People v. Dearborne, 246 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63

Background

Defendant kidnapped Yolanda, threatened her with what she believed was a gun, raped her in a car, then forced her into prostitution; the john also orally copulated and had intercourse with Yolanda while Destiny chaperoned. Defendant also controlled another prostitute, Alexandra E., and an uncharged prior victim testified to similar conduct.
Jury convicted defendant of multiple offenses including human trafficking, kidnapping to commit a sex offense, forcible rape in concert (two counts), forcible oral copulation in concert (two counts), robbery, pimping, and pandering; special findings under the One Strike law and numerous priors were found or admitted.
Trial verdict: guilty on all charged counts; court sentenced to an aggregate term of 205 years to life plus 28 years, with some counts stayed and some concurrent as described in the opinion.
On appeal defendant challenged (1) sufficiency of the evidence for forcible rape and rape-in-concert (arguing rapes were by threats/fear not force and that the john lacked mens rea), (2) instructional errors (force instruction and failure to instruct mistake of fact re: the john), and (3) multiple sentencing errors (section 654 stay, sentencing discretion to run certain counts concurrently, presentence and conduct credits, and retroactive discretion to strike a 5‑year prior enhancement).
Court affirmed convictions, found substantial evidence supported forcible rape and rape-in-concert, rejected instructional‑error claims, but (a) agreed the court misapprehended its discretion to run certain counts consecutively and remanded for resentencing on those counts, (b) held the pimping sentence must be stayed under section 654, (c) awarded two additional days of custody credit, (d) denied conduct‑credit entitlement under the One Strike law, and (e) remanded to allow the trial court to consider striking the five‑year serious‑felony enhancement under amended section 1385.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of forcible rape (force vs. fear)	Evidence shows physical acts (pinning, fake gun) overcame victim's will; supports forcible rape.	Rapes were accomplished by threats/fear, a lesser showing than "force" required for One Strike/forcible rape.	Affirmed: pinning and pressing a fake gun against victim satisfied force; substantial evidence supported forcible rape.
Rape‑in‑concert liability re: john's mens rea	Victim testified she repeatedly said she did not consent; jury could infer john knew lack of consent; even if john lacked mens rea, defendant intended and acted in concert.	If the john honestly and reasonably believed consent existed, he did not commit rape; then defendant cannot be guilty in concert.	Affirmed: jury could infer john knew lack of consent; even if john lacked mens rea, defendant's own intent sufficed for concert liability.
Instructional error — mistake of fact regarding the john	N/A (People argued victim's statements showed lack of reasonable mistake)	Trial court should have instructed sua sponte on mistake of fact re: the john's belief about consent.	Rejected: defendant did not request instruction or rely on that defense; no substantial evidence supporting the defense; no sua sponte duty to instruct.
Instructional error — clarity on "force"	N/A	Rape‑in‑concert instruction was unclear because it referenced force and also threats/fear.	Forfeited: defendant failed to object at trial; instructions were legally accurate.
Section 654 (pimping vs. human trafficking)	Human trafficking and pimping were the same objective here; cannot punish both.	People argued forcible elements could render acts separately punishable.	Remand/correction: stay the pimping sentence under §654 — trafficking (as charged) necessarily included intent to pimp.
Sentencing discretion — consecutive vs concurrent under One Strike	N/A	Trial court thought it lacked discretion and imposed consecutive terms for related sex counts; defendant seeks remand.	Remanded: court erred in believing no discretion; resentencing needed so court can exercise discretion whether to run certain counts concurrently.
Presentence and conduct credits	People conceded two days of custody credit; One Strike statutory scheme excludes conduct credits.	Defendant sought additional conduct credits under general statutes.	Partially granted: add two days actual custody credit; denied conduct credits under One Strike as amended.
Retroactive relief on 5‑year prior enhancement	People conceded Senate Bill 1393 gives trial court discretion to strike prior serious‑felony enhancement.	Defendant sought remand to permit exercise of that discretion.	Remanded for the trial court to consider striking the five‑year enhancement under amended §1385.

Key Cases Cited

People v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (standard of substantial evidence review)
People v. Griffin, 33 Cal.4th 1015 (defining "force" in rape law; resistance no longer required)
People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal.3d 143 (mens rea/honest reasonable belief in consent defense)
People v. Brooks, 3 Cal.5th 1 (trial court sua sponte duty to instruct when evidence supports a defense)
Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11 (section 654 — single objective rule)
People v. Deloach, 207 Cal.App.3d 323 (distinguishing pandering vs. forcible sex acts for §654 purposes)
People v. Solis, 206 Cal.App.4th 1210 (separate‑occasion analysis under One Strike/§667.6)
People v. Brown, 147 Cal.App.4th 1213 (remand required when trial court misapprehends sentencing discretion)
People v. Adams, 28 Cal.App.5th 170 (One Strike amendments and entitlement to conduct credits)
People v. Garcia, 28 Cal.App.5th 961 (retroactivity of Senate Bill 1393/Sec. 1385 discretion)