People v. TennysonPeople v. Tennyson
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Lead Opinion
We granted oral argument to consider whether evidence that a child was present in a home in which defendant was in possession of drugs and firearms is, by itself, legally sufficient to support defendant’s conviction under
I. PACTS AND HISTORY
On August 16, 2006, Detroit police executed a search warrant at defendant’s home. They found defendant sitting on a bed in one of the home’s two bedrooms. When one of the officers looked under the bed, he found a baggie of what he believed, based on his experience and training with narcotics, to be heroin on a plate with a razor blade and a coffee spoon. A second officer testified similarly, estimating that the amount recovered was approximately three grams, with a street value of about $700. The police also found two loaded firearms in a dresser drawer in the same bedroom. The bedroom contained both men’s and women’s clothing, while the other bedroom contained only children’s clothing.
Defendant was charged with possession of less than 25 grams of heroin,
With respect to the latter charge, the prosecutor argued at trial that the child “being in that house is being subject to neglect and/or delinquency.” In its instructions, the trial court stated:
To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: that the defendant acted or by any word, encouraged, contributed toward, caused or tended to cause any minor child under the age of 17 years to become neglected or delinquent.
The jury convicted defendant of all charges. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a suspended sentence of 45 days in jail for the misdemeanor of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The court also told defendant that it would contact the Department of Human Services (DHS) to request that a petition be filed to terminate his parental rights, and that same day wrote to DHS requesting that it investigate possible child neglect and abuse by defendant.
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. People v Tennyson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 16, 2008 (Docket No. 278826). Regarding defendant’s conviction under
Here, defendant’s actions, at the very least, placed [the child] directly in a home where illegal activity was occurring. It would be reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant knew [the child] was living in a house where heroin and loaded firearms were unlawfully kept. When considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that defendant’s illegal activities could have subjected his son to the jurisdiction of the courts. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of contributing to the neglect or delinquency of a minor. [Tennyson, unpub op at 4.]
This Court directed that oral argument be heard on the application for leave to appeal and specified that the parties must address whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction under
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review
III. ANALYSIS
A.
We are called upon to construe
Any person who shall by any act, or by any word, encourage, contribute toward, cause or tend to cause any minor child under the age of 17 years to become neglected or delinquent so as to come or tend to come under the jurisdiction of the juvenile division of the probate court, as defined in [MCL 712A.2 ], whether or not such child shall in fact be adjudicated a ward of the probate court, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
This statute requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant (1) by any act or word (2) “tend[ed] to cause” any minor1 (3) to “become neglected or delinquent” (4) so as to “tend to come” under what was then probate court jurisdiction, which has since been transferred to the family division of circuit court, or “family court.”2
The statute also makes clear that “neglect” and “delinquency” are specifically defined by
Although it is clear that a prior adjudication of neglect or delinquency is not required for a conviction under
When reviewing a statute, all undefined “words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language[.]”
However, the fact that “tend” pertains to matters that cannot be assessed with absolute certainty, unlike matters that have already occurred, does not mean that the determination that a person is “disposed or inclined” toward something can be made arbitrarily. Instead, logic suggests that “tend” is commonly understood to express some level or gradation of certainty, for if a person is “disposed or inclined” to do one thing, he is obviously not “disposed or inclined” to do its opposite. Stated another way, although “tend” conveys possibilities along a continuum, logically, a person can only “tend” toward one end of that continuum at any given time. The term thus implies a level of certainty greater than 50 percent, to wit, that it is possible to conclude from the available information and circumstances that something is “more likely than not” to occur.5
However, “tend” is not always used to convey gradations of certainty. The last dictionary entry for “tend” defines it as “to lead or be directed in a particular direction.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). While this definition is also consistent with the word’s forward-looking quality, in this purely directional sense, it does not compel the conclusion that a person is closer to one end of a continuum than the other. Instead, in this sense, “tend” can mean that a person has, perhaps for just an instant, been turned “toward” a “particular direction.” Thus, a determination that a person “tends” toward something in this sense could be made where there is only a 5 percent or 1 percent or 0.3 percent chance that a particular result will occur. That is, even though a person remains far closer to one end of the “good behavior-bad behavior” spectrum, if he is turned “toward” the other end even momentarily, it can be said by the purely directional understanding of the term that such person “tends” toward that direction. Because this understanding does not necessitate
For several reasons, we believe that the purely directional meaning of “tend” is not what was intended by the drafters of
Second, the directional sense of “tend” does not accurately reflect the word’s specific placement in this statute. The statute pairs “tend to cause” and “tend to come” with “cause” and “come,” respectively. The difference between each of these pairings is essentially one of degree, not kind. However, an interpretation of “tend” that is based merely on direction bears no conceptual connection to actually “causing” neglect or delinquency or actually “com[ing] under” family court jurisdiction, the alternative violations with which the “tend” violations are paired. Thus, instead of establishing pairings of violations in which apples are compared with apples — in which the magnitude of the certainty or likelihood of the harm is what distinguishes the violations — the directional understanding establishes pairings of violations in which apples are compared with oranges — in which there is no coherent relationship within each pairing.
Third, construing “tend” in its directional sense in this statute would result in a highly unreasonable and unworkable, if not potentially absurd, interpretation. If all that is required by “tend” is a determination that a child had been turned in the “direction” of neglect or delinquency — “toward” the “bad behavior” rather than “toward” the “good behavior” end of the spectrum, and without regard to whether the child had been moved closer to the “bad behavior” outcome than to the “good behavior” outcome, what other than prosecutorial discretion would prevent a parent from being charged with “contributing to the neglect and delinquency of their children” whenever they tell their children a lie, exceed the speed limit while children are in the car, nick another car in a parking lot where children are present and fail to take responsibility, use coarse language in front of their children, or engage in any other such behavior into which imperfect parents sometimes lapse? Each of these forms of less-than-admirable, but hardly extraordinary, behavior on the part of the parent might well “tend” to cause harm to a child in the purely directional sense of the term because each such dereliction in parental behavior could hardly be expected to have a positive impact upon the child, and therefore could only be understood to have a negative impact. This reasoning would be particularly applicable with regard to a younger child. That is, rather than being pointed in a positive direction along the continuum of bad to good behavior, such parental breaches could only, however slightly or imperceptibly, point the child toward the wrong end of the behavioral continuum. Because we cannot imagine that it was within the Legislature’s contemplation that violations of
By applying the more reasonable and appropriate definition of “tend” in this context as being “disposed or inclined . . . to do something,” everyday lapses in parental behavior would not ordinarily suffice to lay a foundation for criminal charges that would trigger at least the initiation of the parental rights termination process, just as they have never before sufficed in this state to establish criminal charges under
Accordingly, the statute’s first use of “tend” requires a determination that a
B.
With this understanding of
The jurisdiction of the family division of the circuit court over a minor for delinquency is discussed in
The jurisdiction of the family court over a minor for neglect is discussed in
[w]hose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian,or other custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship.
This provision sets forth multiple potential grounds for a finding of neglect. The most egregious form of neglect occurs where the child has been “abandoned by his or her parents” or is “without proper custody or guardianship.” Other grounds for a finding of neglect occur where the parent “neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for his or her health or morals,” or where a child’s “mental well-being” is subject to a “substantial risk of harm .. . .”
The other relevant basis for a finding of neglect under
[w]hose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in.
For purposes of the instant case, this provision requires a finding that the home at issue constitutes an unfit place for the juvenile to live “because of” a parent’s criminal act. Criminality per se, or even criminality in a home per se, is insufficient to support a finding of neglect under § 2(b)(2).
C. STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA
Pursuant to the express terms of
1. “DELINQUENCY”
When
These standards — and the interpretation of “tend” from which they derive — are consistent with those used by Michigan courts for almost a half-century where they have been asked to construe
Since Owens, there have been few cases addressing “sufficiency of the evidence” challenges to convictions under
These decisions reflect the existing, and proper, approach to understanding
2. “NEGLECT”
As noted above,
There are no reported Michigan cases that address a conviction under
D. APPLICATION
The essential elements derived from construing
1. “DELINQUENCY”
The prosecutor contends that defendant’s conviction can be sustained on grounds of delinquency.12 Referencing statutes that prohibit the possession and use of a controlled substance, the prosecutor argues that defendant’s actions “tend[ed] to cause” the child to violate these statutes and, thus, become a delinquent so as to “tend to come” under family court jurisdiction. The prosecutor supports this argument with social science research that suggests that children of parents who abuse drugs are more likely to abuse drugs themselves.
As a threshold matter, we note this research was not part of the proofs considered by the jury. However, even if it had been, we find the prosecutor’s argument inapt under
While this Court is ill-equipped to assess the merits of the research cited by the prosecutor, as a reviewing court with the full record before us, we do possess the tools, and are charged with the duty, to ensure that the “sufficiency of the evidence” standard is met. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, we are unable to conclude that a rational juror could have determined that defendant’s actions “tended to cause” the child to become delinquent. By his presence in the home, the child did not violate, nor was he in danger of violating, any “municipal ordinance or law of the state or of the United States.” Nor does the record contain any evidence whatsoever that the child was “disposed or inclined” to abuse drugs, engage in criminality, or become a delinquent for any other reason. Quite simply, the prosecutor presented no evidence regarding the child’s education, behavioral history, relationships with his peers, or any other relevant fact that could support the conclusion that defendant’s actions “tended to cause” this child, to become delinquent. Therefore, no matter how favorably we interpret the evidence in the prosecutor’s favor, as we are required to do, defendant’s conviction cannot be sustained under
2. “NEGLECT”
The prosecutor also argues that defendant’s conviction can be sustained on grounds of neglect. Specifically, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the child “being in that house is being subject to neglect and/or delinquency.” Again, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to allow a rational fact-finder to make such a finding. There was simply no evidence presented that the illegal drugs or firearms at issue had any impact on the child’s “mental well-being” or his “health and morals,” as there was no evidence at all that he was even aware of these items, much less of their illegality. The child’s awareness of the illegal items is critical, if not dispositive, in this case because the overall evidence is so very sparse. To review, the evidence indicated that the child was found on the couch in the living room; he had his own bedroom; drugs were found under the bed in the parents’ bedroom; the firearms were found in a dresser drawer in the parents’ bedroom; he started crying when the police entered his home; and his mother was handcuffed and given a citation. Everything the jury knew about this child was in relation to his presence in the home at the moment of the raid; the jury knew these facts and it knew nothing more. By resting her case on a theory that the child’s presence in the home plus illegal activity in the home amounts to a violation of
The other relevant ground for a finding of neglect is under
Nor, in contrast to the home in Antjuan Owens, was there any indication that defendant’s home was a “drug-house,” subject to an influx of drug purchasers, or otherwise unsanitary or uninhabitable. Rather, the record established only that the house was a furnished two-bedroom home. There is nothing from the evidence that suggests that the physical condition of the home made it in any way “unfit” for a juvenile to live in. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could not reasonably find that defendant’s home was rendered an “unfit place” for the child to live “by reason of” defendant’s criminal conduct where there was no evidence at all that the child was even aware of this criminality.
Therefore, once again, no matter how favorably we interpret the evidence in the prosecutor’s favor, defendant’s conviction cannot be sustained under
IV SLIPPERY SLOPE
In deciding this case, like all cases, we are conscious that our judicial duty is “to declare what the law is . . . .” Wilson v Arnold, 5 Mich 98, 104 (1858). In attempting to discharge this duty, we have relied on traditional tools of interpretation to determine what constitutes the most reasonable meaning of relevant statutory provisions. Accordingly, our holding rests on the conclusion that defendant’s conviction cannot be sustained in accordance with the most reasonable interpretation of
However, we would be derelict if we did not comment further on the very steep slippery slope down which our legal system would be headed if this statute were to be . given the interpretation urged by the prosecutor and the dissents, and adopted by the lower courts. We have already commented upon the extraordinarily broad, and arguably absurd, applications of
The prosecutor and the dissents would also effectively read out of the statute language requiring a causal connection between a defendant’s “criminality” and a finding that his home is “unfit” for a juvenile. No further showing would be required in order to establish a violation of
At oral argument, the prosecutor appeared to recognize this slippeiy slope. When asked whether a hypothetical case involving a parent’s possession of an illegally scalped sporting or entertainment event ticket would fall within the statute, the prosecutor responded, “I don’t know. I don’t think I would feel comfortable arguing to a jury that going to a football game with some tickets bought from a scalper produces the substantial risk [to] mental well-being. I don’t think that does fall within the statute.” When asked if she was suggesting that this Court rely exclusively on the good judgment of the prosecutor not to bring such a case rather than on the law itself, the prosecutor answered, “Well, and if the prosecutor misuses their judgment you would deal with it in the appropriate case as well.” However, this Court does not review the discretionary charging judgments of the prosecutor, but rather the prosecutor’s compliance with the law. And despite the prosecutor’s initial assertion in this case that ticket scalping “does [not] fall within the statute,” it is clear that there is no basis whatsoever in the prosecutor’s own interpretation of the law that would allow for a ticket-scalping exception or that would distinguish between criminal offenses.16
V RESPONSE TO DISSENTS
In their dissents, Justices CORRIGAN and YOUNG take issue with our interpretation of the relevant statutes, our application of the law, and, most insistently, with the result that we reach. While we have addressed discrete points of disagreement throughout this opinion, it is necessary to respond more generally to our differing perspectives.
First, we respectfully disagree that this case is as “simple” as the dissenters would have it.17 Rather, this case requires consideration
Second, unlike the dissents, we find it significant that a conviction under
Third, we disagree with the dissents that it is we who misconstrue the “sufficiency of the evidence” standard. This standard makes clear that a reviewing court is required to take the evidence produced at trial in a light favorable to the prosecutor.19 As such, this standard does
VI. CONCLUSION
We recognize that the facts here engender no sympathy for defendant. It is easy to understand, and even applaud, the admonition delivered by the trial court to defendant at sentencing, when it stated, “I’m not going to tolerate this kind of behavior by a parent of a child in this state.” As with the trial court and the dissents, we desire more for the children of this state than a parent who keeps contraband in the home. The fact remains that the evidence presented in this case cannot sustain defendant’s conviction under
On the facts of this case, where the jury was presented with no evidence other than that a child was present in a home where criminal activity occurred, we hold that a rational fact-finder could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant “tend[ed] to cause” the child to become delinquent or neglected so as to “tend to
Notes
Alternatively, this element can be satisfied with proof that defendant “encouragefd], contributed toward, [or] caused” a minor to become neglected or delinquent. Like the prosecutor, we focus our analysis on the “tend[ed] to cause” alternative because it requires the lowest threshold of proof.
Alternatively, this element can be satisfied with proof that the minor child did, in fact, “come .. . under the jurisdiction of the probate court.” The instant analysis focuses on the “tend to come” alternative again because it requires the lowest threshold of proof.
Contrary to the assertions of the dissents, the fact that the violation of this statute constitutes a misdemeanor has no obvious bearing on this Court’s application of the “sufficiency of the evidence” standard, which is the same for a misdemeanor as for a felony. Both require evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
This definition is similar to that relied upon by the prosecutor, which defines “tend” as meaning “to be apt or inclined.” Oxford Dictionary & Thesaurus, American Edition (1996).
This common understanding of “tend” is taken for granted in everyday speech. Thus, the statement “I tend to be an early riser” conveys that I tend not to be a late riser; and the statement “My son tends to be a well-behaved child” conveys that he tends not to be a poorly behaved child. From these statements, it can be said that, more likely than not, I will get up early and my son will behave well.
The absurd results rule “demonstrates a respect for the coequal Legislative Branch, which we assume would not act in an absurd way.” Pub Citizen v United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 US 440, 470; 109 S Ct 2558; 105 L Ed 2d 377 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring); “[I]t is a venerable principle that a law will not be interpreted to produce absurd results.” K Mart Corp v Cartier, Inc, 486 US 281, 324 n 2; 108 S Ct 1811; 100 L Ed 2d 313 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55, 79; 718 NW2d 784 (2006) (Markman, J., concurring) (“The ‘absurd results’ rule underscores that the ultimate purpose of the interpretative process is to accord respect to the judgments of the lawmakers.”).
We consider termination to be a potentially serious consequence of a conviction for contributing to a child’s delinquency or neglect under
Contrary to the repeated criticisms of the dissent, our consideration of the relationship between a
Notwithstanding the dissenting justices’ characterization of this discussion as “confusing,” we do not think that lower courts will be confused by this standard, which requires only that courts apply a “more likely than not” analysis. Indeed, applying this standard should hardly be more difficult than applying the “ ‘more probable than not’ ” standard supported by each of the presently dissenting justices in People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 494; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
The dissenting justices also consider this discussion “unnecessary,” and instead would employ their “straightforward approach” to discerning the proper meaning of “tend,” which basically consists of listing the word’s multiple definitions and then more or less arbitrarily inserting language found in one of these definitions into the statute with no explanation of why this particular definition is appropriate. As is evident to others who have considered
Justice Corrigan correctly notes that a “probable cause” stándard is used to authorize jurisdiction under
The trial court did not provide the jury with the statutory definition of “neglect” or “delinquency” found in
From the available caselaw, it appears that most convictions under
Similarly, the trial court focused on delinquency as its rationale for how the child would “tend to come” under family court jurisdiction, stating at sentencing:
[Wje’ve got a situation where someone who’s committing criminal activity and has a young child in the house and that young child thinks, well, daddy does it, I can do it, too. You know, good grief. And it just gets — it just goes on and on and on and on. So that your life is not the only one that’s ruined, but all the people that you love as well.
Although both the prosecutor and the trial court concentrated on delinquency as the applicable grounds for defendant’s conviction, the dissents do not discuss this ground at all.
If, for example, social science research further suggested some correlation between exposure to violent video games and aggressiveness in children, or between divorce and behavioral problems, or even between poverty and delinquency, then could anything on the part of the parent contributing to these circumstances “tend” to contribute to a child’s delinquency?
Absent any evidence of the child’s awareness, the dissenting justices offer two largely irrelevant and distracting facts to sustain defendant’s conviction: (1) that the child’s mother was “arrested”; and (2) that the child started crying when the police raided defendant’s home. In doing this, the dissents do nothing more than reiterate their theory that the child’s presence plus illegal activity in the home amounts to a separate criminal violation. Concerning the “arrest,” while one officer testified that the mother was “arrested,” it appears that the officer used this phrase to explain only that the mother had been “forcibly restrained,” not that she was taken into custody. This is consistent with the testimony of another officer who, when asked if the mother was “arrested,” clarified that she had been written a “ticket.” That the officers ticketed the mother at the scene is confirmed by the police activity log. That neither officer indicated the mother was ever removed from the home explains why the prosecutor, unlike the dissenting justices, never pursued the argument that the child was ever left “without proper custody.”
Concerning the child’s crying, while Justice Corrigan is undoubtedly correct that an in-home arrest is “traumatic” to all concerned, especially to children, we do not believe that this evidence sustains a conviction under
Moreover, defendant’s criminality surrounding the firearms is predicated upon his status as a convicted felon. Absent this status, the firearms found in defendant’s bedroom are indistinguishable from those found in hundreds of thousands of homes in Michigan. A firearm is a firearm, and unless a child is aware that a firearm is possessed unlawfully, it is hard to understand what distinction there could be in that child’s mind between a legal and an illegal firearm, and what difference there could be in causing him to become delinquent or neglected. Furthermore, although the dissenters decry the fact that the firearms found in a drawer in defendant’s bedroom were “unsecured” and “loaded,” it is not illegal in this state to store firearms in this manner. Indeed, such storage would not be uncommon in the case of persons who rely upon these for personal and family self-defense. We point this out not to minimize defendant’s criminal conduct, for his drug and firearms convictions are not altered in any way by this case, but to indicate why something more than mere awareness of, or exposure to, a firearm is required before it can be considered as contributing to the delinquency of a child or as evidence of neglect. At the same time, we reiterate that there is not even evidence that the child was aware of, or exposed to, a firearm in this case.
Although Justice Corrigan attempts to limit the potentially sweeping scope of the rule she would adopt, in the end, under her interpretation, the only thing standing athwart a judicially created crime wave for “delinquency or neglect” will be the good judgment of prosecutors, and that cannot be the exclusive safeguard of the people. Despite the focus of
Even more remarkably, Justice Corrigan expresses “no opinion concerning the circumstances under which a jury could convict a law-abiding gun owner of a misdemeanor under
Moreover, if, as the dissents necessarily argue, the mere presence of contraband is “inherently dangerous” to the child’s health, there is no principled reason why the mere presence of other contraband, such as false tax returns, would not be “inherently dangerous” to the child’s morals. Finally, by suggesting that this case would be different “if defendant had been arrested on the street and had kept his guns and drugs outside the home,” Justice CORRIGAN merely underscores the validity of our criticism that where contraband is not located “outside” the home, but “inside,” and a child is merely present, a criminal violation will routinely be established under her interpretation of
The dissenting justices criticize the analysis in this opinion as “lengthy,” “unnecessary,” and “confusing,” and avoid their own lengthiness, unnecessariness, and confusion largely by avoiding analysis at all. Concerning the critical term in question, “tend,” the dissents manage not to address the various meanings of this term, not to select among these meanings, and not to justify a preferred meaning. If it is the avoidance of a “lengthy” analysis that the dissents desire, they succeed with flying colors. When Justice Young states that “[o]nly a lawyer” could produce the result reached in this opinion, this appears to he shorthand for the promise that there will be no serious analysis of the law in his opinion, and he lives up to this promise.
From the absence of discussion of delinquency, we assume that the dissents recognize that there is no evidence in this record to sustain defendant’s conviction on this ground.
“One of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the (prosecution) has the burden of establishing guilt solely on the basis of evidence produced in court and under circumstances assuring an accused all the safeguards of a fair procedure.” Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717, 729; 81 S Ct 1639; 6 L Ed 2d 751 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Again, the prosecutor argued that the child’s “being in that house is being subject to neglect and/or delinquency.”
Because of lack of evidence produced at trial, the dissents turn to evidence that was not presented at trial to sustain defendant’s conviction. In doing so, they forget that the prosecutor “has the burden of establishing guilt solely on the basis of evidence produced in court . . . .” Irvin, 366 US at 729 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). For instance, Justice Young’s dissent places great weight on the fact that “the trial court did, in fact, recommend to the Department of Human Services that the court exercise jurisdiction over the child,” albeit on the basis of the same failure to assess the applicable law as the dissenting justices. Nonetheless, this fact was not in evidence because the trial court did not make this recommendation until sentencing. Likewise, the jury was not presented with evidence of defendant’s “open use of heroin,” as Justice Young suggests, or that defendant was a “repeat drug-offender,” as noted by Justice CORRIGAN. And, as already noted, the jury did not consider the social science research offered by the prosecutor on appeal.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I would affirm defendant’s misdemeanor conviction for contributing to the neglect or delinquency of a minor under
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Defendant is a repeat drug offender. On August 16, 2006, officers with the Narcotics Section of the Detroit Police Department executed a warrant to search for drugs in defendant’s home. They knocked on defendant’s door and ultimately forced it open and entered the home. They found a small boy — defendant’s 10-year-old stepson — sitting alone on the living room couch. The boy was scared and crying. He was dressed only in his underwear.
The officers discovered defendant sitting on a bed in one of the home’s two bedrooms. They observed a plastic bag filled with heroin on a plate under the bed. They also found a digital scale used for weighing narcotics and two loaded handguns in the drawer of his bedroom dresser. Finally, the officers confiscated cash that
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v Wright, 477 Mich 1121, 1122 (2007). “A reviewing court need not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id., quoting Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 319; 99 S Ct 2781; 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979) (additional quotation marks and citation omitted). “Rather, ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Wright, 477 Mich at 1122, quoting Jackson, 443 US at 319 (emphasis omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A.
Any person who shall by any act, or by any word, encourage, contribute toward, cause or tend to cause any minor child under the age of 17 years to become neglected or delinquent so as to come or tend to come under the jurisdiction of the [family] division of the [circuit] court, as defined in [MCL 712A.2 ], whether or not such child shall in fact be adjudicated a ward of the . .. court, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.[2]
Significantly, the statute does not require the evidence to show that a defendant’s acts actually caused the child to come under the court’s jurisdiction. Rather, the text establishes a fairly low threshold, asking whether a defendant’s acts encouraged, contributed toward, caused, or tended to cause a child to come or tend to come under the court’s jurisdiction. And, crucially, the statute applies “whether or not such child shall in fact be adjudicated a ward” of the court.
First, as the majority opinion observes, the statute twice employs the word “tend.” “Tend” is a commonly used word that needs little explanation.3 According to
1. to be disposed or inclined in action, operation, of effect to do something .... 3. to lead or conduce, as to some result or condition.... 4. to be inclined to or have a tendency toward a particular quality, state or degree .... 5. (of a course, road, etc.) to lead or be directed in a particular direction....
Webster’s defines “tendency” in relevant part as follows: “1. a natural or prevailing disposition to move, proceed, or act in some direction or toward some point, end, or result. 2. an inclination, bent, or predisposition to something.” Id. Finally, Webster’s states that to “predispose” is “1. to make susceptible or liable: genetic factors predisposing us to disease. 2. to dispose beforehand; incline; bias.” Thus,
Second, a defendant’s acts need not actually cause, or be the sole cause of, a tendency toward the court having jurisdiction over the child. Rather, it is sufficient for a jury to conclude that the acts “encourage[d]” or “contribute[d] toward” such a tendency.4
Finally, the statute not only lacks any requirement that actual court jurisdiction be realized, it also does not require that the child become a ward of the court if the court does actually assume jurisdiction as the result of alleged abuse or neglect. As I explain further below, an order assuming court jurisdiction over a child is distinct from an order rendering the child a court ward. The court may take initial jurisdiction in order to ensure that a child is protected, but the child may never become a court ward; that is, he may not be removed from his parents’ care although conditions justifying initial jurisdiction are present. Further, even if the child becomes
B.
Because a jury must be able to conclude that a defendant’s acts affected a child’s tendency to come under the court’s jurisdiction as defined in
(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship. . . . [or]
(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent adult, or other custodian, is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in. [MCL 712A.2(b) .]
A court may authorize a petition for jurisdiction under
Indeed, an initial exercise of court jurisdiction may result in a wide array of outcomes. For example, the court may permit the child to remain with his parents “under reasonable terms and conditions necessary for either the juvenile’s physical health or mental well-being.”
This discussion highlights the normal threshold necessary for the court to establish jurisdiction over a child. However, important for my analysis here, I reiterate that the prosecution need not establish that there was actual jurisdiction over the child or that there was actual probable cause for such jurisdiction. The prosecution need only show that defendant’s actions were of such a kind or sort that they contributed to or tended to cause the child’s susceptibility to the court’s jurisdiction.
C. APPLICATION
Here the police found heroin6 under defendant’s bed and two loaded guns in an unlocked dresser drawer of the bedroom that defendant shared with the child’s mother. As a result of the raid, defendant and the child’s mother were arrested. The raid thus revealed that, as a result of defendant’s crimes, the child lived in an unsafe home where heroin and loaded weapons were easily accessible to the child. One could certainly entertain a reasonable belief that the accessible guns and extremely dangerous drugs — kept not in a safe or other locked area, but under a bed and in a dresser drawer — posed a significant danger to a 10-year-old child.7 It would take moments for a child to walk into a bedroom and discover heroin under a bed or open a dresser drawer to discover loaded weapons. I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the child’s awareness of the heroin and weapons is decisive. A jury could conclude that the unsecured heroin and weapons posed a significant danger to the child without regard to whether the child had yet discovered these items. I similarly disagree with the
Accordingly, the evidence of unsecured drugs and two unsecured, loaded weapons was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that defendant’s acts posed a danger to the child that would tend to result in or contribute toward court jurisdiction, particularly under
In sum, defendant’s criminal acts resulted in the presence of dangerous items in the child’s home and a traumatic police raid. Because of these combined facts, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude that defendant’s acts tended to cause, encouraged, or contributed to neglect — of the child’s health or morals, of his mental wellness, or by creating an unfit home — to such an extent that a court was likely to find probable cause to believe that there was neglect and thus that the child was susceptible to the court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly
IV ADDITIONAL RESPONSES TO THE MAJORITY
I respectfully suggest that the majority’s analysis is underpinned, to some degree, by a misunderstanding of family division jurisdiction and conflation of the potential assertion of jurisdiction with termination of parental rights. As explained above, and contrary to the majority’s fears, initial court jurisdiction over a child is not akin to a termination proceeding and by no means must lead to termination of parental rights.
Here, for example, the court could have assumed initial jurisdiction because of the unsafe conditions discovered by the police at the time of the raid. But the court may well have immediately returned the child home conditioned on proof of the removal of all guns and drugs — and, indeed, perhaps on removal of defendant himself — from the home. My point is that the court still could have obtained jurisdiction over the child as an initial matter because of defendant’s criminal acts even if there were no grounds for termination and the child never became a court ward but was simply returned to his mother.
I further note, in response to the majority’s fears, that the low thresholds established by
In any event, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that this case involves “a ‘by itself’ criminal conviction serving as a basis for a neglect or delinquency conviction.” To the contrary, as discussed above, defendant’s specific acts — keeping unsecured drugs and loaded weapons in the home and necessitating a police raid — were a sufficient basis on which to find probable cause justifying the court’s jurisdiction because the acts compromised the child’s health, morals, and mental well-being or rendered the home unfit for the child as a result of criminality. Therefore, this case is not comparable to the majority’s hypothetical cases in which, for example, a parent merely commits tax fraud, performs unlicensed work, or possesses items such as pirated DVDs or “scalped” football tickets in a home where a child is present. First, most of these supposed crimes do not involve keeping inherently dangerous items unsecured in the home. Second, the effect to a child of a parent’s unlawful activity cannot be ascertained without the surrounding facts of a particular case. For instance, the majority refers to parents who possess unlawful fireworks. Whether such possession could ever form the basis for a court taking jurisdiction over a child would clearly depend on numerous factors including the dangerousness and location of the fireworks and the age of the child. With regard to the majority’s aforementioned fears for lawful gun owners, I express no opinion concerning the circumstances under which a jury could convict a law-abiding gun owner of a misdemeanor under
In closing, a conviction under
v CONCLUSION
For each of these reasons, I would affirm defendant’s misdemeanor conviction for contributing to the neglect or delinquency of a minor under
People v Tennyson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 16, 2008 (Docket No. 278826), p 4.
2 The statutory language has been altered to reflect the transfer of jurisdiction from the probate court to the family division of circuit court. See
I find the majority’s lengthy discussion of “tend” unnecessary and confusing. The majority accuses me of “avoiding analysis at all” and failing “to address the various meanings of this term....” But this Court’s duty is to ascertain the plain, everyday meaning of non-technical statutory words.
The majority focuses on the Legislature’s use of the word “tend” in
A conviction under
Heroin is classified in the highest, most harmful category of drugs; it is a schedule 1 controlled substance,
Because the facts revealed multiple unsecured, loaded weapons within a child’s reach combined with similarly accessible heroin, defendant’s acts cannot be directly compared to those of a law-abiding gun owner. I address the majority’s fears concerning law-abiding gun owners later in this opinion.
This is to say nothing of the danger posed by defendant’s apparent drug-dealing, particularly if he engaged in drug transactions in the child’s home. The jury was not asked to decide whether the evidence showed that defendant engaged in drug sales although testimony by police officers at trial established that, during the raid, they confiscated a digital scale and money they believed was attributable to drug dealing. Arguably this evidence could cause a probate court to form a reasonable belief that defendant’s drug-dealing posed an additional danger to the child worthy of investigation.
Further, particularly with regard to the child’s mental well-being, the evidence shows that the child was scared and crying during the police raid. Defendant’s criminal acts were the direct cause of the police raid that traumatized the child. I express no opinion concerning whether a police raid caused by a defendant’s criminality could alone justify a conviction under
I also note that, if both of the child’s caregivers were detained as a result of the police raid, the jury could have reached the alternative conclusion that the child was susceptible to the court’s jurisdiction because he was “without proper custody or guardianship.”
See also People v Beasley, 370 Mich 242, 246; 121 NW2d 457 (1963) (observing that a felony in Michigan is distinguishable from a misdemeanor “by reason of the place and severity of punishment”); 1 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 1:2, p 9 (“Misdemeanors . . . include all crimes for which punishment is provided that do not amount to felonies, and all acts prohibited by statute where the statute imposes no penalty for the violation.”).
Clearly, mere gun ownership does not endanger children and will not lead to the court taking jurisdiction over a child. Further, legal gun ownership may not be said to render a home unfit for a child under
It is irrelevant that the judge who presided over defendant’s criminal trial stated at sentencing that he would contact the Department of Human Services to request that a petition be filed to “terminate” defendant’s parental rights. The judge actually — and properly— requested an investigation into possible neglect or abuse. Any resulting child protective proceedings against defendant would take place according the mandates and protections of the juvenile code; the criminal judge’s mention of “termination” is of no moment.
In 2009, for example, 6,975 child protection petitions alleging abuse or neglect were filed. Only 2,618 termination petitions were filed that year. See Michigan Supreme Court Annual Report 2009, p 45 <http://courts.michigan.gov/scao/resources/publications/statistics/2009/ 2009execsum.pdf> (accessed May 21, 2010).
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). This is really a very simple case. Defendant shared a home with his 10-year-old stepson. In that home, defendant used heroin and stored it on a plate under his bed; he also kept loaded firearms in an unlocked bedroom dresser. These acts precipitated a raid by the police and the arrest of defendant while the child was present.
Only a lawyer could come to the conclusion that defendant’s conduct does not constitute “criminality” that, in theory, allows the family division of the circuit court to take jurisdiction over defendant’s stepchild. And here we need not even engage in theoretical or fanciful speculation because the trial court did, in fact, recommend to the Department of Human Services that the court exercise jurisdiction over the child. Yet four justices of this Court have held that keeping heroin and illegal, loaded handguns in easily accessible locations in a home occupied by a 10-year-old boy were insufficient predicates for a jury to find defendant guilty of the misdemeanor of contributing to the delinquency or neglect of a minor.
I concur in Justice CORRIGAN’s analysis that the evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction. In particular, I fully support Justice CORRIGAN’s straightforward analysis regarding the use of “tend” in the statute: the phrase “tend to cause” is clearly directional and it certainly does not require “but for” causation as the majority opinion holds. I simply cannot subscribe to the majority’s herculean effort to create a heightened standard of causation out of a
The majority concludes that it would be “unreasonable” and “potentially absurd”3 for the Legislature to have created criminal liability on these facts. I do not believe that the legislative protection of children in homes where heroin is used and where loaded guns are easily accessible is either unreasonable or absurd. Simply put, the open use of heroin or being a felon illegally in possession of a firearm is the type of “criminality” contemplated by the statute, which criminality “tend[s] to cause” a child in its presence to become neglected or delinquent. Accordingly, I dissent.
Corrigan, J., concurred with Young, J. DAVIS, J.,did not participate in the decision of this case in order to avoid unnecessary delay to the parties in a case considered by the Court before he assumed office by following the practice of previous justices in transition and participating only in those cases for which his vote would be result-determinative. His non-participation in this decision does not affect his eligibility to participate in deciding a motion for rehearing.
Ante at 737 (emphasis added).
The causation language of
Ante at 740.