Pacific Coast Horseshoeing v. Kimberly Kirchmeyer, 961 F.3d 1062

Plaintiffs: Pacific Coast Horseshoeing School (PCHS) run by Bob Smith (farrier instructor) and prospective student Esteban Narez, who lacks a high-school diploma or GED and is an "ability-to-benefit" student under California's PPEA.
PPEA requirement: ability-to-benefit students may not execute enrollment agreements at private postsecondary schools unless they pass a Department of Education–prescribed exam; the Act contains multiple subject- and speaker-based exemptions (e.g., avocational courses, flight instruction, certain nonprofit or trade-sponsored programs).
PCHS is California’s only full-time horseshoeing school, charges $6,000 for an 8-week vocational course, and alleges the prescribed exams do not test horseshoeing skills; Bureau enforcement led PCHS to decline admission to ability-to-benefit students.
Procedural posture: Plaintiffs sued, alleging the PPEA violates the First Amendment; the district court dismissed, holding the Act regulates conduct (enrollment contracts) and imposes only incidental burdens on speech.
Ninth Circuit decision: Reversed the dismissal, holding the PPEA implicates protected speech and is content-based because it differentiates by subject matter and by speaker, so heightened First Amendment scrutiny applies; remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether PPEA regulates speech	PPEA restricts instructors from communicating vocational instruction to certain listeners; vocational training is protected speech	PPEA regulates non-expressive conduct (enrollment contracts) and is a consumer-protection law	Court: PPEA implicates speech (instruction and right to receive information)
Whether the regulation is content-based	Exemptions turn on subject matter (avocational vs. vocational); thus law targets content	Act is neutral consumer-protection regulation, not aimed at speech	Court: PPEA is content-based because it distinguishes courses by subject matter
Whether the regulation discriminates by speaker	Exemptions favor certain institutions/speakers (trade, nonprofit, licensing bodies)	State argues exemptions are benign administrative categories, not speaker discrimination	Court: PPEA disfavors particular speakers; exemptions show identity-based differentiation
Standard of review and claim viability	Plaintiffs: heightened scrutiny required; dismissal improper	State: rational-basis review applies; Act survives	Court: heightened scrutiny required (court did not decide which form applies); plaintiffs stated First Amendment claim and dismissal reversed

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (a law framed as regulating conduct can implicate speech when the conduct consists of communicating a message)
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (creating and disseminating factual information is protected speech; content- and speaker-based restrictions trigger heightened scrutiny)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (facial content-based speech regulations are subject to strict scrutiny)
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (heightened scrutiny applies when laws burden expressive rights)
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (intermediate scrutiny for laws regulating conduct that incidentally burden speech)
Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (intermediate-scrutiny framework for commercial speech)
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (constitutional interest in listeners’ access to speakers in educational settings)
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) (content-neutral time, place, manner restrictions must leave open ample alternative channels)