; the IJ also denied CAT deferral on the merits.
- The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decisions, agreeing the conviction was a particularly serious crime and upholding the adverse credibility determination and denial of CAT deferral.
- Singh petitioned for review arguing (1) after Sessions v. Dimaya his NYPL § 120.05(2) conviction no longer qualifies as an aggravated-felony crime of violence, (2) the particularly-serious-crime determination and use of the PSR/police report violated due process, and (3) the factual findings denying withholding and CAT relief were erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NYPL § 120.05(2) is a "crime of violence" after Dimaya | Singh: Dimaya invalidated §16(b); §16(a) doesn't encompass §120.05(2) so conviction is not a crime of violence | Govt: §120.05(2) requires use of physical force (deadly weapon/dangerous instrument) and falls within §16(a) | Held: §120.05(2) is a crime of violence under §16(a); conviction remains an aggravated felony and Singh is removable |
| Whether the assault is a "particularly serious crime" and admissibility/use of PSR and police report | Singh: PSR was irrelevant and admission violated due process; police report was inadmissible hearsay; IJ improperly relied on contested facts | Govt: PSR only used to confirm probation status; police report was probative and Singh failed to preserve specific evidentiary challenges below | Held: BIA/IJ did not violate due process; any PSR error harmless; Singh failed to preserve attack on police report; crime is particularly serious |
| Denial of CAT deferral and withholding — factual findings and credibility | Singh: IJ erred in adverse credibility finding for witness Alli and showed insufficient consideration of country conditions to deny CAT/withholding | Govt: findings were factual and discretionary and thus not reviewable here; evidence insufficient to meet CAT/withholding standards | Held: Court lacked jurisdiction to review these essentially factual determinations; denial of CAT deferral and withholding affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (struck down §16(b) residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("violent force" requires force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (elements‑clause analysis and ordinary meaning of "crime of violence")
- Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2019) (modified categorical approach and §16(a) analysis guidance)
- Morris v. Holder, 676 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2012) (earlier holding that NYPL §120.05(2) fell within §16(b))
- United States v. Walker, 442 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2006) (NYPL §120.05(2) is a violent felony under ACCA/§924(e) elements clause)
- Ramos v. United States, 892 F.3d 599 (3d Cir. 2018) (analogous assault statute analysis; discussion of omissions and violent‑force requirement)
- Villanueva v. United States, 893 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2018) (physical‑force inquiry focuses on impact of weapon/substance on victim)
- Ortiz‑Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2015) (jurisdiction limited to constitutional claims and questions of law when removability conceded)
- Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 2006) (factual credibility and discretionary findings are generally unreviewable)
