PEOPLE v BRUNER
No. 154779
Michigan Supreme Court
March 28, 2018
501 Mich. 220
Arguеd on application for leave to appeal January 10, 2018. Chief Justice: Stephen J. Markman. Justices: Brian K. Zahra, Bridget M. McCormack, David F. Viviano, Richard H. Bernstein, Kurtis T. Wilder, Elizabeth T. Clement. Reporter of Decisions: Kathryn L. Loomis.
Syllabus
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
PEOPLE v BRUNER
Docket No. 154779. Argued on application for leave to appeal January 10, 2018. Decided March 28, 2018.
Carl R. Bruner II was convicted following a jury trial in the Wayne Circuit Court of first-degree premeditated murder,
In a unanimous opinion by Justice MCCORMACK, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
The admission at a joint trial with a single jury of an unavailable witness‘s prior testimony about a codefendant‘s confession violated Bruner‘s constitutional right to confrontation, notwithstanding the redaction of Bruner‘s name and the reading of a limiting instruction to the jury. Bruner had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, and because the substance of the witness‘s testimony—the codefendant‘s confession that implicated the defendant—was so powerfully incriminating, the limiting instruction and redaction were ineffective to cure the Confrontation Clause violation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for that Court to consider whether the prosecution established that the error was harmless beyоnd a reasonable doubt.
1. The Confrontation Clause, set forth in the
2. Webb‘s preliminary examination testimony was testimonial in nature. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was no Confrontation Clause violation (and therefore no Bruton violation) by ascribing significance to the nontestimonial nature of the statements Webb attributed to Lawson. Although Lawson‘s nontestimonial hearsay statements would not have implicated the Confrontation Clause if Webb had testified at trial, because Bruner‘s confrontation right would have been vindicated by cross-examining Webb, Bruner never got to cross-examine Webb. Because Webb‘s prior testimony was testimonial, the admission of that testimony implicated Bruner‘s confrontation right.
3. Neither the court‘s instruction that the jury should consider Webb‘s testimony only with respect to Lawson nor the redaction of Bruner‘s name from Webb‘s testimony remedied the violation of Bruner‘s confrontation right. Webb was a witness against Bruner for Confrontation Clause purposes in spite of the remedial steps taken by the court to attempt to limit the jury‘s consideration of Webb‘s testimony as only against Lawson. The United States Supreme Court held in Bruton that when one codefendant implicates another at their joint trial, that evidence is so powerfully incriminating that allowing it to go uncross-examined deprives the nonconfessing defendant of a fair trial. In such circumstances, a limiting instruction cannot be trusted to eliminate thе risk of prejudice and is not an adequate remedy for a confrontation violation. The redaction of Bruner‘s name was also not an adequate remedy. A codefendant‘s confession may be admissible if it is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant‘s name, but any reference to his or her existence. However, the obvious redaction used here—inserting the word “Blank” in place of Bruner‘s name—did not achieve that result, given that “Blank‘s” conduct was identical to what the prosecutor told the jury Bruner had done and that, because Bruner and Lawson were the only people charged, there was no other person to whom “Blank” might have referred. Because the limiting instruction and crude redaction were inadequate to protect Bruner, he was deprived of his right to confront Webb, a witness against him. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals judgment was reversed and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the prosecution established that the preserved constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Court of Appeals judgment reversed in part; circuit court order vacated; case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
©2018 State of Michigan
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
CARL RENE BRUNER II, Defendant-Appellant.
FILED March 28, 2018
No. 154779
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MCCORMACK, J.
In this case we consider whether the admission at a joint trial with a single jury of an unavailable witness‘s prior testimony about a codefendant‘s confession violated the defendant‘s constitutional right to confrontation, notwithstanding the redaction of the defendant‘s name and the reading of a limiting instruction to the jury. It did. The defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, and because the substance of the witness‘s testimony—the codefendant‘s confession that implicated the defendant—was so powerfully incriminating, the limiting instruction and redaction were ineffective to cure the Confrontation Clause violation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for that Court to
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The defendant, Carl Rene Bruner II, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder,
Bruner was tried jointly with codefendant Michael Lawson before a single jury. The prosecution argued that Bruner was the shooter and that he was aided or abetted by Lawson. Bruner‘s defense was that he was not present and was not the shooter. Lawson‘s defense was that he was merely present at the scene and was not otherwise involved in the shooting. The prosecution planned to call Westley Webb as a witness. Importantly, Webb had testified at Lawson‘s preliminary examination about statements he claimed Lawson had made to him a few days after the shooting; Webb did not testify at Bruner‘s preliminary examination.
At Lawson‘s preliminary examination, Webb testified that Lawson told him that the police were investigating Lawson because of an incident at a nightclub. Webb testified that Lawson said the bouncers threw Bruner out for fighting and therefore Lawson left the club with Bruner and they drove around the area in Bruner‘s car. Webb further testified that Lawson said that the two men parked down the block from the nightclub, Bruner walked off, and Lawson stepped out of the car for a cigarette. Webb testified that Lawson went on to say that he got back into the car and drove away because he heard gunshots. Although Webb did not offer the fact that Lawson described Bruner having a gun or committing a shooting, Webb was impeached with his police statement, in which he said Lawson described Bruner coming back with a gun.
The prosecutor understandably viewed Webb as a critical witness against Bruner. At trial, the prosecutor emphasized in his opening statement that Webb would be the key witness whose testimony would place the gun in Bruner‘s hands. But things do not always go as planned. And at the close of the prosecution‘s case in chief, the prosecutor informed the court that Webb could not be located аnd asked to read Webb‘s prior testimony to the jury. The trial court declared Webb unavailable. The prosecutor conceded that the prior testimony could not be admitted against Bruner and offered to remove mention of Bruner from the transcript of Webb‘s testimony. The trial court determined, over defense counsel‘s objection, that a limiting instruction would be adequate to ensure the jury would not consider the redacted testimony against Bruner. But the trial court found the testimony admissible against Lawson and it was read into the record. Each mention of Bruner‘s name was replaced with the word “Blank” and the court instructed the jury to consider the testimony only against Lawson.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Bruner‘s convictions, holding that the Confrontation Clause was not implicated by the admission of Webb‘s preliminary examination testimony because Lawson‘s statements to Webb were not testimonial and Webb‘s
II. DISCUSSION
Whether a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation has been violated is a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo. People v Fackelman, 489 Mich 515, 524; 802 NW2d 552 (2011). De novo review means we review this issue independently, without any required deference to the courts below. People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 268; 547 NW2d 280 (1996).
The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]”
Joint trials with a single jury present a special problem. Some evidence may be admissible as to one defendant but viоlate a codefendant‘s confrontation right. When that is the case, a court must either exclude the testimony or take measures to eliminate the confrontation problem. See Richardson v Marsh, 481 US 200, 209-212; 107 S Ct 1702; 95 L Ed 2d 176 (1987).
Since we presume juries follow their instructions, the result of a limiting instruction can often be as effective as еxcluding or redacting the testimony. But other times evidence is too compelling for a jury to ignore even with a limiting instruction. Especially relevant here, limiting instructions are categorically inadequate to protect against evidence that a nontestifying defendant confessed and implicated a codefendant in that confession. Bruton, 391 US 123. In such a case, the confrontation problem persists as if no instruction had been given at all. Id. at 137.
III. APPLICATION
Finally, to the issues here, of which there are two. First we must consider the threshold question whether Webb‘s preliminary examination testimony is “testimonial.” That question answers itself. It is Webb‘s testimony that presents a straightforward confrontation problem. And the content of Webb‘s prior testimony places it squarely in the category governed by Bruton. The pitfall that must be avoided in this case—and that which the Court of Appeals landed in—is ascribing significance to the nontestimonial nature of the statements Webb attributed to Lawson. To bе sure, Lawson‘s nontestimonial hearsay statements would not have implicated the Confrontation Clause if Webb had testified at trial—Bruner‘s confrontation right would have been vindicated by cross-examining Webb. But Bruner never got to cross-examine Webb.3 Because Webb‘s prior testimony was, of course, testimonial, the admission of that testimony implicates Bruner‘s confrontation right.
The second question we must answer is whether Webb was “a witness against” Bruner, in spite of the remedial steps taken by the court to attempt to limit the jury‘s consideration of Webb‘s testimony as only against Lawson.
Webb‘s testimony presented such a problem. Because Bruner did not cross-examine Webb, and the substance of Webb‘s statement placed it in a category “in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored,” id. at 135, the limiting instruction wаs not an adequate remedy for the Confrontation Clause violation.
Nor was the redaction. There are measures a court can take that permit the admission of a codefendant‘s confession that would otherwise violate Bruton without the need for separate trials or juries, including, in some cases, redaction. A codefendant‘s confession may escape Bruton‘s protective rule if it is “redacted to eliminate not only the defendant‘s name, but any reference to his or her existence.” Richardson, 481 US at 211. The obvious redaction used here (inserting the word “Blank” in place of Bruner‘s name), however, did not achieve that result and specifically ran afoul of Gray v Maryland, 523 US 185. In Gray, blank spaces or the word “delete” were substituted for the defendant‘s name to attempt to avoid the Bruton problem. The United States Supreme Court held that “[r]edactions that simply replace a name with an obvious blank space or a word such as ‘deleted’ or а symbol or other similarly obvious indications of alteration, however, leave statements that, considered as a class, so closely resemble Bruton‘s unredacted statements that, in our view, the law must require the same result.” Gray, 523 US at 192.4
Far from eliminating any reference to Bruner‘s existence, the jury instead got a wink and a nod about an unnamed person, “Blank.” Blank‘s conduct was not just uncannily similar to what the prosecutor told the jury Bruner had done. No, it was the same. And the prosecutor‘s opening statement had stressed that Webb‘s testimony would be the linchpin of the case against Bruner:
And [the evidence] is going to corroborate directly with what Mr. Webb is telling you that Mr. Bruner came back with a gun involving got involved [sic] in a shooting and tie it up directly with where these shots came from.
* * *
I think the statement from Mr. Webb is very clear. He knew that Mr. Bruner had a gun . . . .
Bruner and Lawson were the only people charged; there was no other person to whom “Blank” might have referred. The prosecutor told the jury that two people were involved in the murders, to expect Webb to incriminate Bruner, and that Webb‘s testimony would place the gun in Bruner‘s hand. In such circumstances, any juror who “wonders to whom the blank might refer need only lift his eyes to [the codefendant], sitting at counsel table, to find what will seem the obvious answer . . . .” Gray, 523 US at 193.
Because Bruner never had the chance to cross-examine Webb, Webb‘s testimony was inadmissible against Bruner under a straightforward application of the Confrontation Clause, as the prosecutor conceded and the trial court held. But while the testimony was technically admitted only against Lawson, the limiting instruction and crude redaction were inadequate to protect Bruner. Bruner was thus deprived of his right to confront Webb, a witness against him. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the prosecution has established the preserved cоnstitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.5 Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich at 406.
Bridget M. McCormack
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Kurtis T. Wilder
Elizabeth T. Clement