951 F.3d 84
2d Cir.2020Background
- Plaintiffs (New York, several states, and New York City) challenged three immigration‑related conditions that DOJ (Attorney General) attached to 2017 Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance (Byrne) grant awards: (1) Certification that applicants will comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (Certification Condition); (2) advance notice to federal immigration authorities of incarcerated aliens’ scheduled release dates (Notice Condition); and (3) federal immigration access to incarcerated aliens for status determinations (Access Condition).
- The district court (S.D.N.Y.) enjoined enforcement of the three conditions as to plaintiffs and ordered release of withheld 2017 Byrne funds, holding the conditions exceeded statutory authority, were arbitrary and capricious under the APA, and that § 1373 raised Tenth Amendment commandeering concerns.
- DOJ appealed. The Second Circuit reviewed statutory text governing the Byrne Program (34 U.S.C. §§ 10151–10158, especially § 10153) and the Attorney General’s rule/form authority to condition applications.
- The panel considered related circuit decisions (7th, 9th, 3rd Circuits) and the DOJ Inspector General’s report documenting declining state–federal immigration cooperation, which informed DOJ guidance and the challenged conditions.
- The Second Circuit reversed: it held the Attorney General had statutory authority to impose all three conditions under §§ 10153 and 10155, rejected the facial Tenth Amendment ruling, and found the agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statutory authority to impose immigration‑related conditions on Byrne grants | States/NYC: AG lacked statutory authority; §10102(a)(6) doesn’t independently authorize these conditions | DOJ: AG (via §10102 and other Title 34 provisions) may prescribe forms/rules and place conditions | Held: Authority springs from §§10153(a)(4), 10153(a)(5)(C),(D), and §10155 (form/rule‑making); §10102(a)(6) not necessary but consistent |
| Certification Condition (§1373 inclusion) — scope of “all other applicable Federal laws” | Plaintiffs: “Applicable” should be limited to laws affecting the grant program, not general laws applicable to applicants; §1373 not properly required | DOJ: §10153(a)(5)(D) lets AG require certification of willingness to comply with other applicable federal laws, including §1373 | Held: AG may identify laws applicable to applicants or grants; §1373 is an applicable law and AG could require certification |
| Tenth Amendment / commandeering challenge to §1373 (as applied to grant condition) | Plaintiffs: §1373 commandeers state/local sovereignty; cannot be imposed on states even via grant condition | DOJ: Spending‑clause conditioning is permissible; loss of Byrne funds here is not coercive like Medicaid coercion in NFIB | Held: Court rejected facial commandeering ruling; as applied to conditional federal funding, §1373 does not unconstitutionally commandeer (no coercion like NFIB) |
| Notice and Access Conditions — statutory basis and scope | Plaintiffs: No explicit statutory basis; requirements exceed AG’s authority for formula grants | DOJ: §§10153(a)(4) (reporting), 10153(a)(5)(C) (coordination), and §10155 authorize form/rule requirements that can include notice and access when programs affect DHS duties | Held: Notice and Access authorized where grant programs relate to prosecution/incarceration/release (they affect DHS); coordination and reporting provisions support conditions |
| APA arbitrary and capricious challenge | Plaintiffs: DOJ failed to consider detrimental effects (community trust, policing) and changed policy without reasoned explanation | DOJ: Record (IG report, prior guidance) shows consideration; conditions implement statutory certification/reporting/coordination requirements | Held: Not arbitrary or capricious — DOJ considered relevant issues sufficiently; imposition was a reasonable exercise of delegated authority |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2019) (upheld some limits on Notice/Access but analyzed AG authority under Byrne scheme)
- City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019) (reached narrower view of AG authority under Byrne statutes)
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (addressed Notice/Access and §10102 authority)
- City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999) (earlier Second Circuit decision addressing §1373 and federal‑state information exchange)
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (discussed federal preeminence in immigration and federal–state consultation)
- National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Spending Clause coercion analysis in Medicaid context)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (anticommandeering principle)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary and capricious review standard)