People v. Munoz-Salgado, 61 N.E.3d 257

Defendant Mudy Munoz-Salgado was convicted by a jury of aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated battery, and unlawful restraint and sentenced to concurrent prison terms. The complainant (J.L.) did not testify at trial; her statements to an emergency-room nurse were admitted.
Hotel surveillance and witness testimony showed defendant led J.L. to his room; she later left upset. Police took defendant into custody; a sexual-assault exam at the hospital occurred about 3:30 p.m. that day.
The nurse (Sheehan) performed a sexual-assault kit, asked questions about the assault and timing, observed bruising and vaginal spotting, and recorded J.L.’s statements that defendant forcibly had sex while wearing a condom.
Defendant conceded sexual intercourse but maintained it was consensual; he testified J.L. voluntarily accompanied him and that any pain was not due to force.
Defendant challenged admission of J.L.’s out-of-court statements under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and sought to admit evidence that J.L. had sexual activity within 72 hours before the exam (excluded under Illinois’ rape-shield statute).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether J.L.’s statements to the ER nurse were testimonial, thus barred by the Confrontation Clause unless unavailable + prior cross-examination	Statements were nontestimonial because the medical exam and questioning were primarily for treatment and evidence collection, not to create prosecutorial proof	Statements were testimonial because a reasonable person would expect her statements to be used in prosecution; nurse’s questions focused on evidence collection	Court held statements were nontestimonial: primary purpose was medical care and evidence collection, not to create testimony for prosecution; admission did not violate Confrontation Clause
Whether evidence that J.L. had sex within 72 hours before the exam was admissible despite the rape-shield statute	State argued rape-shield bars evidence of complainant’s prior sexual activity unless constitutionally required; other admissible avenues (expert/explaining spotting) existed	Defendant argued such evidence was relevant to explain vaginal spotting and undermine inference of nonconsent	Court held trial court did not abuse discretion; rape-shield exclusion proper because prior sexual activity with someone else would not meaningfully contribute absent evidence it was nonconsensual

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause bars testimonial hearsay unless witness unavailable and defendant had prior cross-examination)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (Statements during ongoing emergency are generally nontestimonial; primary-purpose test)
Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 311 (2015) (Primary-purpose test applies regardless of whether the recipient is law enforcement; statements to nonpolice often less likely testimonial)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (Primary-purpose inquiry is the ultimate test; ongoing-emergency factor informs that inquiry)
People v. Stechley, 225 Ill. 2d 246 (Ill. law on testimonial statements and distinction between police interrogation versus other contexts)
People v. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d 441 (2007) (ER statements held testimonial under earlier analysis)
People v. Santos, 211 Ill. 2d 395 (Rape-shield statute and narrow construction of constitutionally required exception)