Simpson, Mark Twain, PD-0599-15

Mark Twain Simpson pleaded guilty to robbery (second-degree offense) with a prior aggravated-robbery enhancement, elevating the punishment range to first-degree (5–99 years or life).
At sentencing the court heard testimony from Simpson and family about his limited role in the instant offense, his parole/probation history, employment, health of his parents, and alleged drug problems.
The trial court sentenced Simpson to 25 years’ confinement and Simpson filed a motion for new trial alleging the sentence was grossly disproportionate.
At the new-trial hearing the trial court granted a new trial as to punishment (but denied withdrawal of the guilty plea); the State appealed.
The Dallas Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order and reinstated the judgment; the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review on whether Simpson produced evidence in the record to substantiate his disproportionality claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Simpson produced evidence or pointed to trial-record evidence substantiating that his 25-year sentence was grossly disproportionate	Simpson argued the sentence was grossly disproportionate given his limited role in the robbery, comparably lenient treatment of a codefendant, and mitigating facts (family support, work, drug treatment needs)	State argued Simpson failed to point to record evidence showing the first punishment was "seriously flawed" or that the sentence was grossly disproportionate; Simpson’s lengthy violent-felony history and the sentence being within statutory range rebut the claim	The court held Simpson did not produce or point to sufficient trial-record evidence to substantiate a gross-disproportionality claim; the trial court abused its discretion in granting the new trial and the appellate judgment reinstating the sentence was correct

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (gross-disproportionality inquiry must account for recidivist history)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (Eighth Amendment prohibits only extreme, grossly disproportionate sentences)
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (proportionality test does not require strict parity between crime and sentence)
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (successful proportionality challenges should be exceedingly rare)
McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313 (if no inference of gross disproportionality from threshold comparison, no further inter-jurisdictional analysis is required)
Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320 (Tex. Crim. App.) (punishments within statutory limits, including habitual enhancements, generally not cruel or unusual)
State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. Crim. App.) (standard of review for trial-court grant of new trial; must be shown proceedings were seriously flawed)
State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. Crim. App.) (defendant must articulate claim, point to record evidence, and show prejudice to substantial rights to support new trial in the interest of justice)
Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. Crim. App.) (Texas courts must follow U.S. Supreme Court guidance on Eighth Amendment proportionality)