OPINION
May the payor of a bribe to a state official conspire with that official to extort property from himself in violation of the Hobbs Act? We hold that he cannot, and we thus reverse the convictions of Michael and Jerry Brock. Darrin Webb’s unrelated challenges to his conviction and sentence, by contrast, do not have merit, and we thus affirm both of them.
I.
Michael Brock and Darrin Webb are “best friends” with a long history. The two once operated video poker machines together in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Michael Brock eventually left that business to open Brock Bonding, a bail bond company, which he now runs with his brother Jerry. Webb remained in the video poker business after Michael Brock’s departure, and over the years he also developed a reputation as someone who had a way with fire. See JA 139, 642-43 (Webb admitting that he had “burned some [buildings] down in [his] past.... People pull your machines out, and ... [y]ou know, bad things happen.”).
In December 1999, while Webb was working on a poker machine at a local bar, the bar’s employees — apparently interest *765 ed in burning down a rival bar — asked him how to start a chemical fire. Webb explained how to create a “delayed reaction” fire, using Score hair gel, that would leave “no trace.” JA 348-49. Despite Webb’s assistance, the planned arson never took place.
In May 2001, one of Brock Bonding’s clients “skipped town,” which as a business matter meant that Brock Bonding would have to pay the bond. To avoid having to make this payment, Jerry Brock approached Scott Simcox, a friend and the supervisory clerk for the criminal division of the county courthouse, who agreed to “make [the problem] go away” by removing the scheduled forfeiture hearing from the court’s calendar. JA 362. (Without the prompt of a hearing, as Jerry Brock well knew, the court would never order the Brocks to forfeit the bonds entered on behalf of their clients.) Two days later, Jerry Brock called Simcox and told him to “swing by the office” when he was heading home. There, Jerry Brock gave Simcox a “$ 100 bill” to thank him for “helping ... out.” Id.
For the next two-and-a-half years, Sim-cox fixed the court date of the bond forfeiture hearing whenever a client of Brock Bonding fled the county — which happened 24 times. Each time, Jerry Brock paid Simcox 10% of the face value of the bond that Brock Bonding would have forfeited.
On September 6, 2003, Webb, who had learned about Simcox from Michael Brock, paid Simcox $1,000 to erase several of his girlfriend’s traffic citations.
In early December, officers from the Federal Bureau of Investigation approached Simcox. When they told him that they “knew what [he] was doing,” Simcox agreed to cooperate with them by recording his conversations with the Brocks. JA 366.
On December 16, Jerry Brock contacted Simcox about fixing another case. Two days later, Simcox wore a wire to a meeting with him, where Jerry gave Simcox $200 for dealing with two prior cases and where they discussed another case involving a $7,000 bond that might need to be fixed soon.
On February 6, 2004, Simcox wore a wire to another meeting, where Jerry Brock gave Simcox “10[] $100 bills” for “taking care of prior cases.” JA 386-87. Jerry asked Simcox to fix the case they had discussed back in December and one other case. Jerry also asked Simcox to help his brother get out of a traffic citation.
On March 8, Simcox met with Jerry Brock at the office of Brock Bonding to discuss additional work that Jerry needed to have done. Michael Brock stepped in and asked if Simcox had taken care of his traffic citation. On March 12, Jerry Brock paid Simcox another $400 for his work.
Even though the Brocks and Webb continued to pay him for his efforts, Simcox stopped fixing cases ■ after the FBI confronted him. In mid-March, Jerry and Michael Brock noticed that one of the supposedly fixed cases kept “popping back up” on the list of upcoming hearings. On March 24, the Brocks shared their concerns with Simcox. JA 405-06. Jerry Brock reiterated his concerns to Simcox on April 13 and gave him a list of cases on the calendar that should have been fixed. And on April 20, Michael Brock again called Simcox to discuss his traffic citation.
On December 15, the government filed parallel indictments against Webb and the Brocks alleging that they had conspired to bribe a public official (Simcox) in violation of the Hobbs Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Webb’s indictment also charged him with illegally distributing information about an incendiary device to the employees of a local bar, see 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2), and the Brocks’ indictment charged them with *766 four counts of mail fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
Michael Brock and Webb both retained Fred Hanzelik as counsel. (Jerry Brock maintained separate counsel.) The government wrote Hanzelik a letter seeking to negotiate a plea agreement for Michael Brock, for Webb or for a third client of Hanzelik’s, Dean DiFilippo. The letter, among other things, asked if Webb would consider testifying against Michael Brock, asked if Webb would consider testifying against DiFilippo or vice versa and noted that Hanzelik’s continued representation of all three individuals might violate the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct.
The government filed a motion asking the district court to determine whether Hanzelik’s representation of Michael Brock, Webb and DiFilippo was appropriate, after which the district court held an evidentiary hearing. After hearing the testimony of two government witnesses, after observing that the government had filed an intervening indictment alleging that Webb and the Brocks had conspired together to bribe Simcox and after questioning Hanzelik extensively, the district court gave Hanzelik four days to respond to the government’s contentions.
Following the hearing, Hanzelik stopped representing DiFilippo. And on February 14, Michael Brock and Webb filed nearly identical affidavits, each stating that he was “unaware of any conflict of interest,” that he “heard all of the things discussed in Court ... and [did] not feel that any of those things presented a conflict,” but that “[i]f the Court believes there is a conflict of interest in this case,” “actual or potential,” each “affirmatively waivefd] [the] conflict.” JA 183, 186.
On February 15, the district court disqualified Hanzelik from representing both Webb and Michael Brock because the situation was “rife with potential conflicts of interest.” JA 195. The court noted that it may “be in the best interest of one of these clients to plead guilty and testify against the other” and that, should they both be found guilty, Hanzelik “may be in a position of contending that one or the other of his clients should receive a mitigating role ... and thus a lesser sentence than the other.” JA 196. And because the waivers did not acknowledge these potential conflicts, the district court found that Brock and Webb did not “clearly comprehend the risks here” and thus did not “know what they [were] waiving.” JA 197.
A federal jury convicted Webb of illegally distributing information relating to a destructive device, and he later pleaded guilty to violating the Hobbs Act. After hearing extensive testimony about Webb’s “considerable additional criminal activity other than ... what he was convicted of in this case,” JA 659, the district court decided that a sentence within the advisory guidelines range of 27-33 months was not “enough to deter criminal conduct,” JA 660, and imposed a 48-month sentence.
Although the court dismissed the mail-fraud charges against the Brocks, the jury convicted the two of conspiring with Sim-cox to extort money in violation of the Hobbs Act. After considering the advisory guidelines range of 21-27 months along with the other § 3553(a) factors, the court sentenced each of the Brocks to a 21-month prison term.
II.
Mike and Jerry Brock contend that the Hobbs Act does not permit them to be convicted of conspiring to extort their own property. We agree and accordingly reverse their convictions and sentences.
The relevant provisions of the Hobbs Act say:
Interference with commerce by threats or violence
*767 (a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section—
(2) The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.
18 U.S.C. § 1951.
The question is whether extortion, or a conspiracy to commit extortion, extends to the Brocks’ scheme, which essentially amounted to the bribing of a state-court clerk to prevent bail bonds from being collected when the Brocks’ criminal-defendant clients skipped town. All agree that the Brocks did not commit a substantive act of extortion. They did not “obtain[ ] ... property from another” person.
Id.
§ 1951(b)(2). And they are not public officials and thus could not have obtained any property “under color of official right,”
id.,
and did not otherwise use “actual or threatened force, violence, or fear” in the course of this bribery scheme,
id.; see Evans v. United States,
That leaves the possibility of a conspiracy to commit extortion. The Hobbs Act prohibits “conspiring]” to “affect[] commerce ... by ... extortion,” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and it defines extortion involving a public official as the “obtaining of property from another, with his consent ... under color of official right,”
id.
§ 1951(b)(2). To be covered by the statute, the alleged conspirators — the Brocks and Simcox (the court clerk) — must have formed an agreement to obtain “property from another,” which is to say, formed an agreement to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy. Yet that did not happen. These three people did not agree, and could not have agreed, to obtain property from “another” when no other person was involved — when the property, so far as the record shows, went from one coconspirator (one of the Brocks) to another (Simcox). We see no reason to ignore the “property from another” requirement and ample reason to give it content.
See Jones v. United States,
In addition to requiring the conspirators to agree to obtain property from another, the statute requires the conspirators to obtain that property with the other’s consent. How do (or why would) people conspire to obtain their own consent? And how could it be said that the Brocks conspired with Simcox to obtain their consent to give, say, “10 $100 bills” to him, JA 387, money which came from their own pockets or at most from their own company, Brock Bonding? The context in which the consent requirement appears confirms that it must be taken seriously. The Hobbs Act prohibits not only extortion but robbery as well; what separates the two is the payor’s consent. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (defining robbery as “taking ... property from ... another, against his will”), with id. § 1951(b)(2) (defining extortion as “obtaining ... property from another, with his consent”). Failure to re *768 spect the consent requirement blurs the line between robbery and extortion.
These textual shortcomings underscore another concern. The Hobbs Act is meant to prohibit public officials from obtaining property from others by extortion. Yet sweeping the Brocks within its coverage through a conspiracy theory effectively transforms the Act into a prohibition on paying bribes to public officials. While the definition of extortion “under color of official right” correctly extends to public officials who
accept
a bribe when there is a quid pro quo for the payment,
see Evans,
Two other interpretive principles undermine this prosecution. Although we think it clear that the language of the Hobbs Act does not prohibit bribery either directly or indirectly through the contortion of an extortion conspiracy, one must acknowledge at a minimum that the text of the statute does not unambiguously support the government’s theory of prosecution — because, as we have shown, the law says that the conspiracy must extort “property from another” and do so “with his consent,” neither of which applies naturally to the conspirators’ own property or to their own consent. “When there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other,” the rule of lenity tells us that “we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.”
Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc.,
Basic notions of federalism also undermine the government’s interpretation. “[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes.”
Jones,
In urging us to uphold the Brocks’ convictions, the government acknowledges that we have not decided this issue but suggests that we follow the reasoning of four other courts.
See United States v. Cornier-Ortiz,
Perhaps more importantly, the primary debate in
Spitler,
as in the other three cases upon which the government relies,
*770
did not concern the “property from another” requirement but something else — ■ whether the prohibitions of the Hobbs Act could be extended to the “victim” of.an extortion scheme (the giver of the bribe), as opposed to the public official (the taker of the bribe), under a conspiracy theory or an aiding and abetting theory,
see
18 U.S.C. § 2. The cases all suggest that perpetrators of extortion schemes may be treated as Hobbs Act conspirators or aiders and abettors, but victims may not be.
See Cornier-Ortiz,
Nothing in the statute, however, creates any such dichotomy, and indeed none of the cases looked to the statute to come up with this distinction. The statute refers to the “obtaining of property from another, with his consent, ... under color of official right.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). It thus is not extortion, but robbery, if the victim gives the property without consent; all victims of extortion must consent to give the money to the public official. Why, under these circumstances, bribers of public officials are necessarily perpetrators of Hobbs Act violations rather than Hobbs Act victims, how the distinction matters to the statute and what the line is between the two are questions these cases never answer.
See, e.g., Cornier-Ortiz,
In reaching this conclusion, the four cases also rely on two Supreme Court decisions construing the Mann
Act
— Unit
ed States v. Holte,
Two of the lower court cases also relied on the legislative history of the Hobbs Act, principally a provision stating that Congress intended to punish “those persons who have been impeding interstate commerce and levying tribute from free-born Americans engaged in interstate commerce.”
Spitler,
Also unhelpful is the government’s reliance on the proposition that the Hobbs Act “manifest[s] a purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence.”
Stirone v. United States,
Not only does the Act fail -to support a perpetrator/acquiescor/victim distinction but it also is by no means clear how such a distinction would work. Because all Hobbs Act prosecutions require the “consent” of the payor, it will be difficult to ascertain what level of enthusiasm, ambivalence or regret is required to escape prosecution. In passing the Act, Congress already drew several distinctions — among those who are robbed (their property is taken “against [their] will”), those who are extorted (their property is obtained “with [their] consent”), those who are extorted through coercion (their consent is “induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear”) and those who are extorted by public officials (their consent is given to one acting “under color of official right”). 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). Faced with a statute that already draws these lines, what warrant do we have to draw several more on our own? Either the Act picks up all perpetrators, acquiescors and victims, or'it picks up none of them. We say it picks up none of them and would leave it to Congress (if it wishes) to do what it has done before: Make it a crime to offer or give a bribe to a public official. See, e.g., id. §§ 201; 210; 212; 226.
III.
Unlike the Brocks, Webb does not challenge the legal or factual theory underlying his conviction but instead argues that the district court improperly disqualified Hanzelik from representing him and improperly sentenced him. We review the district court’s decision to disqualify Hanzelik for abuse of discretion,
see Serra v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs.,
A.
Webb argues that by disqualifying Hanzelik the district court violated Webb’s Sixth Amendment right to choose his own counsel. But the right to choose one’s counsel is not absolute, and “the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.”
Wheat
*772
v. United States,
The district court did not exceed this “substantial latitude” in finding a serious potential for conflict here. Michael Brock and Webb were codefendants charged with conspiring in a common scheme to bribe Simcox, and they had a history of criminal activity together. Because the government knew that Webb originally had helped Michael Brock finance Brock Bonding (and suspected that Webb remained a “silent partner” in the business, JA 311), it reasonably expected that one or the other would be amenable to a plea agreement, receiving a favorable sentence in exchange for the pleader’s assistance in convicting the other. Facing this joint representation of defendants in a case with interlocking proof — a classically “suspect” situation because it “tends to prevent” an attorney from vigorously representing each client,
Holloway v. Arkansas,
Webb responds that, even if Hanzelik faced a conflict of interest, Webb adequately waived the conflict, and a court cannot ignore such waivers absent “compelling circumstances.”
See United States v. Reese,
Perhaps a greater obstacle for Webb is that the waiver of a constitutional trial right must be knowing and intelligent,
see Johnson v. Zerbst,
B.
Webb challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, claiming that the district court did not “sufficiently consider[] and address[]” all of the sentencing factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and “disregarded and ignored ... the highly positive aspects of [Webb’s] character.” Webb Br. at 28. Because Webb did not raise these issues below, even after the district court asked his counsel whether he had “[a]ny objections to the sentence or the guidelines or anything else here that have not previously been raised,” JA 661, we review the claim for plain error.
See United States v. Bailey,
No plain error occurred. To ensure reasonable sentencing, we require a district court to calculate the appropriate guidelines range, to appreciate the advisory nature of the guidelines and to consider the guidelines along with the other relevant statutory factors.
United States v. Davis,
To the extent Webb contends that the district court did not thoroughly discuss every § 3553(a) factor, we need note only
*774
that the district court has laid out “a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.”
Rita v. United States,
— U.S. -,
C.
Webb also claims that his 48-month sentence- — a 45% variance over the guidelines-recommended sentence — is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this sentence. It had compelling evidence that Webb had little if any respect for the law,
see
JA 139 (Webb, stating in a magazine interview that “I would say criminal is a word you could use to describe me. Like I said, I fractured a few laws. Damn, I broke a lot of them. I bent some rules and I broke some laws.”), that Webb had committed arson in the past without getting caught,
see id.
(Webb, stating that “I’ve burned some [buildings] down, (laughs) Statute of Limitations run out. I’ve burned some [buildings] down in my past.”), and that Webb had attempted to bribe a state official,
see
JA 660. These reasons are surely sufficient to distinguish Webb from the average guidelines offender and to support this variance.
See United States v. Cherry,
IV.
. For these reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence of Darrin Webb and reverse the convictions of Michael and Jerry Brock and remand for further proceedings.