R.M. Packer Co., Inc. v. Marmik, LLC
41 N.E.3d 54
Mass. App. Ct.2015Background
- Packer (fuel seller/deliverer) delivered diesel to an underground tank at a site where Marmik owned the tanks and Dockside operated a marina that sold fuel from those tanks; Dockside was a long‑term "pass‑through" customer.
- A Packer employee mistakenly delivered 1,060 gallons of diesel into a tank that had room for ~273 gallons, causing a rupture and an estimated 787‑gallon diesel spill; DEP notified both Packer and Dockside as Potentially Responsible Persons under G. L. c. 21E.
- Packer paid for remediation (about $300,000, covered by insurance), then sent demand letters under G. L. c. 21E, § 4A seeking 80% contribution from each of Dockside and Marmik and later sued Dockside for contribution when demands were refused.
- At bench trial the judge found Packer caused the spill (Packer employee error), Dockside was blameless, and entered judgment for Dockside on Packer's claims.
- Dockside counterclaimed for attorney's fees under G. L. c. 21E, § 4A(f). The trial judge awarded Dockside fees and costs, reasoning Packer had no reasonable basis to assert Dockside's liability; the Appeals Court affirmed on an alternative ground that Packer's demanded allocation was unreasonable under § 4A(f)(3).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Packer had a reasonable basis to sue Dockside under § 4A(f)(2) | DEP's pre‑suit notice to Dockside made it reasonable to assert Dockside's liability (as an operator) | Dockside argued it lacked ownership, control, maintenance duties, or day‑to‑day operational control of tanks, so liability was not reasonably asserted | Appeals Court did not decide §4A(f)(2) on the merits but noted mixed facts; affirmed fee award on alternative ground (§4A(f)(3)) |
| Whether Packer's pre‑suit position on Dockside's equitable share was unreasonable under § 4A(f)(3) | Packer insisted Dockside pay 80% despite Packer's clear fault and Dockside's blamelessness; Packer argued its allocation demand was justified | Dockside argued the 80% demand was unreasonable given Packer's causation and control of the tanks; sought fees under §4A(f)(3) | Court held Packer's insistence on 80% contribution was unreasonable and affirmed award of attorney's fees and costs under §4A(f)(3) |
| Whether fee award procedures and findings below supported reversal | Packer contended the judge erred in awarding fees under §4A(f)(2) | Dockside relied on trial findings and alternative statutory subsections to support fees | Court accepted trial findings (no factual challenge) and affirmed fee award on §4A(f)(3) basis |
| Standard for reviewing ultimate legal determination from judge's findings | Packer implied appellate review should overturn fee finding | Dockside relied on judge's subsidiary findings and statutory framework | Court explained ultimate legal questions reviewed de novo but may apply law to unchallenged factual findings; affirmed under §4A(f)(3) |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Boston Edison Co., 444 Mass. 324 (describing G. L. c. 21E's remedial framework)
- Bank v. Thermo Elemental Inc., 451 Mass. 638 (allocation of response costs among liable parties under c. 21E)
- Martignetti v. Haigh‑Farr, Inc., 425 Mass. 294 ("operator" status requires actual control and active involvement; fact‑specific inquiry)
- Scott v. NG US 1, Inc., 450 Mass. 760 (reasonableness inquiry focuses on plaintiff's position when complaint was filed)
- Matter of Jane A., 36 Mass. App. Ct. 236 (appellate review principles for mixed questions of fact and law)
- Simon v. Weymouth Agric. & Industrial Soc., 389 Mass. 146 (appellate standard for ultimate legal determinations from trial findings)
- VMark Software, Inc. v. EMC Corp., 37 Mass. App. Ct. 610 (appellate court may form independent legal conclusions from trial judge's factual findings)