People v. Hodges CA2/6
B305465
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jul 27, 2021Background
- In 2000 Desmond Alexander was shot and killed; Odell Hodges was tried and convicted of first‑degree murder.
- The prosecution argued Hodges was the shooter; the jury acquitted the special allegation that Hodges personally and intentionally discharged the fatal firearm (the 12022.53(d) allegation was found NOT TRUE).
- In 2019 Hodges petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code §1170.95, asserting he was not the actual killer and could not now be convicted under the revised law (Senate Bill No. 1437).
- At the initial §1170.95 stage the trial court asked defense counsel if Hodges was the actual shooter; counsel effectively conceded, and the court summarily denied the petition without considering the jury’s finding or Hodges’s verified petition.
- The People did not assert Hodges was the shooter in opposition; on appeal the Court of Appeal held the court’s summary denial rested on an incorrect factual finding and that Hodges was denied a fair first‑stage §1170.95 hearing and effective counsel.
- The Court reversed and remanded for a new §1170.95 hearing so the trial court can assess eligibility consistent with the record and applicable law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was summary denial of §1170.95 petition proper when court relied on belief Hodges was the shooter? | Trial court’s factual finding was permissible; appellate court may affirm by substituting findings. | The court relied on an incorrect fact—jury found Hodges did not personally discharge the fatal weapon—and thus summary denial was improper. | Reversed: court erred; must consider the record and petitioner’s verified statements before summary dismissal. |
| Did Hodges have a right to effective counsel at the §1170.95 first stage and was counsel ineffective? | No Sixth Amendment right in postconviction; counsel’s concession was not prejudicial. | Hodges had a due process right to appointed and effective counsel; counsel’s inaccurate concession prejudiced eligibility. | Held Hodges was entitled to effective representation; counsel’s concession was deficient and prejudicial at the first stage. |
| Can prosecution rely on alternative theories (direct aider/abettor liability) to defeat eligibility without further factfinding? | Hodges could still be liable as a direct aider and abettor, so he’s ineligible. | The record does not conclusively establish aider/abettor intent; jury rejected shooter theory; SB 1437 and case law changes require further inquiry. | Trial court cannot resolve these disputes at first stage; must issue an order to show cause and allow evidentiary development. |
| Did Hodges make a prima facie showing under §1170.95 (including claim the natural and probable consequences doctrine applied)? | SB 1437 relief targets NPC cases; claim NPC not applicable here. | Hodges alleged NPC doctrine applied and jury instructions contained NPC language; that supports a prima facie showing. | Court treated the verified petition and record as sufficient to preclude summary denial and remanded for full §1170.95 proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Anthony, 32 Cal.App.5th 1102 (explaining SB 1437’s purpose to limit murder liability for non‑killers)
- People v. Drayton, 47 Cal.App.5th 965 (verified §1170.95 petition may preclude summary dismissal)
- People v. Cervantes, 44 Cal.App.5th 884 (discussing summary dismissal of frivolous or ineligible §1170.95 petitions)
- People v. Verdugo, 44 Cal.App.5th 320 (same)
- People v. Cornelius, 44 Cal.App.5th 54 (same)
- People v. Duchine, 60 Cal.App.5th 798 (due process requires fair §1170.95 proceedings)
- People v. Rouse, 245 Cal.App.4th 292 (right to counsel in post‑judgment proceedings grounded in due process)
- Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152 (right to appointed counsel in certain appellate/postconviction contexts)
- Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (right to counsel in appellate proceedings under due process)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- People v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (limits on imposing murder liability on non‑killers)
- People v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (standards for malice/reckless indifference and major participant analysis)
- People v. Gentile, 10 Cal.5th 830 (aider‑and‑abettor instruction must require proof of malice to impose murder liability)
- People v. Rivera, 62 Cal.App.5th 217 (trial court should not question petitioner’s evidence at first §1170.95 stage when record is not conclusive)
- People v. Tarkington, 49 Cal.App.5th 892 (take petitioner’s factual allegations as true at prima facie stage)
