Penny Gardner v. Durham D and M LLC, 5:19-cv-01344

Plaintiff Penny Gardner sued Durham D&M LLC in San Bernardino County Superior Court alleging a single California Labor Code § 204 claim for failing to timely pay wages (PAGA representative action).
Defendant removed to federal court asserting federal-question jurisdiction under LMRA § 301 (29 U.S.C. § 185), arguing the claim is governed by collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with Teamsters Local 572.
Defendant submitted the CBAs showing payroll is handled biweekly and paychecks are distributed every other Friday.
Plaintiff’s claim asserts rights conferred by California law (Lab. Code § 204), not rights derived from the CBAs.
The central legal question was whether § 301 preempts the state-law wage-timing claim because resolution would require interpretation of the CBAs.
The district court concluded Defendant failed to meet the removal burden and remanded the action to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether federal question jurisdiction exists under LMRA § 301	Gardner insists her § 204 claim is a state-law right independent of the CBAs	Durham contends § 204 is displaced by CBAs and the claim is governed by § 301	No; § 301 does not preempt the § 204 claim and federal jurisdiction not established
Whether the claim "arises under" federal law because resolution requires interpreting the CBAs	Claim can be resolved under state law by applying § 204; CBAs may be consulted but are not the source of the right	Resolution requires interpreting CBA pay provisions (biweekly pay) and thus federal law governs	No; court may “look to” but need not interpret the CBA; plaintiff’s right is state-derived and not substantially dependent on CBA interpretation
Whether a CBA contains a clear and unmistakable waiver of the state right such that § 301 preemption is triggered	Gardner says no such waiver exists in the CBA and § 204 rights remain intact	Durham points to the CBA pay- timing language to argue § 204(c) applies	No; CBA language is unambiguous but whether it displaces § 204 is a state-law question and does not trigger § 301 preemption

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction)
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (well-pleaded complaint rule; federal-question removal limits)
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (§ 301 preemption where resolution requires interpreting CBA)
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (distinguishing claims that merely require consulting a CBA from those that require interpreting it)
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (state-law claims that only ‘look to’ CBAs are not necessarily preempted)
Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102 (discussing limits of § 301 preemption)
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904 (en banc) (two-step preemption analysis under § 301)
Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (two-step test for § 301 preemption)
Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683 (clear-and-unmistakable waiver requirement for displacing state law)
Detabali v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 482 F.3d 1199 (focus on plaintiff’s claim to determine whether CBA interpretation is necessary)
Gregory v. SCIE, LLC, 317 F.3d 1050 (§ 301 preemption principles in wage/time context)
Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261 (removal statute strictly construed)
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564 (doubts about removal must be resolved against federal jurisdiction)