Rios v. Commissioner of Correction, 224 Conn.App. 350

In 2013, Alberto Rios was convicted of multiple crimes and sentenced to 20 years in prison (suspended after 14) with probation; while incarcerated, he earned sentence reduction credits through Connecticut’s Risk Reduction Earned Credit (RREC) program.
The RREC program, established by statute (§ 18-98e), allows the commissioner discretion to award up to 5 days of credit per month for good behavior, programs, and rule compliance.
At the time of Rios’s offenses, the Department of Correction’s 2013 administrative directive allowed him to earn 5 days/month; a 2016 administrative directive reduced this for higher-risk inmates like Rios, decreasing his credits to as low as 3 days/month based on security risk classification.
Rios lost approximately 104 days of credits under the new policy compared to the old one, affecting his discharge date and parole eligibility; he filed a habeas petition arguing the retroactive application of the 2016 directive violated the U.S. Constitution’s ex post facto clause.
The habeas court granted summary judgment for Rios, finding the 2016 directive was a "law" under the ex post facto clause and its retroactive application was unconstitutional; the Commissioner of Correction appealed.

Issue	Rios' Argument	Commissioner's Argument	Held
Is the 2016 administrative directive a "law" under the ex post facto clause?	Yes; it substantively changed how credits are earned, prolonging incarceration.	No; it's a discretionary policy, not a penal statute or regulation adopted with legislative authority.	No; the directive is not a law for ex post facto purposes.
Can changes in administrative policy violate the ex post facto clause?	Yes, if substantive or legislative in effect; case law is cited for support.	No, unless the directive is adopted under delegated legislative authority and subject to approval procedures.	No; only statutes or legislatively-backed regulations trigger the prohibition.
Did the habeas court err in denying the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction?	No, because Rios had alleged a colorable ex post facto claim.	Yes; failure to state a claim because the directive is not a “law.”	Yes, but only because claim was legally insufficient, not for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Does Rios state a legally sufficient habeas claim?	Yes; retroactive application causes him to serve more time.	No; because there is no law or violation within the meaning of ex post facto.	No; claim fails as a matter of law.

Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (ex post facto prohibition applies only to laws—not policies—that increase punishment retroactively)
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (ex post facto clause implicates only specified categories of penal laws)
Abed v. Commissioner of Correction, 43 Conn. App. 176 (1996) (ex post facto clause does not reach DOC administrative rules adopted for internal management)
Beasley v. Commissioner of Correction, 50 Conn. App. 421 (1998) (administrative directives restricting good time are not "laws" for ex post facto purposes)
Washington v. Commissioner of Correction, 287 Conn. 792 (2008) (describes the separation of powers in criminal justice; executive branch’s discretion over corrections policies)