912 N.W.2d 514
Mich.2018Background
- Defendant Carl Bruner II was tried jointly with Michael Lawson for a 2012 nightclub shooting that killed one security guard; no eyewitness identified the shooter.
- Prosecution planned to call Westley Webb, who had testified at Lawson’s preliminary exam that Lawson relayed statements implicating Bruner; Webb was not called at Bruner’s preliminary exam.
- At trial Webb could not be located; the trial court declared him unavailable and the prosecutor sought to read Webb’s preliminary-exam testimony to the jury.
- The court allowed admission of Webb’s prior testimony only as to Lawson, redacting Bruner’s name to the word “Blank,” and gave a limiting instruction that the testimony should be considered only against Lawson.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed; the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding the admission violated Bruner’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights because the redaction and limiting instruction were ineffective.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Webb’s preliminary-exam testimony was "testimonial" for Confrontation Clause purposes | Testimony at a preliminary hearing is testimonial; admission requires availability or prior cross-examination | Webb’s statements attributed to Lawson were nontestimonial hearsay, so Confrontation Clause not implicated | Webb’s preliminary-exam testimony was testimonial; Confrontation Clause implicated |
| Whether admission of Webb’s prior testimony against Lawson violated Bruner’s confrontation rights at a joint trial | Reading testimonial prior testimony about Lawson’s statements against Lawson was permissible if redacted and limited to Lawson | Admission (even redacted and with limiting instruction) impermissibly implicated Bruner because he had no opportunity to cross-examine Webb | Admission violated Bruner’s Confrontation Clause rights; Bruton protection applies |
| Whether the trial court’s limiting instruction cured any Confrontation Clause/Bruton problem | Limiting instruction suffices; juries are presumed to follow instructions | Limiting instruction cannot be trusted where a codefendant’s confession implicates another; too prejudicial | Limiting instruction insufficient to cure the violation (Bruton rule) |
| Whether redaction (replacing defendant’s name with “Blank”) cured the Bruton problem | Redaction removing the name prevents testimony from being "against" the other defendant | The obvious redaction ("Blank") still points to Bruner given context and prosecutor’s opening; Gray prohibits obvious deletions | Redaction here was inadequate under Gray; Confrontation violation stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (nontestifying codefendant’s confession that implicates co-defendant cannot be used at joint trial even with limiting instruction)
- Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) (obvious redactions like blanks or "deleted" can be as prejudicial as unredacted confessions)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause applies to testimonial statements; testimonial hearsay of absent witnesses requires prior cross-examination)
- Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) (redaction that eliminates any reference to codefendant’s existence can avoid Confrontation Clause problems)
- People v. Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich. 392 (1994) (harmless-error analysis for preserved constitutional errors in Michigan)