Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10164

Background

Oglala Sioux Tribe, Rosebud Sioux Tribe, and three individual Native American parents sued state officials (Judge Jeff Davis, State’s Attorney Mark Vargo, DSS Secretary Kim Malsam‑Rysdon, and DSS Regional Manager Luann Van Hunnik) in their official capacities alleging procedures at 48‑hour emergency custody hearings violate the Fourteenth Amendment and the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).
Plaintiffs challenge practices at the 48‑hour hearings: parents not given the petition or affidavit, inability to cross‑examine or present evidence, long delays (60–90 days) before a full hearing, lack of inquiry into whether the emergency still exists, and judicial/coercive inducements to waive rights.
Defendants moved to dismiss on multiple grounds: Younger and Rooker‑Feldman abstention, lack of standing, failure to exhaust state remedies, failure to state a claim, prosecutorial/judicial immunity, and that ICWA remedies displace § 1983 relief.
The court applied Sprint and Middlesex abstention principles, considered Rooker‑Feldman, standing (including parens patriae for the Tribes), exhaustion rules, and Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standards.
The court denied all motions to dismiss, holding Younger and Rooker‑Feldman inapplicable, Tribes have parens patriae standing, exhaustion is not required for these § 1983 claims, defendants are not immune from prospective relief, §1922 and the Due Process/coercion claims were adequately pleaded, and §1914 of ICWA does not preclude §1983 suits.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicability of Younger abstention	Plaintiffs seek prospective relief; federal court should hear systemic ICWA/Due Process claims	Defendants: ongoing/recurring state emergency custody proceedings and judicial functions require abstention	Denied—Sprint’s narrow categories not met; relief would be prospective and not interfere with state proceedings
Rooker‑Feldman jurisdictional bar	Plaintiffs challenge procedures, not seek review of state judgments	Vargo: federal suit is an indirect attack on state court judgments	Denied—claims are not "inextricably intertwined" with prior state judgments
Standing (Tribes’ parens patriae)	Tribes assert parens patriae to protect tribe integrity and members’ interests under ICWA/Due Process	Defendants: ICWA §1922 confers no tribal rights and parens patriae limited to whole‑tribe harms	Granted—court finds ICWA’s purpose and tribal interest in children support parens patriae standing
Exhaustion of state remedies	Plaintiffs: §1983 suits need not exhaust state remedies; Wax ’n Works limited to property contexts	Defendants: procedural due process claims must exhaust state remedies per Eighth Circuit precedent	Denied—exhaustion not required for these §1983 claims; Wax ’n Works limited to property deprivation cases
Whether defendants are policymakers under §1983	Plaintiffs: judge and state/DSS actors create or ratify policies/practices denying process; DSS failures to train amount to policymaking conduct	Defendants: actions governed by state statute and judicial process; no independent policymaking or causation	Denied—complaint plausibly alleges policymaker conduct by Judge Davis, DSS leaders, and Vargo (sufficient to survive 12(b)(6))
ICWA §1922 rights and §1983 remedy	Plaintiffs: §1922’s second sentence imposes substantive duties (terminate emergency placement when no longer necessary; expeditiously initiate custody proceedings); violations actionable under §1983	Defendants: §1922 defers to state emergency procedures and does not create enforceable tribal/parental rights; §1914 is the exclusive ICWA remedy	Denied—court reads §1922 to create substantive duties; §1914 does not preclude §1983 enforcement for ICWA violations
Due Process and coercion claims	Plaintiffs: lack of notice, inability to confront evidence, delay to full hearing, and coercive waiver practices risk erroneous deprivations of parental rights	Defendants: emergency context and state procedures justify limited process at 48‑hour stage; immunity defenses	Denied—taking allegations as true, Mathews factors support plausible Due Process and coercion claims; prospective relief not barred by prosecutorial or judicial immunity

Key Cases Cited

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (Younger abstention principle regarding federal interference with state proceedings)
Sprint Commc’ns., Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013) (limits Younger to three narrow categories of cases)
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (forum availability factors sometimes considered in Younger analysis)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires policy or custom by policymakers)
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (prosecutorial absolute immunity for damages; does not bar prospective equitable relief)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (procedural due process balancing test)
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (statutory rights and availability of § 1983 enforcement)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading standard: plausibility)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard guidance)
Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. on Rooker‑Feldman scope)
Slaven v. Engstrom, 710 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. on distinguishing statutory duties from municipal policy)