Rachel Post v. Trinity Health-Michigan, 44 F.4th 572

Rachel Post worked as an anesthetist in St. Joseph Mercy Oakland’s anesthesiology department after her employer became Wayne State University Physician Group (the Group).
While preparing for a procedure at St. Joseph, Post struck her head on a protruding monitor, suffered a severe concussion and post-concussion syndrome, and took medical leave.
Her doctor recommended simulated practice before returning; Post also needed recredentialing at St. Joseph, but the Group’s chair (who signs credentials) declined to clear her while she was on leave.
The Group terminated Post for purported budgetary reasons, later filed bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court disallowed her discrimination claim against the Group’s estate.
Post sued non-employer St. Joseph alleging (1) ADA §12203(b) interference with employment-related ADA rights and (2) a §1985(3) conspiracy with the Group to deprive her of ADA-protected employment rights; the district court granted summary judgment for St. Joseph.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed: (1) §12203(b) interference claims arising from employment rights are subject to Title VII–based remedial limits and therefore available only against employers (or similarly listed entities); and (2) §1985(3) conspiracy claims based on disability-discrimination are foreclosed by Sixth Circuit precedent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ADA §12203(b) allows suits against non-employers for interference with employment-related ADA rights	Post: §12203(b) uses passive language and does not name who may be sued, so it reaches third parties like St. Joseph	St. Joseph: §12203(c) incorporates the ADA employment remedial scheme (via §12117 → Title VII), which restricts suits to employers and a few listed entities	Held: No. For employment claims §12203(b) is limited by the Title VII remedial framework and thus permits suit only against employers (or statutory analogues)
Whether §1985(3) permits a conspiracy claim for deprivation of ADA employment rights (disability-based discrimination)	Post: §1985(3) creates a remedy against conspiracies that deprived her of ADA employment rights; other circuits have allowed disability-based §1985 claims	St. Joseph: Sixth Circuit precedent (Bartell) forecloses disability-based §1985 claims; §1985(3) requires class-based, invidious animus (typically race or a class receiving heightened scrutiny)	Held: No. Sixth Circuit precedent bars disability-based §1985(3) claims; plaintiff conceded Bartell controls
Whether Post preserved a joint-employer or other theory treating St. Joseph as her employer	Post did not develop or press a joint-employer theory on appeal	St. Joseph: not plaintiff’s employer; any joint-employer argument was forfeited	Held: Forfeited. Plaintiff did not argue joint-employer status and cannot raise it now

Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2000) (disability-based discrimination does not fall within §1985(3))
Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999) (retaliation provisions read in light of Title VII remedies limit suits to employers)
Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (§1985 cannot be used to evade detailed remedial schemes of statutes like Title VII)
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (§1985(3) requires some racial or class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus)
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (clarifies limitations on §1985 claims and requirement of class-based animus)
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983) (context on §1985 and Reconstruction-era purpose)
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (use common-law employment tests to define statutory “employee”/“employer”)
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (adopts common-law agency test for employment status)