Sempey v. Stamford Hospital, 194 Conn.App. 505

Sempey, an at-will employee of Stamford Hospital, sued after her termination, originally alleging wrongful discharge (implied contract), negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and CUTPA violations.
The trial court struck the original complaint; Sempey filed substitute pleadings (including a retaliation/race claim), and the court struck or dismissed various iterations over time.
On appeal this court affirmed dismissal of the discrimination claim as untimely but reversed as to the NIED and CUTPA counts to allow repleading; the case was remanded for that limited purpose.
On remand Sempey filed a new substitute complaint adding four counts (implied-contract wrongful discharge, defamation, NIED, CUTPA); the hospital moved to strike all counts (arguing procedural defects and substantive insufficiency, and asserting absolute privilege for statements made in unemployment proceedings).
Sempey’s factual allegations relied principally on (1) statements the hospital made when contesting her unemployment benefits and (2) the hospital’s alleged withholding of three personal folders containing certificates and records at discharge.
The trial court struck all four counts with prejudice and entered judgment for the defendant; Sempey appealed and the appellate court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Wrongful discharge (implied contract / public policy)	Employee manual created an implied contract and discharge violated public policy	Sempey was at-will; no manual language created contract; no public policy identified	Struck — complaint lacked facts to establish an implied contract or identify a public policy; prior abandonment/repleading rules also bar revival
Defamation	Hospital made false statements contesting her unemployment claim	Statements to the Employment Security Division are absolutely privileged; plaintiff improperly added a new cause post-remand	Struck — procedurally improper addition after remand and substantively barred by absolute privilege for quasi-judicial unemployment proceedings
Negligent infliction of emotional distress	Withholding personal folders and false unemployment allegations caused NIED	Unemployment statements privileged; withholding folders not patently unreasonable or shown to contain irreplaceable items	Struck — privileged statements excised; remaining allegation (withheld folders) insufficient as a matter of law to show conduct beyond socially tolerable bounds
CUTPA	False/deceptive acts intentionally deprived her of benefits	Employer–employee disputes do not involve trade or commerce; alleged post-termination statements are privileged	Struck — no conduct in trade or commerce alleged and privileged statements cannot support CUTPA claim

Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 (Conn. 1986) (statements made in unemployment compensation proceedings are absolutely privileged because the Employment Security Division acts in a quasi-judicial capacity)
Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66 (Conn. 1997) (NIED in employment arises only from termination process conduct that is patently unreasonable)
Lund v. Milford Hospital, Inc., 326 Conn. 846 (Conn. 2017) (filing an amended/substitute pleading waives the right to appeal earlier rulings; repleading cannot add new causes without permission)
Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 303 Conn. 205 (Conn. 2011) (motion to strike is proper where the complaint alleges only legal conclusions unsupported by facts)
Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., 277 Conn. 113 (Conn. 2006) (standard of review for motion to strike; court construes pleadings in the plaintiff’s favor)
Quimby v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 28 Conn. App. 660 (Conn. App. 1992) (employer–employee disputes generally do not fall within CUTPA’s definition of trade or commerce)
Montinieri v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 175 Conn. 337 (Conn. 1978) (elements for negligent infliction of emotional distress require breach of duty creating unreasonable risk of emotional harm)
Stone v. Pattis, 144 Conn. App. 79 (Conn. App. 2013) (repleading to add new causes after remand requires court permission under the practice rules)