896 N.W.2d 76
Mich. Ct. App.2016Background
- After a church dispute over being denied the role of lector, Sanford Lakin confronted Sister Barbara Rund; Rund told Monsignor Tocco that Lakin had “put a finger” in her chest and that she was afraid of him.
- Plaintiffs sued for defamation, alleging Rund’s statement imputed the criminal offense of battery and thus was defamatory per se (no special damages required).
- Trial court denied summary disposition as to the battery-based defamation-per-se claim, finding the statement could reasonably be read to allege an intentional, offensive touching (battery).
- Defendants sought interlocutory review; the Michigan Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for plenary consideration of (1) whether a false statement imputing battery is actionable per se and (2) whether Rund’s statement in fact imputed battery.
- The Court of Appeals (per curiam) held the statement did impute battery but, as a matter of law, a false accusation of simple battery is not defamation per se because battery is not a crime involving moral turpitude nor punishable by an "infamous punishment."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rund’s statement imputed the criminal offense of battery | Rund said Lakin "put a finger" in her chest — this alleges an intentional, offensive touching (battery) | The remark was mere gesturing, not an assertion of an intentional offensive touching | Held: Yes — viewing pleadings in plaintiffs’ favor, the statement reasonably imputed battery |
| Whether a false allegation of battery is actionable as defamation per se | All accusations of criminal activity (including battery) are defamatory per se and therefore actionable without special damages | Defamation per se is limited by common-law rules (crime must involve moral turpitude or infamous punishment); battery does not meet either criterion | Held: No — battery is not moral turpitude and is punishable only by misdemeanor (not an "infamous punishment"), so false accusation of battery is not defamation per se |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Stolberg, 231 Mich. App. 256 (motions under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tested on pleadings)
- Burden v. Elias Bros. Big Boy Restaurants, 240 Mich. App. 723 (words charging commission of a crime characterized as defamation per se in prior appellate decisions)
- Mains v. Whiting, 87 Mich. 172 (identifying categories of slander actionable without special damages)
- People v. Reeves, 458 Mich. 236 (definition of battery)
- People v. Cameron, 291 Mich. App. 599 (battery need not cause injury; includes assault as consummation)
- People v. Starks, 473 Mich. 227 (attempted battery establishes assault)
- People v. Terry, 217 Mich. App. 660 (intent may be proven circumstantially)
- Attorney Gen. ex rel. O'Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504 ("infamous crime" means punishable by state prison)
- People v. Renno, 392 Mich. 45 (discussion of "infamous" in witness-impeachment and common-law contexts)
- Mitan v. Campbell, 474 Mich. 21 (elements of defamation action)
- Kevorkian v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 237 Mich. App. 1 (not all accusations of criminal activity are automatically defamatory)