Sacora v. Thomas
628 F.3d 1059
9th Cir.2010Background
- Petitioners challenge BOP community corrections center (RRC) placement policies under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b) and 3624(c) and APA.
- SCA amended § 3624(c) to allow up to 12 months of pre-release RRC placement; previously not to exceed six months.
- BOP issued April 14 Memorandum and later interim final regulations (Oct. 21, 2008) changing how placements are reviewed and implemented.
- BOP also issued November 14 Memorandum guiding consideration of RRC transfers earlier in sentences and requiring individualized consideration.
- District court certified a class for inmates harmed by § 3624(c) and April 14 Memorandum; enjoined use of the challenged regulations; petitioners appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether BOP policies comply with § 3624(c) and § 3621(b). | Sacora argues six-month rule ignores up to 12 months and misreads statute. | Sacora contends BOP may designate up to 12 months per statute and must consider individually. | Policies are reasonable constructions of the statutes. |
| Whether memorandum-based policies are binding substantive rules requiring notice-and-comment. | Policies are binding regulations; require APA notice-and-comment. | Policies are general statements of policy; not substantive rules; not subject to § 553. | Memoranda are not substantive rules; not subject to notice-and-comment. |
| Whether the APA arbitrary-and-capricious standard supports invalidating the policies. | BOP failed to provide empirical support; relied on experience; inadequate rationale. | Agency could rely on experience; reasonably supported by statute and agency expertise. | Policies are not arbitrary or capricious; supported by experience and statutory framework. |
| Whether the November 14 Memorandum violates Rodriguez v. Smith by failing to consider mandatory § 3621(b) factors. | November memorandum imposes unjustified presumptions and restricts discretion. | Memorandum preserves individualized consideration and cites mandatory § 3621(b) factors. | Memorandum does not violate Rodriguez; individualized consideration retained. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (distinguishes when deference applies to agency interpretations)
- Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (Skidmore deference based on persuasiveness of agency reasoning)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (persuasive power of agency judgments depends on factors)
- Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishes interpretive guidance from substantive rules)
- Colwell v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 558 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2009) (general statement of policy vs substantive rule analysis)
- Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2008) (mandatory factors in § 3621(b) must be considered)
- Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008) (APA arbitrary-and-capricious standard guidance)
- Crickon v. Thomas, 579 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2009) (arbitrary-and-capricious standard applied)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (agency choices must be rationally related to evidence)
- Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (Skidmore analysis factors and deference considerations)