People v. Myles CA4/2, E076505A

In 1996 John Myles and an accomplice robbed a restaurant; the accomplice shot and killed a patron. Myles was convicted of first degree murder and a robbery-murder special circumstance, and sentenced to death on two counts plus other terms.
In 2019 Myles petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6 (formerly § 1170.95), challenging his felony-murder liability under the post–Senate Bill 1437 standard.
The trial judge summarily denied the petition, relying on the robbery-murder special circumstance and his recollection that Myles was a “major participant” who acted with “reckless disregard for human life.”
Myles appealed; this panel initially affirmed, the California Supreme Court granted review and deferred action pending People v. Strong, then transferred the matter back directing reconsideration under Strong.
Applying Strong and the standards from People v. Banks and People v. Clark, the court held the pre‑Banks/Clark special‑circumstance finding does not categorically bar § 1172.6 relief and that the trial court improperly engaged in merits factfinding at the prima facie stage. The order denying the petition was reversed and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a pre‑Banks/Clark robbery‑murder special‑circumstance finding renders a § 1172.6 petitioner categorically ineligible for relief	The special‑circumstance finding proves Myles was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference, so he is ineligible	The special‑circumstance finding predates Banks/Clark and under current law does not automatically bar relief	A pre‑Banks/Clark special‑circumstance finding does not make a petitioner ineligible as a matter of law (following People v. Strong)
Whether the trial court may resolve factual sufficiency at the prima facie stage of a § 1172.6 petition	The court may rely on prior findings and its recollection to deny the petition	Prima facie review requires taking petition allegations as true and not resolving disputed facts	The trial court erred by conducting merits factfinding instead of determining whether the petition stated a prima facie case
Whether a postconviction substantial‑evidence determination applying Banks/Clark can bar relief at the prima facie stage	The substantial‑evidence showing supports the special circumstance under current standards, so deny relief	Such a merits determination goes beyond the prima facie inquiry and is improper at that stage	A postconviction substantial‑evidence determination cannot be used to deny eligibility at the prima facie stage

People v. Strong, 13 Cal.5th 698 (2022) (pre‑Banks/Clark special‑circumstance findings do not categorically bar § 1172.6 relief)
People v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015) (factors for assessing whether a defendant was a "major participant" in an underlying felony)
People v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016) (factors for assessing whether a defendant acted with "reckless indifference to human life")
People v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (2021) (prima facie review in § 1172.6 proceedings — take petitioner’s allegations as true)
People v. Drayton, 47 Cal.App.5th 965 (2020) (standard of review for the trial court’s prima facie determination)
People v. Gentile, 10 Cal.5th 830 (2020) (Senate Bill 1437 narrowed felony‑murder and eliminated natural and probable consequences doctrine)
People v. Myles, 53 Cal.4th 1181 (2012) (opinion recounting trial facts and prior proceedings)