Neiman v. LaRose, 2022 Ohio 2471

Background

In Adams v. DeWine this Court invalidated the General Assembly’s November 2021 congressional plan as unduly partisan and for unduly splitting certain counties; the Court ordered a remedial plan not dictated by partisan considerations.
The General Assembly failed to enact a remedial plan within the 30‑day Article XIX, §3(B)(1) window, so the Ohio Redistricting Commission (the commission) was required to adopt a replacement plan under §3(B)(2); the commission adopted the “March 2 plan.”
Petitioners (Neiman and League of Women Voters-related groups) filed original actions challenging the March 2 plan under Article XIX, §1(C)(3)(a) (partisan favoritism) and §1(C)(3)(b) (undue splitting of governmental units).
Multiple experts submitted simulation, compactness, and partisan‑performance analyses; petitioners’ experts concluded the March 2 plan still packed and cracked Democratic voters and produced an outlier partisan outcome favoring Republicans.
The Court held petitioners carried their burden (applying the presumption of constitutionality but requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt) that the March 2 plan unduly favors Republicans in violation of Article XIX, §1(C)(3)(a); it found no sufficient showing of a §1(C)(3)(b) violation for the March 2 plan.
Remedy: the March 2 plan is invalid; the General Assembly must pass a constitutional congressional plan within 30 days (and, if it fails, the commission must adopt one under §3(B)(2)).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a remedial plan adopted by the commission must comply with Article XIX, §1(C)(3) (anti‑gerrymandering and no undue splits)	The commission must remedy the court‑identified §1(C)(3) defects in the invalidated plan under §3(B)(2)	§1(C)(3) applies only to plans “passed” by the General Assembly, not to commission remedial plans; commission free to act differently	Court: §3(B)(2) obliges the commission to remedy the same §1(C)(3) defects; commission cannot ignore §1(C)(3) requirements
Whether the March 2 plan unduly favors or disfavors a political party (Art. XIX, §1(C)(3)(a))	The plan packs/cracks Democratic voters (esp. Cincinnati, Columbus, Cleveland), producing a partisan outlier and fewer Democratic‑favored seats than neutral simulations predict	The plan reasonably aims to maximize competitive districts; competing expert analyses create doubt; plaintiffs failed to meet burden	Court: Petitioners proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the March 2 plan unduly favors Republicans in violation of §1(C)(3)(a); plan invalid
Whether the March 2 plan unduly splits governmental units (Art. XIX, §1(C)(3)(b))	Splitting (and resulting pairing of urban with distant rural areas) shows undue splits and noncompact districts	The commission did not excessively or unwarrantedly split counties this time; splits are explainable by neutral criteria	Court: Petitioners did not meet the threshold showing that splits were excessive or unwarranted; no §1(C)(3)(b) violation established
Appropriate remedy and timing	Order immediate remedial relief before next relevant elections; require General Assembly to act within 30 days as §3(B)(1) mandates	Some respondents argued process/ timing concerns or that commission plan should stand for now	Court: Declared March 2 plan invalid; General Assembly must pass a constitutional plan within 30 days, otherwise §3(B)(2) requires the commission to adopt one

Key Cases Cited

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (U.S. 2019) (recognizing difficulty of defining "fair" districting and competing map‑drawing goals)
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (U.S. 1911) (judicial power limited to actual controversies; principle of restraint)
Wilson v. Kasich, 981 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 2012) (describing strong presumption of constitutionality for enacted plans)
LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 916 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2009) (court cites principle of judicial restraint in deciding unnecessary issues)
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 937 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 2010) (party may not invoke privilege and then selectively rely on privileged communications—shield and sword doctrine)
In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2005) (federal precedent rejecting selective invocation of privilege; quoted for privilege doctrine)