Robert Michael Arteaga, Jr. v. State
2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10828
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- Defendant Robert Michael Arteaga was tried jointly on 23 counts of sexual assault of a child (victim was his biological daughter) and 17 counts of possession of child pornography; convictions on all counts; sentences run consecutively.
- The sexual-assault counts were charged under Tex. Penal Code § 22.011(f) as first-degree felonies alleging the victim was a person the defendant was “prohibited from marrying.”
- The jury charge included a special issue asking whether Arteaga was “prohibited from marrying” the victim, and the abstract portion of the charge incorporated the Texas Family Code consanguinity (void marriage) definition rather than the bigamy statute language from Penal Code § 25.01; Arteaga did not object to that charge language.
- Trial evidence included extensive testimony from the victim, a SANE nurse, a forensic interviewer, and the defendant’s girlfriend; the defendant testified and denied the allegations and said he did not view the photos as child pornography.
- Arteaga challenged (1) the jury charge for using the Family Code consanguinity definition instead of bigamy language and (2) a trial ruling restricting argument that the jury should consider the defendant’s subjective view of whether photos were “lewd.” The court affirmed on both issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Arteaga) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether including the Family Code consanguinity (void marriage) definition in the jury charge instead of referencing Penal Code § 25.01 (bigamy) was error requiring reversal | The charge and special issue put the enhancement element before the jury; common usage and the abstract definition were harmless or unobjectionable because §22.011(f) lacks its own definition and the jury found the special issue true | The Family Code definition misstated the law and deprived Arteaga of a proper statutory definition of the enhancement element (bigamy), causing egregious harm | Court held no reversible error; even if inclusion was erroneous, any harm was not egregious and the special issue cured concerns; affirmed convictions |
| Whether the court erred by preventing defense counsel from arguing that the jury could determine lewdness based on defendant’s and others’ perspectives (arguing a subjective view of lewdness) | The jury alone decides lewdness; the statute requires the State to prove defendant knew the material depicted a child engaged in sexual conduct and the jury determines lewdness objectively | Arteaga argued scienter and perspective evidence were relevant and he should argue others might not view images as lewd | Court held trial court did not abuse discretion: defense could present testimony that Arteaga did not view photos as lewd, but counsel could not instruct the jury to limit lewdness inquiry to defendant’s subjective view; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Rodriguez v. State, 456 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) (standard for identifying jury-charge error and harm analysis)
- Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (preservation and harm standards for jury-charge error)
- Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (egregious-harm review when no timely charge objection)
- Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (improperly singling out specific evidence in an abstract instruction can be error)
- Crenshaw v. State, 378 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (superfluous abstract definitions are generally harmless when not applied in the charge’s application paragraph)
- State v. Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (discussing interplay of §22.011(f) and §25.01 and bigamy-related issues)
- Price v. State, 434 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (statutory interpretation principles when plain text produces problematic results)
- Chase v. State, 448 S.W.3d 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (ambiguity and absurd-results exceptions to plain-meaning statutory construction)
- Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (when State fails to prove an aggravating element but proves the base offense, standards for judgment reformation)
- Tovar v. State, 165 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005) (common meaning of “lewd” and jurors’ capacity to apply it without statutory definition)