THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JAMES K. SANTOS, Appellee
No. 94620
Supreme Court of Illinois
June 24, 2004
211 Ill. 2d 395
JUSTICE RARICK joins in this special concurrence.
Opinion filed June 24, 2004.
G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Kathleen J. Hamill, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellee.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
A jury in the circuit court of Winnebago County convicted defendant James K. Santos of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (
Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Accordingly, we will summarize the evidenсe adduced at trial except where greater specificity is necessary to our resolution of the legal issues.
Many of the facts surrounding the charges against defendant are undisputed. In May 1999 T.K. was 16 years old. She and defendant met at a party at the home of Angie Enna and Herbert Reaves late on May 8 or in the early morning hours of May 9. At the time Enna and Reaves were 25 and 20 years old, respectively. T.K., who had been drinking since approximately 9 p.m. on May 8, was already somewhat inebriated when she arrived at the party that night. When defendant subsequently arrived, there was no alcohol at the party, and T.K. was among the people who went with defendant to purchase more. Defendant purchased T.K. a beer at her request. After returning the other persons to the party, defendant and T.K. left again in defendant‘s car.
Defendant and T.K. testified to different versions of the subsequent events at trial. Both agreed that after riding around for several hours, defendant parked the car in a remote area where the two engaged in sexual intercourse. T.K. testified that she told defendant that she was 16 years old before the two engaged in any sexual activities. She also testified that all sexual contact between her and defendant occurred without her consent and against her will. Defendant, by contrast, testified that T.K. made advances upon him and told him she was 18 years old, only revealing that she was 16 years of age when the two were already engaged in sexual intercourse. He testified that whеn she informed him of this fact, he immediately ceased all sexual activities with her.
The State charged defendant with criminal sexual assault (
The appellate court reversed defendant‘s conviction and remanded for a new trial. The appellate court held that the circuit court committed reversible error in its issues instruction to the jury. The court determined that there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to support the defense theory that defendant had reasonably believed that T.K. was over 16 years of age. Accordingly, the appellate court held, the circuit court was required to instruct the jury that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not reasonably believe the victim to be of age. The failure to properly instruct the jury on the State‘s burden of proof constituted reversible error, entitling defendant to a new trial. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 8.
The appellate court also elected to address an additional issue because it was likely to recur on remand. Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting the court‘s permission to cross-examine T.K. regarding inconsistent statements she had made to the authorities. Specifically, on May 9, T.K. told medical personnel who were collecting rape kit samples that she had not engaged in sexual intercourse with anyone other than
The appellate court held that the circuit court erred in excluding the evidence. 333 Ill. App. 3d at 9. The appellate court noted that the rape shield statute contains an exception, permitting the introduction of evidence the statute would otherwise bar where admission of such evidence is “constitutionally required.” Relying on its earlier decision in People v. Grano, the appellate court held that the circuit court should have allowed defendant to inquire regarding T.K.‘s statements, because “T.K.‘s credibility was at issue.” 333 Ill. App. 3d at 9. The court remanded for a new trial, and directed the circuit court to permit defendant to cross-examine T.K. with her inconsistent statements.
In partial dissent, Justice O‘Malley disagreed with the majority regarding the evidence the circuit court had excluded under the rape shield statute. See 333 Ill. App. 3d at 10-11 (O‘Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissenting justice argued that the appellate court majority erred in stating that Grano involved “prior inconsistent statement[s].” 333 Ill. App. 3d at 10 (O‘Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also noted that, regardless, the instant case did not involve prior inconsistent statements, because the statements in question were inconsistent only with each other, not with any statement the victim had made during her in-court testimony. The dissenting justice concluded that the cross-examination was impermissible regardless of
ANALYSIS
The State concedes that the appellate court acted correctly in granting defendant a new trial based on the jury instructions. The State‘s only argument before this court is that the appellate court erred in overruling the circuit court order barring defendant from cross-examining T.K. about her inconsistent statements regarding whether she had engaged in sexual activities with anyone else during the 72 hours preceding the assault. The State contends that the trial court acted correctly in excluding this evidence from the trial.
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001). A trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is “‘arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable’ or ‘where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court.‘” People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 182 (2003), quoting People v. M.D., 101 Ill. 2d 73, 90 (1984) (Simon, J., dissenting), quoting Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 1963).
The rape shield statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
“In prosecutions for *** criminal sexual assault, [and] aggravated criminal sexual abuse, *** the prior sexual activity or the reputation of the alleged victim *** is inadmissible except (1) as evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim *** with the accused when this evidence is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim *** consented to the sexual conduct with respect to which the offense is alleged; or (2) when constitutionally required to be admitted.”
725 ILCS 5/115-7(a) (West 1998).
Thus the statute absolutely bars evidence of the alleged
The appellate court determined that the circuit court erred in excluding the evidence. The court relied exclusively on People v. Grano, 286 Ill. App. 3d 278 (1996). The appellate court stated that in Grano, the court had
“determined that the [rape shield] statute was not designed to preclude the admission of all evidence related to sex. Instead, the legislative intent of the rape shield statute is to exclude evidence of actual sexual history or reputation of the victim, not evidence offered for the purpose of impeachment, even when that evidence relates to sex.” 333 Ill. App. 3d at 9.
After discussing Grano, thе appellate court noted that the credibility of the alleged victim, T.K., was at issue in the instant case, and concluded that “the trial court misapplied the rape shield statute as a basis for excluding the evidence of T.K.‘s inconsistent statements.” We find the appellate court to have erred.
Grano does not support the appellate court‘s holding in this case. In Grano, the appellate court reviewed a circuit court ruling that the rape shield statute precluded the defendant from introducing evidence that the complainant had previously falsely accused three other men of sexual assault. The court reasoned that the circuit court had erred in determining that the rape shield statute barred the introduction of this evidence because a verbal accusation was not “sexual activity.” Grano, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 288. This finding meant that the rape shield statute had no bearing on the case at all, and thus the trial court had erred in excluding the evidence.
The same is not true of the instant case. Here, although as in Grano the evidence at issue does consist of statements by the complainant, those statements
The first exception relates only to prior sexual activity between the victim and the accused, offered for purposes of establishing a defense of consent. This exception is inapplicable in the instant case, as the prior activity revealed by the evidence in question was not between complainant and defendant.
The second exception permits introduction of evidence which the statute would otherwise operate to exclude, “when constitutionally required.”
As the dissenting justice in the appellate court noted, what defendant wished to do by introducing this evidence was to impeach the victim‘s credibility with a specific act of untruthfulness. He wished to show the jury that T.K. had lied on one occasion—when she told medical personnel she had not had sexual intercourse with anyone else in the previous 72 hours—in order to support his argument that when she testified in court she was lying about
Defendant argues that the impeachment in this case is more than ordinary mere-fact impeachment, however. He claims that it is especially important that the jury hear about T.K.‘s untruthfulness because it occurred at the time she was reporting the crime. He argues that he
We reject this argument. Defendant‘s argument is the same as that advanced in favor of any particular instance of untruthfulness—if the jury knew that the witness had lied on a previous occasion, the jury would be more likely to believe she was lying in her testimony regarding the facts at issue in the case. Such cross-examination is simply not permitted, because it is overly prejudicial in relation to its probative value. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham‘s Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 608.5, at 390 (8th ed. 2004).
Defendant‘s argument here is really a contention that he was not impeaching the witness on a collateral matter. But this contention is inaccurate. “A matter is collateral if it is not relevant to a material issue of the case.” Esser v. McIntyre, 169 Ill. 2d 292, 304-05 (1996). “The test to be applied in determining if a matter is collateral is whether the matter could be introduced for any purpose other than to contradict.” People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 269 (1985). Whether T.K. had, unbeknownst to defendant, engaged in sexual relations with someone else is wholly unrelated to the question of whether defendant reasonably believed that T.K. was of age when the act of sexual penetration took place, which was the only controverted issue on this charge. The only reason defendant sought to inquire of T.K. about her statements to medical personnel was in order to contradict those statements with her later statements to law enforcement authorities. Thus it was, indeed, a collateral matter. This distinguishes the authority on which defendant relies wherein our appellate court has found the constitution required a defendant to be permitted to offer certain evidence which was directly relevant to matters at issue
The dissent characterizes the victim as having lied about a “critical fact” (211 Ill. 2d at 424) at the time she “reported” (211 Ill. 2d at 411, 424, 425, 428, 430) the crime to the “authorities” (211 Ill. 2d at 425). We note for purposes of clarification that the victim lied to an emergency room nurse about having had sexual relations with her boyfriend. There is no indication that the victim herself ever repeated this lie to the police, or indeed ever directly lied to the police. Rather, the evidence is that once the police inquired of the victim, she immediately admitted to them the truth. This weakens considerably the dissent‘s inference that because the victim told this lie she might also have lied to the police about having told defendant she was 16. 211 Ill. 2d at 428. Moreover, the fact that the victim told the police that she had told defendant she was 16 before they engaged in sexual activity was not referred to at trial and is thus irrelevant. Thus the victim‘s “state of mind” at the time she first reported the crime is also irrelevant. What matters is whether the victim told the truth in her in-court testimony, and referring to prior bad acts in order to raise the inference that a witness is lying at trial is prohibited under Illinois law.
The dissent‘s characterization that the victim lied about a fact “critical” to DNA analysis (211 Ill. 2d at 425-26) is also difficult to accept. Nothing in the record establishes that the victim‘s answer to this question was
This court has specifically held that precluding a defendant in a sexual assault trial from impeaching a complaining witness on a collateral matter does not contravene the constitution. In People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159, 181 (1990), the defendant admitted he had anal sexual intercourse with the complaining witness, as alleged, but claimed the encounter was consensual. During the victim‘s direct examination, she testified that she had never had anal sex with anyone other than the defendant. The trial court ruled that the rape shield statute precluded the defendant from cross-examining the victim regarding the veracity of this statement. This court affirmed.
We acknowledged the defendant‘s argument that the case “boil[ed] down to the jury‘s determination of the credibility of the parties and he was denied the opportunity to confront the witness with what he allege[d] was a lie.” Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 180. Nevertheless, we found that the allegedly untrue statement the victim had made was collateral to the only controverted issue in the case—consent on the occasion in question—and thus there was no constitutional violation in denying defendant the opportunity to attempt the impeachment. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 181 (“Even if this court were to assume that the complainant was not truthful when she testified that she had not had anal sex with others, we would not be required to reverse the verdict of the jury based on a denial of defendant‘s right of confrontation. Impeachment of a witness is restricted to relevant matters; a witness may not be impeached on collateral or irrelevant matters“). Here, as in Sandoval, the defendant seeks to impugn his accuser‘s credibility by showing that
We note finally that the dissent contends that the court‘s ruling on the motion in limine under review precluded defendant from informing the jury that no semen matching his genetic profile had been recovered from the victim. 211 Ill. 2d at 426. This is inaccurate. Although the circuit court did preclude defense counsel from so informing the jury, this was clearly a separate and independent ruling from the court‘s ruling that defendant could not cross-examine the victim with her inconsistent out-of-court statements. We note that the motion in limine referred only to crоss-examination; the other matter was raised separately during oral argument on the motion. Although both rulings required the circuit court to interpret and apply the rape shield, we see no logical or legal reason that the two rulings must either both be upheld or both be reversed. Our holding is limited to the question before us: whether the circuit court was correct in precluding defendant from cross-examining the victim regarding her collateral out-of-court statements concerning her sexual history. Our opinion is not an endorsement of any other pretrial ruling by the circuit
CONCLUSION
The evidence in question revealed the victim‘s “prior sexual activity.” Accordingly, the rape shield statute rendered it inadmissible.
The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.
CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:
At issue in this appeal is whether, under the rape shield statute (
I respectfully, but strongly, dissent from the opinion of the majority. I would hold that the appellate court below was correct in determining that, due to the nature of the evidence relating to defendant‘s affirmative defense against the sole criminal charge remaining against him, the trial court misapplied the rape shield statute in denying defendant‘s motion in limine seeking permission to cross-examine the complainant, T.K., regarding inconsistent statements she had made at the time she reported the alleged crime and during the investigation.
The motion asserted that, upon submitting to a rape kit shortly after the alleged assault, T.K. stated to hospital personnel who collected samples for the kit that she had not had sexual intercourse with anyone other than defendant within 72 hours of the sample collection. Three months later, however, it was determined through DNA testing performed by the Illinois State Police lab that the seminal fluid and pubic hair found on T.K.‘s underwear did not match defendant. In light of these test results T.K. admitted to police that she had, in fact, engaged in a sexual encounter with another man within
The instant cause presents this court not only with the first opportunity in 14 years, since our decision in People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159 (1990), to address the general parameters of the rape shield statute, but also with our first opportunity to speak to the scope of the exception to the rape shield statute which allows for the introduction of otherwise-barred evidence when such evidence is “constitutionally required.” The matter before us underscores the tension between the demands of the rape shield statute and of the confrontation clause. We are vested with the responsibility to strike an appropriate balance between these demands to assure that the legislature‘s intent in protecting the privacy of the victims of sexual crimes is fulfilled, while also ensuring that a defendant‘s constitutional rights to confront his accuser and to present evidence in support of his defense are secured. In arriving at an appropriate balance, we must assess the nature and quality of the evidence at issue, as well as the need for that evidence to assure that the charges in the case are fairly adjudicated. In the mat
In order to answer the question presented by this appeal, it is necessary to briefly review the constitutional principles involved, the genesis and purpose of the rape shield statute, and the manner in which the statute has been interpreted by Illinois courts.
The confrontation clause provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted with the witnesses against him ***.”
However, a defendant‘s rights guaranteed under the Constitution are not absolute and “may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). One such instance is the rape shield statute. Under the rape shield statute, in a prosecution for the crimes of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse,
“the prior sexual activity or the reputation of the alleged victim *** is inadmissible except (1) as evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim *** with the accused when this evidence is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim *** consented to the sexual conduct with respect to which the offense is alleged; or (2) when constitutionally required to be admitted.”
725 ILCS 5/115-7(a) (West 1998).
Prior to the enactment of the rape shield statute in 1978, Illinois had a long-standing rule that in rape cases, where the accused offered a defense of consent, it was proper to introduce evidence of the complaining witness’ general reputation for immorality and unchastity. See People v. Allen, 289 Ill. 218, 220 (1919) (“Where the defense to a charge of forcible rape is consent and the woman is of the age of consent, evidence of her bad character for chastity is competent as bearing on the probability of her consent to the act with whiсh the defendant is charged, because it is more probable that an unchaste woman assented to such an act than a virtuous woman“); see also S. Murphy, Rape Shield Statute Upheld by Illinois Appellate Court, 69 Ill. B.J. 110, 110
“[t]he State policy underlying the rape shield statute *** is to prevent the defendant from harassing and humiliating the prosecutrix at trial with evidence of either her reputation for chastity or specific acts of sexual conduct with persons other than the defendant, since such evidence has no bearing on whether she consented to sexual relations with the defendant. Further, exclusion of such evidence keeps the jury‘s attention focused only on issues relevant to the controversy at hand. Last, but not least, the exclusion promotes effective law enforcement because victims can report crimes of rape and deviate sexual assault without fear of having the intimate details of their past sexual activity brought before the public.” People v. Ellison, 123 Ill. App. 3d 615, 626 (1984).
See also C. Loftus, Comment, The Illinois Rape Shield Statute: Privacy at Any Cost, 15 J. Marshall L. Rev. 157, 162-64 (1982).
This court‘s first opportunity to interpret and apply the rape shield statute was presented in People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159 (1990). In Sandoval, the defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual assault and one count of battery for repeated acts of nonconsensual sodomy with his former girlfriend. At trial, the complainant admitted that she had engaged in sodomy in the past with defendаnt, but stated that she had never willingly engaged in that practice with anyone else. The defendant attempted to impeach that statement with evidence that the complainant had participated in sodomy with others. Pursuant to the rape shield statute, the trial court refused to allow the impeachment.
At the time Sandoval was decided, the rape shield statute did not contain the exception for admission of otherwise-barred evidence when “constitutionally
However, because the defendant in Sandoval did not establish that the exclusion of the evidence of the complainant‘s prior sexual activity prevented him from presenting his theory of the case, i.e., that the complainant, his former girlfriend, consented to engage in sodomy but thereafter accused him of rape in retaliation for his rejection (Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 175), this court was “not *** confronted with an applicable situation demanding emphasis of the right of confrontation over the preclusion of the rape shield statute” (Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 191-92). Thus, under the specific facts presented in Sandoval, this court concluded that the application of the rape shield statute did not unconstitutionally deny the defendant his right to confront the complainant.
Sandoval, however, made it clear that the protections of the rape shield statute are not absolute, and that the statute should not be mechanically applied. Sandoval did not foreclose the possibility that evidence of a complainant‘s prior sexual activity could be admissible; to the contrary, this court in Sandoval recognized—even absent the now-existing exception which allows admission of otherwise-barred evidence if such evidence is “constitutionally required“—that under certain “extraordinary circumstances” evidence of past sexual activity by the complainant may be both relevant and its admission necessary to preserve the defendant‘s right to confrontation. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 191-92. As our appellate court has observed, Sandoval did
“not impose any restriction on the type of circumstances that requires the statutory protection‘s subservience to constitutional imperative. It merely provides a sample of possible situations where prior sexual conduct would have the probative value necessary for admission into evidence. *** [N]othing in Sandoval suggests limitation only to those circumstances where prior sexual history shows bias, prejudice, or motive. A fair reading of Sandoval instructs that prior sexual conduct may be relevant to prove a fact in issue, in which case, it should be admitted. It calls for a case-by-case examination of the reason tendered for the introduction of prior sexual conduct to determine its probative value.” People v. Hill, 289 Ill. App. 3d 859, 863-64 (1997).
Subsequent to this court‘s decision in Sandoval, the General Assembly in 1994 amended the rape shield statute to expressly provide that the prior sexual activity of the complainant may be admitted “when constitutionally required.”
In its opinion, the majority reverses the appellate court below, finding that the panel improperly held that the trial court erred in excluding the disputed evidence pursuаnt to the rape shield statute. The majority criticizes the appellate court for “rel[ying] exclusively on People v. Grano, 286 Ill. App. 3d 278 (1996)” (211 Ill. 2d at 402) in arriving at its holding. The majority concludes that Grano does not support the appellate court‘s result in the instant case, because Grano is factually distinguishable from the matter at bar. In Grano, the court held that the circuit court erred in ruling that the rape shield statute prevented the defendant in that case from introducing evidence that the complainant had previously accused three other men of sexual assault. The majority emphasizes that the Grano court reasoned that because a verbal accusation did not constitute sexual activity, the rape shield statute had no application to the facts presented there. The majority then explains that here, although the disputed evidence also consists of the complainant‘s statements, those statements, unlike the statements in Grano, reveal her “prior sexual activity.” Therefore, in this case, the rape shield statute applies. 211 Ill. 2d at 402-03.
Although the majority spends much time explaining that the appellate court‘s reliance upon Grano was misplaced because this case and Grano are factually distinguishable, a close review of the appellate court‘s opinion below reveals that the court did not analogize the facts at bar to the facts in Grano. Rather, the court cited Grano for its “interpret[ation] [of] the parameters
Indeed, the interpretation of the parameters of the rape shield statute as set forth by the appellate court below and also in Grano is consistent with the analysis
“should never be mechanically applied to obscure relevant evidence that bears directly on guilt or innocence. The shield should be raised in a manner consistent with its purpose. That purpose is not to preclude relevant evidence. If it were, the statute could never conform with constitutional imperative under the sixth amendment‘s confrontation clause (
U.S. Const., amend. VI ) or the fourteenth amendment‘s due process clause (U.S. Const., amend. XIV ). The rape shield statute is expressly designed to yield to constitutional protections that assure fair trials with just outcomes.” Hill, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 862, citing Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159.
Thus, “[w]henever the rape shield statute‘s preclusion of prior sexual conduct is invoked, a question of relevancy arises.” Hill, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 863. “Relevant evidence” means evidence having “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of an action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 455-56 (2001); People v. Bolden, 197 Ill. 2d 166, 184 (2001); see also People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 115 (2000) (relevancy is any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence in light of logic, experience, and accepted assumptions concerning human behavior). However, evidence which is relevant may nevertheless be deemed inadmissible if the prejudicial effect of admitting such evidence substantially outweighs its probative value. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 114-15; People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 146 (1998). In the
Applying the above analytical framework, our appellate court has held that a defendant‘s right to confront witnesses against him and to present his defense may supersede the protections of the rape shield statute. See, e.g., People v. Hill, 289 Ill. App. 3d 859 (1997) (prior sexual activity of a child victim may be admissible to show age-inappropriate sexual knowledge did not derive from acts with defendant); People v. Grant, 232 Ill. App. 3d 93 (1992) (instances of prior sexual activity may be admitted to explain the presence of semen in the complainant); People v. Mason, 219 Ill. App. 3d 76 (1991) (due process precluded the application of the rape shield statute to exclude testimony that the alleged minor victim had viewed sexually explicit videotapes); People v. Gray, 209 Ill. App. 3d 407 (1991) (it wаs error to bar defendant from cross-examining complainant about her alleged fear of pregnancy as a possible motive to falsely accuse defendant); People v. Halcomb, 176 Ill. App. 3d 100, 106 (1988) (the trial court improperly excluded evidence under the rape shield statute that complainant had revealed to defendant, immediately prior to the alleged assault, that she had recently had an abortion; the evidence “was offered not to establish prior sexual activity, but to prove that defendant and complainant engaged in intimate conversation immediately before the sexual acts in question took place. *** [There is a] distinction
Turning to the matter at bar, it is my view that the information defendant sought to introduce before the jury was both highly relevant to a disputed issue in this case and also necessary to preserve defendant‘s constitutional rights and guarantee him a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. In this case, there is only one disputed issue with respect to the lone charge for which defendant was convicted, and, for which he will now be retried: whether defеndant reasonably believed the complainant to be 17 years of age or older at the time of this incident. As the majority correctly notes, defendant was originally charged in a three-count indictment: count I charged defendant with criminal sexual assault (
It is of import that defendant has been acquitted of the charges in which the use of force or the consent of complainant could be at issue. The only charge which remains pending against defendant is for aggravated criminal sеxual abuse (
There is no dispute in this case that, at the time of the incident in the matter at bar, T.K. was under the age of 17 and defendant was at least five years older. Thus, absent the affirmative defense available to defendant under
A review of the trial record shows that, absent T.K.‘s testimony that she told defendant that she was 16 before any sexual activity took place, there was virtually no evidence which tended to rebut his affirmative defense that it was reasonable for defendant to believe that T.K. was 17 years of age or older. First, as stated, defendant testified that complainant told him that she was 18 at the time that they first met. In addition, the record reveals that, at the time of the offense, T.K. was 16 years and 7 months old, less than 5 months away from her seventeenth birthday. Defendant did not know T.K. prior to this incident, and he first met her late at night during a social gathering hosted by a 25-year-old woman and her 20-year-old boyfriend. Nearly all of the people at the gathering were 18 years of age or older, and when defendant first met T.K. she had been consuming alcohol, an activity which is restricted to adults. Shortly after defendant arrived at the gathering, a group of people, including T.K., accompanied him to a liquor store to buy alcohol fоr the party, and T.K. told defendant to buy her a beer. Further, T.K. was apparently free to stay at the party all night, into the early morning hours, without any curfew. The totality of the circumstances supports
I submit that, had the jury been informed that T.K. lied about a critical fact at the same time she reported that she was sexually assaulted by defendant, and that she recanted the false statement three months later, only after being confronted by police with the fact that DNA testing revealed that defendant could not have been the source of semen recovered from her, it is very likely that the jurors would have questioned T.K.‘s assertion that she told defendant that she was 16 before the commencement of any sexual activity. The disputed evidence was not offered to establish T.K.‘s prior sexual activity or to portray her as a sexually promiscuous person. Rather, it was offered to show that, in reporting the very crime for which defendant was on trial, the claimant lied about significant facts, which, incidentally, also revealed her past sexual conduct.
Accordingly, I would hold that the application of the rape shield statute in this case does not serve the statute‘s legitimate purposes. The exception for the admission of otherwise-barred evidence when “constitutionally required” should be interpreted in a manner which preserves the legitimate purposes of the statute, while also safeguarding a defendant‘s constitutional rights. In my view, the facts in the matter at bar are divorced from the legitimate concerns of the rape shield statute. Indeed, under the unique facts of this case, it would not behoove defendant to attempt to admit the disputed evidence in an effort to reveal complainant‘s past sexual conduct or to raise an inference of promiscuity on the part of T.K., because the crime with which defendant is charged is based solely upon the disparity in the parties’ ages, and does not involve any question or issue with respect to whether T.K. consented to, or was forced into participating in, the sexual conduct. In addi-
In sum, the evidence excluded under the rape shield statute in this case was relevant to the only disputed issue in this matter: whether defendant had reason to believe that complainant was 17 years of age or older at the time of the incident. The evidence was relevant in that it showed that the complainant was untruthful regarding circumstances surrounding the alleged offense when she initially reported the incident to the authorities. In order to assess the results obtained from comparison of the rape kit materials with the defendant‘s DNA markers, it was critical for the laboratory personnel to know whether the complainant engaged in sexual intercourse with anyone other than defendant during the 72-hour period preceding the sample collection. Had defendant been permitted to show that T.K. lied when she reported the circumstances surrounding the alleged offense to the medical personnel on the night she accused defendant, the jury would have been made aware that T.K. was untruthful with respect to her account of the events of that evening, and that her untruthfulness made defendant‘s guilt appear more likely. In other words, the evidence would show that T.K. lied when she reported the incident to the authorities, and would be relevant to defendant‘s affirmative defense, in which he maintained that he had reason to believe that complain-
The majority, however, rejects the argument that the disputed evidence is admissible under the “constitutionally required” exception to the rape shield statute because impeachment of a witness by specific acts of misconduct is prohibited in Illinois. See People v. West, 158 Ill. 2d 155, 162 (1994). I agree with the majority that it is the general rule that a witness may not be cross-examined regarding instances of prior criminal conduct not leading to a conviction, unless that conduct also relates to some issue in the case other than credibility. The rationale for this general prohibition has been explained as follows: “The reason for barring questions about unrelated prior bad acts is to avoid impeachment by insinuation on such matters and to prevent juries
However, the general rule should not apply to the unique facts presented in the case at bar for two reasons: first, claimant‘s so-called “bad acts” occurred during the reporting and investigation of the very crime for which defendant is charged; and second, as explained above, the probative value of this evidence to defendant‘s affirmative defense is high. As stated, not only is the crime with which defendant is charged based solely upon the disparity in the parties’ ages and does not involve any question with respect to whether T.K. consented to, or was forced into participating in, the sexual conduct, but also defendant‘s affirmative defense is grounded in the theory that he had a reasonable belief that T.K. was over 17 years of age and does not revolve around any contention that claimant consented to the sexual conduct.
The cases cited by the majority in suрport of its conclusion that the disputed evidence is barred under the general rule prohibiting specific-act impeachment are all factually distinguishable from the matter at bar: in each cited case, the general rule was applied where a party sought to impeach a witness with specific incidents of prior bad acts unrelated to the case on trial. For example, in West, this court held that it was error when defense counsel attempted to impeach the credibility of the minor victim by asking the minor‘s schoolteacher if
Here, in contrast, the evidence in dispute did not concern a past incident of untruthfulness or a past “bad act” on the part of T.K. that was otherwise unrelated to the instant charge pending against defendant. Rather, the evidence showed that T.K. lied when she reported the very offense for which defendant was on trial, and for which he will be retried: accordingly, her statements are inexorably intertwined with the charge. In addition, as explained in detail above, the rationale for generally barring specific-act impeachment would not be furthered by excluding the disputed evidence in the matter at bar. The fact that T.K. was untruthful at the time she lodged charges against defendant is relevant to whether she also lied to the authorities when she stated that she informed defendant that she was 16 years of age. In addition, the
The majority also rejects the argument that the disputed evidence is admissible under the “constitutionally required” exception to the rape shield statute because, in the view of the majority, the evidence would be used to impeach T.K. on a collateral matter which is not relevant to the case. According to the majority, whether T.K. had engaged in sexual relations with someone else is ”wholly unrelated to the question of whether defendant reasonably believed that T.K. was of age when the act of sеxual penetration took place.” (Emphasis in original.) 211 Ill. 2d at 405. Citing to Sandoval, the majority states “[t]his court has specifically held that precluding a defendant in a sexual assault trial from impeaching a complaining witness on a collateral matter does not contravene the constitution.” 211 Ill. 2d at 407. The majority concludes by stating that “[h]ere, as in Sandoval, defendant seeks to impugn his accuser‘s credibility by showing that she lied regarding a matter collateral to the controverted issues in the case.” 211 Ill. 2d at 407-08. I disagree. It is my view that the proposed impeachment involves a noncollateral matter, and the facts in Sandoval relating to this issue are distinguishable from those in the instant cause.
“Collateral matters are basically ‘side issues’ or ‘small stuff‘, matters unimportant to the principal issues of the case.” J. Corkery, Illinois Civil & Criminal Evidence § 608.103, at 294 (2000). The rule precluding impeachment of a witness on a collateral matter “reflects considerations of judicial economy and prevents hours and days of a trial being consumed with taking evidence on the question of whether and under what circumstances
The majority errs in finding that T.K.‘s untruthful state of mind at the time she reported this alleged crime is a collateral matter in this case. In order to find that the disputed evidence would lead to impeachment on a collateral issue, the majority mistakenly focuses on the fact that the evidence in dispute reveals that T.K. engaged in sexual relations with another person shortly before the alleged crime. Although I agree with the majority to the extent that complainant‘s prior sexual conduct is unrelated and unimportant to the principal issues of this case, the disputed evidence only coincidentally touched upon sex. The focus on this evidence should be directed toward the fact that T.K. was in an untruthful state of mind and lied when she reported this alleged crime to the authorities. This is relevant to her credibility in a very important way, because it goes to the only disputed issue in the case: whether defendant was reasonable to believe that complainant was 18 years of age, or whether his belief was unreasonable because T.K. informed him that she was 16 years old when they met.
Our decision in Sandoval does not change this conclusion. In Sandoval, this court held that two avenues of impeachment pursued by the defendant against the complainant were collateral. First, this court held that impeachment of the complainant‘s statement that she did not engage in sodomy with anyone other than the defendant was collateral and irrelevant to the question of whether she had been forced to have sex with the defendant. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 181. Similarly, this court held that, although the complainant had stated on cross-examination that she had not been able to date anyone since the assault, the defense was properly barred from introducing evidence to show that the witness had been seen with a man just prior to the beginning of the trial. This court held that admitting that evidence would have improperly allowed the defendant to contradict the complainant on a collateral matter. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 181.
As explained above, unlike the evidence discussed in Sandoval, the disputed evidence in the matter at bar is not collateral to the sole disputed issue in the case. To the contrary, the evidence is critical not only to defendant‘s affirmative defense, i.e., that he reasonably believed that T.K. was 18 years of age, but also to the State‘s burden of showing that defendant‘s belief, under the circumstances presented, was unreasonable. In sum, the disputed evidence was central to defendant‘s opportunity, guaranteed him under the Constitution, to present a complete defense.
As a final matter, I find it necessary to respond to the criticism made of this dissenting opinion by the majority. The central focus of the majority‘s response to my dissent is upon semantics. The majority takes great pains to point out that this dissent “charаcterizes” the complain-
Under the
In the matter at bar, the complainant was 16 years of age when she went to Rockford Memorial Hospital, alleging that she had been forced to participate in sexual acts by defendant. Under these facts, any hospital personnel engaged in treating the complainant, as well as the hospital administrator and the hospital itself, were mandated to report this incident to DCFS.
In cases of sexual assault and/or abuse, very often the first contact an alleged victim has with individuals apart from her friends and family is with medical personnel, and not with the police. The same is true here: complainant testified that after she told her friends that she was raped, they immediately brought her to the
In addition, the majority criticizes this dissent for, in the words of the majority, “contend[ing] that the court‘s ruling on the motion in limine under review precluded defendant from informing the jury that no semen matching his genetic profile had been recovered from the
The trial transcript reveals that, during a hearing on the parties’ motions in limine, defense counsel requested that he be allowed to introduce evidence of complainant‘s inconsistent statements regarding whether she had sex with anyone other than defendant in the 72 hours prior to her submission to the rape kit, as well as evidence that defendant‘s semen was not found in the complainant. The State objected to both requests. The court first ruled that the complainant could not be questioned about her inconsistent statements with respect to whether she had sexual conduct with another person 72 hours prior to submitting to the rape kit because “the Rape Shield Act does preclude the defense from inquiring” into that subject.
Then, the court turned to defendant‘s request to introduce evidence that his DNA was not found in the complainant. The State argued that such evidence should
The error of the majority‘s assertion that there was no “logical or legal” connection between the circuit court‘s rulings barring reference to complainant‘s inconsistent statements and barring the introduction of any evidence regarding DNA testing is further revealed by a statement made by the circuit court judge later in the proceedings. After defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial because one of the State‘s witnesses had testified that complainant had been subjected to a rape kit at the hospital, despite the fact that the circuit court had barred all mention of this event, the circuit court had occasion to set forth the basis of its prior rul-
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully, but strongly, dissent from the opinion of the majority. I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
(No. 95132.—
In re MARRIAGE OF ROBERT L. CROOK, Appellant, and PATRICIA J. CROOK, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 24, 2004.