People v. Buford
4 Cal. App. 5th 886
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Victor Leon Buford, serving 25 years-to-life under the pre-Prop. 36 three‑strikes law for a nonviolent, nonserious felony, petitioned under Prop. 36 (§ 1170.126) for recall and resentencing as a second‑strike offender.
- Trial court denied resentencing after a hearing, finding resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety.
- Prop. 36 makes eligible inmates "shall be resentenced" unless the court, in its discretion, determines resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger; the court may consider criminal history, in‑custody discipline/rehabilitation, and any other relevant evidence (§ 1170.126(g)).
- Central legal disputes: (1) burden and standard of proof the People must meet to justify denial (preponderance? beyond a reasonable doubt?), and whether that standard applies to the court’s ultimate discretionary decision; (2) whether Prop. 47’s definition of "unreasonable risk of danger to public safety" (§ 1170.18(c))—which restricts the risk to commission of a new "super strike" violent felony—applies to Prop. 36 resentencing.
- The appellate court affirmed: People must prove the underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence; the ultimate dangerousness decision is discretionary (reviewed for abuse of discretion); and Prop. 47’s § 1170.18(c) definition does not limit or modify § 1170.126.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burden/standard to deny resentencing | People: must prove facts supporting dangerousness by preponderance of the evidence | Buford: People must prove dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt or at least the ultimate dangerousness by preponderance | People must prove the underlying facts by a preponderance, but the trial court’s ultimate discretionary determination need not itself be reached by applying that numeric standard; appellate review is for abuse of discretion (facts reviewed for substantial evidence). |
| Whether § 1170.126(f) creates a presumption in favor of resentencing | People: statute permits courts to deny resentencing when risk shown; no presumption limiting court discretion | Buford: "shall be resentenced unless" creates a presumption in favor of resentencing | No presumption; statutory language affords trial courts broad discretion to deny resentencing when an unreasonable risk of danger is supported by facts. |
| Whether Prop. 47’s § 1170.18(c) definition (risk limited to new "super strike" violent felonies) applies to Prop. 36 resentencing | People: § 1170.18(c) does not alter § 1170.126; voter materials show Prop. 47 addressed different subjects and did not signal change to Prop. 36 | Buford: § 1170.18(c) says "as used throughout this Code," so it should define "unreasonable risk" in § 1170.126 | § 1170.18(c) does not modify § 1170.126; reading it into Prop. 36 would frustrate Prop. 36’s purpose and was not indicated in Prop. 47 voter materials. |
| Focus of the dangerousness inquiry and review standard | People: courts may consider past crimes and custody records to assess current risk; trial court discretion | Buford: decision must show logical nexus to current dangerousness; parole standards may inform review | The inquiry must focus on current risk of danger; prior conduct only supports denial if it remains predictive of current dangerousness. Trial court’s ultimate decision reviewed for abuse of discretion; underlying factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Carmony, 33 Cal.4th 367 (Cal. 2004) (discretionary sentencing reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- People v. Kaulick, 215 Cal.App.4th 1279 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (People bear burden to prove dangerousness by preponderance)
- People v. Blakely, 225 Cal.App.4th 1042 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (Apprendi line does not require jury/beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt finding for Prop. 36 resentencing factors)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (U.S. 2010) (Sixth Amendment does not attach to limits on downward sentence modifications due to intervening laws)
- In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181 (Cal. 2008) (parole decisions require a rational nexus to current dangerousness)
- People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (Cal. 2014) (statutory syntax ambiguity can preclude inferring a presumption from "shall/unless")
- In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (Cal. 1965) (retroactivity presumption for statutes mitigating punishment, discussed in context of Penal Code § 3)