Robles v. Commissioner of Correction
153 A.3d 29
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Robles pleaded guilty under North Carolina v. Alford to first‑degree kidnapping, attempted first‑degree kidnapping, and fourth‑degree sexual assault for two December 2005 incidents; court accepted Alford pleas and sentenced him to 15 years (execution suspended after time served) plus probation.
- After Robles’s conviction, the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Salamon narrowed the intent element of kidnapping, holding that movement or confinement incidental to another crime is not kidnapping unless it exceeds what is necessary to commit that other crime.
- Robles filed a habeas petition (operative amended petition) arguing his kidnapping convictions were unconstitutional under Salamon and that Salamon should be applied retroactively (relying on Luurtsema). He also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in a separate count.
- At the habeas trial only Robles and his trial counsel Meredith testified; Robles’s pleadings and trial testimony focused on insufficiency of the factual basis for kidnapping under Salamon and on counsel’s advice, but he did not expressly present a due process claim that his Alford pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because of Salamon.
- The habeas court rejected procedural default, applied an ‘‘actual innocence’’ standard (asking whether a reasonable properly instructed juror could have convicted under Salamon), found at least one juror could have convicted, and denied relief; Robles appealed asserting his pleas were not knowing, intelligent and voluntary post‑Salamon.
Issues
| Issue | Robles’s Argument | Commissioner’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Robles’s Alford pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because Salamon narrowed kidnapping intent | Robles: Salamon eliminates a factual basis for kidnapping here; his pleas were involuntary and violated due process | Commissioner: Challenges to sufficiency or guilt are waived by guilty plea; habeas court properly rejected actual innocence | Not reviewed on appeal — claim was not distinctly raised or decided below, so appellate court declined to address the merits and affirmed habeas denial |
| Whether Salamon (and Luurtsema retroactivity) entitles Robles to collateral relief from kidnapping convictions | Robles: Salamon and Luurtsema warrant retroactive application and vacatur of kidnapping convictions | Commissioner: To extent claim challenges sufficiency, it is waived; alternatively, habeas court’s actual innocence analysis controls | Court did not reach merits because specific due process plea‑voluntariness claim was not pled or litigated before habeas court |
| Whether a habeas petitioner who pleaded guilty can mount an ‘‘actual innocence’’ claim after a statutory reinterpretation | Robles: Implied argument that Salamon creates actual innocence; his convictions cannot stand | Commissioner: Plea waived many challenges; actual innocence is a heavy burden and was not argued below | Court noted actual innocence standard exists but declined to resolve Robles’s due process claim because it was not presented below |
| Whether the habeas petition’s pleadings were sufficiently specific to alert the habeas court to a plea‑voluntariness due process claim | Robles: Operative petition alleged constitutional invalidity of kidnapping convictions post‑Salamon | Commissioner: Petition was broad; sufficiency/waiver arguments apply | Court: Petition was too ambiguous—no distinct allegation that pleas were involuntary under Salamon—so appellate review is barred |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 (Conn. 2008) (narrowed kidnapping intent: movement incidental to another crime is not kidnapping unless it exceeds what is necessary)
- Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 740 (Conn. 2011) (discussed retroactivity of Salamon; not per se full retroactivity in all contexts)
- Paulsen v. Manson, 203 Conn. 484 (Conn. 1987) (guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary or it violates due process)
- State v. Niblack, 220 Conn. 270 (Conn. 1991) (trial court not constitutionally required to establish factual basis for guilty plea unless judge is put on notice)
- Ghant v. Commissioner of Correction, 255 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2000) (Alford pleas and factual‑basis principles)
- Baillargeon v. Commissioner of Correction, 67 Conn. App. 716 (Conn. App. 2002) (trial court may, in its discretion, require factual basis for Alford or nolo pleas)
- State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 134 (Conn. 2005) (defendant waives several constitutional rights by pleading guilty)