Rynearson v. Ferguson
355 F. Supp. 3d 964
| W.D. Wash. | 2019Background
- Plaintiff Mark Rynearson is an online political commentator who posted critical, sometimes harsh but non-threatening, anonymous and repeated communications about civic leaders related to indefinite-detention/NDAA issues.
- Bainbridge Island authorities referred a police report and a municipal court entered a civil stalking protection order against Rynearson based in part on Washington’s cyberstalking statute, RCW 9.61.260(1)(b).
- The Kitsap County Superior Court vacated that protection order, finding Rynearson’s speech constitutionally protected.
- Rynearson filed a federal suit seeking a declaration that RCW 9.61.260(1)(b) is facially overbroad under the First Amendment and a preliminary injunction preventing defendants from enforcing it against him.
- The state defendants argued lack of standing and defended the statute as cabined to unprotected categories (threats, obscenity); Rynearson argued the statute chills protected anonymous and repeated political speech.
- The district court concluded Rynearson had standing and granted the preliminary injunction, holding § 9.61.260(1)(b) facially unconstitutional as overbroad.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to bring First Amendment challenge | Rynearson alleges self-censorship and a well-founded fear of prosecution from § 9.61.260(1)(b) | Defendants contend the Superior Court dismissal moots or negates any concrete injury | Court: Plaintiff has standing because his intended speech arguably falls within the statute and he faces a credible threat of enforcement |
| Whether § 9.61.260(1)(b) is unconstitutionally overbroad | Statute criminalizes anonymous or repeated electronic communications intended to “harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass,” capturing protected political speech and thus chills speech | Defendants rely on cases differentiating protected speech from true threats/obscenity and urge the statute can be applied constitutionally in many instances | Court: § 9.61.260(1)(b) is facially unconstitutional because its plain terms reach a substantial amount of protected speech |
| Role of state-court precedents (Moriwaki, Stanley) | Rynearson emphasizes the Superior Court’s ruling that his speech was protected to show risk of chilling enforcement | Defendants point to Stanley and similar cases where statute survived challenge in contexts of true threats | Court: Distinguishes Stanley (true threats) and relies on Moriwaki and free-speech precedents to conclude the statute’s text sweeps too broadly |
| Whether preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate | Rynearson urges likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable chill, balance of equities and public interest favoring injunction | Defendants argue limits on federal relief and permissible state prosecutions of unprotected categories | Court: Grants narrowly tailored preliminary injunction for this plaintiff after finding likelihood of success and irreparable harm |
Key Cases Cited
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal courts should generally abstain from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury)
- United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (facial First Amendment overbreadth standards)
- Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (emotionally distressing speech on matters of public concern is entitled to special protection)
- McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (protecting anonymous political speech)
- Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (insulting or offensive public speech merits strong First Amendment protection)
- Rynearson v. Ferguson, 903 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2018) (appellate reversal and remand relevant to procedural posture)
- McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012) (limits of injunctive/declaratory relief against state enforcement; relief may be tailored to federal plaintiffs)