S.H. v. District of Columbia, 270 F. Supp. 3d 260

Background

Police stopped Mordsen Box for an alleged obstructed plate, found ~5 oz marijuana, paraphernalia, and cash; Box arrested. Officer Taylor Volpe applied for a warrant to search 1054 Quebec Place (where Box’s suspended D.C. license listed an address). Warrant issued and executed 13 days later at night.
The Quebec Place occupants (Harrison and her children) told officers Box did not live there; Plaintiffs allege Volpe omitted those statements from his affidavit and misrepresented or overstated his "training and experience." The search recovered no evidence.
During the raid ~20 armed officers entered at ~10:00 p.m.; officers allegedly burst in without announcing, pointed guns at a 19-year-old and at an 11-year-old naked in the shower, handcuffed the 19-year-old ~30 minutes, and ransacked the home.
Plaintiffs asserted multiple claims: warrant lacked probable cause; affidavit contained false statements/omissions (Franks); warrant was overbroad/lacked particularity; car stop was unlawful and tainted the warrant; excessive force/knock-and-announce violations; nighttime search unlawful; and Monell failures to train/ supervise.
Defendants moved to dismiss, primarily arguing qualified immunity for officers, failure to state Monell/negligence claims, and that challenged factual omissions were immaterial. Court addressed the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6) and qualified-immunity standards.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Whether Volpe’s affidavit contained knowingly or recklessly false statements or material omissions (Franks)	Volpe knowingly misrepresented Box’s statement that he lived at Quebec Place, misstated a utility listing, and omitted that occupants told officers Box didn’t live there and that MPD “training/experience” warrants rarely find records/drugs.	Defendants largely failed to rebut plausibility at motion stage; argued omissions/statements immaterial.	Court denied dismissal of Franks claim (Count Two): accepted Plaintiffs’ allegations as plausible and held many contested averments must be excised or added for the hypothetical affidavit—claim survives against Volpe.
2. Whether the affidavit was so facially deficient that no reasonable officer could rely on it (Leon)	The affidavit relied on generalized training/experience and listed many possible locations (homes of friends, stash houses), undermining nexus to this particular residence; thus facially lacked probable cause.	Defendants argued D.C. Circuit precedent supports inferring nexus from drug-distribution observations and reliance on magistrate; execution officers reasonably relied on the warrant.	Court granted dismissal of Count One as to executing officers (qualified immunity) but denied dismissal as to Volpe (who prepared the affidavit). Court found probable cause to search for drugs more defensible than to seize non-contraband records; overall facial challenge survives as to affiant but not as to other officers.
3. Whether the warrant was so overbroad or lacked particularity that officers could not reasonably rely on it	Warrant authorized seizure of broad categories of innocuous records and items without a sufficient nexus to the home.	Defendants did not meaningfully contest particularity at motion stage.	Court denied dismissal of Count Three—particularity challenge proceeds.
4. Whether Plaintiffs can challenge the warrant based on evidence derived from an allegedly unlawful stop of Box	Plaintiffs argue the warrant relied on information obtained in an unlawful stop and thus the warrant was invalid.	Defendants argued Plaintiffs lack standing to attack third-party (Box’s) stop.	Court granted dismissal of Count Four: Plaintiffs cannot vicariously assert Box’s Fourth Amendment claim; exclusionary-rule theory does not permit unrelated third-party challenge.
5. Whether execution of the search violated knock-and-announce and excessive-force principles	Plaintiffs allege no knock/announce, forcible entry, pointing guns at a child in shower and at an unarmed 19-year-old, and prolonged handcuffing.	Defendants relied principally on Summers (authority to detain occupants during warrant searches) and argued force was permitted to secure the scene.	Court denied dismissal of knock-and-announce claim and excessive-force claim (Count Six). It held Summers does not authorize all force; Graham balancing applies to handcuffs and firearms. Dismissal denied as to handcuffing and pointing guns; factual inquiry required.
6. Whether nighttime search claim (negligence per se/statutory) survives	Plaintiffs allege nighttime execution lacked adequate justification under the Fourth Amendment and D.C. law.	Defendants invoked federal criminal statute preemption (21 U.S.C. § 879) and challenged pleading; also contended Plaintiffs failed to state statutory basis.	Court dismissed statutory negligence per se claims under D.C. statutes but allowed the Fourth Amendment challenge to nighttime execution (Count Seven) to proceed.
7. Whether Monell failure-to-train/supervise claims survive	Plaintiffs allege MPD policy/practice of using boilerplate training/experience language and of conducting unjustified nighttime raids.	Defendants argued no underlying constitutional violations established, so Monell fails.	Court denied dismissal of Monell claims (Counts Five and Eight) because underlying constitutional claims survive at pleading stage.

Key Cases Cited

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (Affidavit deliberately or recklessly false requires excision and materiality test)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (Good-faith exception and exceptions where warrant so lacking in indicia of probable cause officers cannot reasonably rely)
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (Standard for objective reasonableness re: issuing warrants and qualified immunity)
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (Threshold for denying good-faith reliance on warrant; magistrate’s issuance not dispositive)
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (Assess warrant validity based on what the magistrate had before him)
United States v. Cardoza, 713 F.3d 656 (D.C. Cir.) (Probable cause that a person deals drugs can support finding that evidence will be in residence)
United States v. Spencer, 530 F.3d 1003 (D.C. Cir.) (Common experience that drug dealers often store evidence at homes supports nexus)
United States v. Thomas, 989 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir.) (Observations away from residence can support inference evidence will be at residence)
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (Authority to detain occupants during execution of search warrant)
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (Detention under Summers permissible; use of handcuffs must be reasonable under Graham)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (Use-of-force reasonableness test: objective balancing)
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (Knock-and-announce rule and remedies)
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (Fourth Amendment rights are personal; cannot assert third-party exclusionary claims)
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (Nexus requirement: probable cause that specific things will be found at the place searched)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (Totality-of-the-circumstances test for probable cause)