Shtrauch v. Dowd
651 F. App'x 72
2d Cir.2016Background
- Plaintiff Moshe Shtrauch, pro se, sued New York state Justice Kevin Dowd under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on Dowd’s order removing Shtrauch from the courthouse.
- The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Dowd was entitled to judicial immunity; Shtrauch appealed.
- The contested act was Dowd’s removal of Shtrauch from a proceeding; Dowd had previously recused from Shtrauch’s underlying divorce case but presided over the motion at which the removal occurred.
- Shtrauch sought money damages and equitable relief (declaratory and injunctive); he also moved to supplement the record on appeal with a state-court transcript.
- The Second Circuit reviewed whether the removal was a judicial act and whether immunity and § 1983 principles bar the relief sought, and considered the motion to supplement the record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dowd is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for removing Shtrauch from the courtroom | Dowd’s recusal from the underlying divorce case means his removal order was nonjudicial and not immune | Removal was a judicial act—typical function performed in relation to a case—so absolute immunity applies | Held: Removal was a judicial act; Dowd entitled to absolute judicial immunity |
| Effect of prior recusal on judicial-capacity analysis | Recusal meant Dowd acted outside judicial capacity when ordering removal | Recusal does not change the functional nature of a courtroom-removal decision made during proceedings on a recusal motion | Held: Recusal did not negate judicial nature of the removal |
| Availability of declaratory or injunctive relief under § 1983 | Sought declaratory/injunctive relief to remedy the removal | Judicial officers are immune from money damages for judicial acts; injunctive relief barred absent violation of a declaratory decree or unavailability of declaratory relief | Held: No declaratory decree was violated and Shtrauch alleged only past conduct; injunctive/declaratory relief not available |
| Motion to supplement the appellate record with a state-court transcript | Transcript should be included and considered | Transcript is not in district-court record so ordinarily not considered on appeal | Held: Grant motion to supplement because transcript undisputed, does not affect merits, and was reviewed for the motion |
Key Cases Cited
- Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2009) (judges generally have absolute immunity for judicial actions)
- Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (judicial immunity does not cover nonjudicial actions)
- Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (functional approach to determine judicial acts)
- Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (factors for whether act is judicial; immunity protects wrongful exercises of judicial function)
- Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (judicial immunity does not bar prospective injunctive or declaratory relief in some circumstances)
- Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2005) (state law informs whether judge acted in judicial capacity)
- Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999) (injunctive relief under § 1983 requires violation of a declaratory decree or unavailability of declaratory relief)
- Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 1996) (declaratory/injunctive relief must be prospective, not only remedial for past conduct)