Ocasio v. United States
136 S. Ct. 1423
| SCOTUS | 2016Background
- Samuel Ocasio, a Baltimore police officer, participated (2009–2011) in a kickback scheme: officers referred accident victims to Majestic Auto Repair in exchange for payments from its owners, Moreno and Mejia.
- The scheme routed a large share of Majestic’s customers to the shop; the shopowners paid $150–$300 per referral; many officers joined the scheme.
- Ocasio was indicted and convicted on three substantive Hobbs Act extortion counts (extortion under color of official right) and one conspiracy count under 18 U.S.C. § 371; he did not plead guilty.
- At trial Ocasio sought a jury instruction (relying on United States v. Brock) that a Hobbs Act conspiracy requires an agreement to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy; the district court refused and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether conspirators may agree to obtain property from a conspirator (i.e., whether a victim/cooperator can be a co-conspirator in Hobbs Act extortion). The Court affirmed Ocasio’s conspiracy conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ocasio) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant can be convicted of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act extortion with the person from whom property is obtained (i.e., can the payor be a conspirator). | Conspiracy invalid if the agreement was only to obtain money from shopowners who were co-conspirators; Hobbs Act requires obtaining property "from another" meaning someone outside the conspiracy. | Longstanding conspiracy doctrine permits liability when conspirators agree that a member capable of committing the substantive offense will obtain property; shopowners agreed that officers would obtain money from them, so a conspiracy existed. | Court held conspiracies can include agreements to have one conspirator obtain property from another conspirator; affirmed conviction. |
| Whether § 371 requires each conspirator to be capable of committing the substantive Hobbs Act offense. | (Implicit) If shopowners cannot commit extortion under color of official right (not public officials), they cannot be conspirators to that offense. | Conspiracy law does not require each conspirator to be able to commit the substantive offense personally; it is enough that the agreement contemplates that a conspirator capable of doing so will commit the offense. | Held that conspirators need only intend that some member commit each element of the substantive offense; incapacity to commit the substantive offense does not preclude conspiracy liability. |
| Whether the Hobbs Act’s use of "from another" or the nature of "consent" prevents conspiracy liability when payments are consensual/bribes. | The Hobbs Act’s phrase "from another" and the consensual nature of extortion under the Act make it unnatural to treat a payor as a conspirator; this interpretation would conflate extortion and bribery and expand federal reach. | "Consent" in the Hobbs Act distinguishes extortion from robbery; mere consent or acquiescence is insufficient for conspiracy, but active agreement to have officers obtain money from the shopowners suffices. | Held the statute does not preclude conspiracy convictions where conspirators agreed that officers would obtain property from shopowners; mere consent/acquiescence remains insufficient for conspiracy. |
| Whether invoking rule of lenity or federalism concerns requires narrowing Hobbs Act conspiracy exposure. | Argues ambiguous reach of Hobbs Act and intrusion on state sovereignty counsel for narrower reading and application of rule of lenity. | Evans controls that Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right reaches the rough equivalent of bribery; conspiracy liability naturally follows. | Court rejected lenity and federalism arguments given precedent (Evans) and clear application of conspiracy principles. |
Key Cases Cited
- Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right includes the rough equivalent of taking a bribe)
- Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) (conspirators must pursue same criminal objective; members need not perform every element personally)
- United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140 (1915) (a person who could not commit the substantive offense as principal may nonetheless conspire with another to commit it)
- Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932) (mere consent/acquiescence is insufficient to establish conspiracy under the Mann Act; active participation required)
- Rabinowich v. United States, 238 U.S. 78 (1915) (incapacity to commit the substantive offense does not necessarily preclude conspiracy liability)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (partners in a criminal enterprise act for each other; liability for acts in furtherance of conspiracy)
- United States v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2007) (held that Hobbs Act conspiracy requires agreement to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy)