Richard Vos v. City of Newport Beach
892 F.3d 1024
| 9th Cir. | 2018Background
- On May 29, 2014, Newport Beach police responded to a 7‑Eleven report that Gerritt Vos was acting erratically, brandishing scissors, had cut an employee, and had simulated a gun. Vos was later diagnosed schizophrenic and tested positive for stimulants.
- Officers surrounded the store, assembled less‑lethal options (40‑mm launcher, tasers, K‑9), propped open doors, and used a bullhorn to give commands; several officers had AR‑15 rifles.
- After ~20 minutes with little direct communication, Vos exited a back room, ran toward the officers holding a metal object above his head from ~30–40 feet away, and ignored commands to drop the object.
- Officer Shen fired a less‑lethal projectile; within seconds Officers Henry and Farris discharged AR‑15s, striking and killing Vos. About eight seconds elapsed from Vos’s emergence to his collapse.
- Plaintiffs (Vos’s parents) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force and related claims), the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, various state tort claims, Monell, and conspiracy. District court granted summary judgment to defendants; the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force (Fourth Amendment) | Officers used unjustified deadly force; available less‑lethal options, perimeter, and Vos’s mental illness made deadly force unreasonable | Vos charged officers with an apparent weapon; split‑second threat justified deadly force | Genuine dispute of material fact exists whether Vos posed an immediate threat; summary judgment on Fourth Amendment was improper (trial issue remains) |
| Qualified immunity (individual officers) | Rights were clearly established that would have put officers on notice that shooting was unreasonable | Prior precedent did not clearly place the unlawfulness of these facts beyond debate | Officers entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law; § 1983 claims against individuals affirmed on that ground |
| Monell and civil conspiracy (municipal liability) | City policies/training contributed to the violation; municipal liability viable if constitutional violation proven | District court dismissed because it found no constitutional violation | Remanded for district court to consider these claims in light of disputed constitutional question |
| ADA / Rehabilitation Act | Officers failed to accommodate Vos’s mental disability (de‑escalation, communication, specialized help) | Vos’s conduct was dangerous; immediate threat precluded required accommodation; drug use may preclude ADA protection | Reversed district court: factual disputes preclude summary judgment on ADA/Rehab Act claims; remanded for further proceedings |
| State law claims (negligence, assault, battery, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1) | Under California tort law, officers had broader duties re: preshooting conduct and negligence; factual disputes preclude summary judgment | District court held federal reasonableness meant state claims failed | Reversed summary judgment as to state claims; state remedies survive because qualified immunity does not bar them |
Key Cases Cited
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (supreme court 1985) (deadly force implicates fundamental interest in life; requires objective justification)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (supreme court 1989) (use‑of‑force reasonableness test and primary factors)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (supreme court 2007) (video evidence may permit summary judgment when it so contradicts party’s account no reasonable jury could believe it)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (supreme court 2018) (qualified immunity where law not clearly established in specific factual context)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (supreme court 2015) (caution against defining clearly established law at high level of generality)
- Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (officers should consider mental illness and less intrusive means)
- Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2014) (facts can support deadly force where suspect forces confrontation and poses imminent danger)
- Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (consideration of emotional disturbance in force analysis)
- Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2014) (Title II ADA may require accommodations and less‑lethal response when situation defused)