People v. Lewis
302 Mich. App. 338
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- In summer 2010 several students (aged 16–17) alleged sexual acts with defendant, an individual who had served as a long‑term substitute teacher for their British Literature class during the prior school year.
- First trial ended in mistrial (juror misconduct); second trial produced a dispute over whether charges could allege defendant was a substitute teacher or a contractual service provider.
- Trial judge allowed amendment but later granted defense mistrial request and disqualified the judge; successor judge questioned whether MCL 750.520d(1)(e) applies when alleged acts occurred during summer break.
- Trial court dismissed charges as a matter of law, concluding the statute requires the sexual conduct to occur while defendant was actively acting as a substitute/contractual provider (i.e., not during summer when school was out).
- Prosecution appealed; appellate court considered statutory interpretation (plain meaning of “is” in MCL 750.520d(1)(e)) and remanded, reversing the dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MCL 750.520d(1)(e) requires the sexual penetration to occur while the actor is actively performing substitute/contractual duties (i.e., during school session) | Prosecution: statute covers persons who "are" substitute teachers/contractual providers regardless of when the sexual conduct occurred; no temporal requirement | Defense: the statute should be read to require the conduct occur while acting in that role (school in session); summer acts fall outside the statute | Reversed dismissal — "is" refers to the actor’s status/position, not timing; statute contains no temporal limitation, so prosecution may proceed for acts occurring during summer if actor occupied the teacher/contractual position |
| Whether the trial court properly construed statutory language as creating a temporal element | Prosecution: court erred by reading a temporal requirement into the statute | Defense: reading prevents absurd or unexpected breadth (after-hours, weekends, summer) | Court held plain meaning does not include timing; temporal limitation not stated and cannot be judicially added |
| Whether ambiguous terms can be resolved by dictionary definitions and related statutes | Prosecution: consult ordinary meaning/dictionary where term undefined; statute’s context shows protective purpose | Defense: argued for use of other statutory or administrative frameworks (workers’ comp, school employment practices) | Court used ordinary meaning/dictionary to construe "is" and declined to read other statutes in pari materia absent express cross-reference |
| Whether dismissal was appropriate on the limited record presented | Prosecution: record suffices on pure legal question; dismissal premature | Defense: relied on factual posture about employment status and timing | Court reversed dismissal and remanded for jury resolution of factual questions (employment status, access, prejudice) |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Bylsma, 493 Mich. 17 (statutory intent governs interpretation)
- People v. Cole, 491 Mich. 325 (plain language controls; no judicial construction when unambiguous)
- People v. Zajaczkowski, 493 Mich. 6 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- People v. Tennyson, 487 Mich. 730 (avoid constructions that produce absurd results)
- People v. Jahner, 433 Mich. 490 (criminal statutes strictly construed)
- People v. Elliott, 494 Mich. 292 (de novo review where law applied to uncontested facts)
- People v. Nicholson, 297 Mich. App. 191 (abuse of discretion standard for dismissal motions)