National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense
138 S. Ct. 617
| SCOTUS | 2018

Background

  • The Clean Water Act (CWA) prohibits discharging pollutants into “navigable waters,” defined as “waters of the United States,” but authorizes permitting programs (NPDES §1342 and Corps §1344) that condition certain discharges.
  • In 2015 EPA and the Army Corps promulgated the “Waters of the United States” Rule (WOTUS Rule), a definitional regulation clarifying which waters fall within the CWA’s geographic scope; the Rule itself imposes no effluent limits.
  • The Government argued that challenges to the WOTUS Rule must proceed directly to federal courts of appeals under §1369(b)(1), which lists seven categories of EPA actions subject to exclusive appellate review, including subparagraphs (E) and (F).
  • Multiple parties filed district-court suits challenging the Rule; many others filed protective petitions in various courts of appeals that were consolidated in the Sixth Circuit. NAM intervened in the Sixth Circuit and sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
  • The Sixth Circuit denied dismissal; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether §1369(b)(1)(E) or (F) provides exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals for challenges to the WOTUS Rule.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether §1369(b)(1)(E) ("effluent limitation or other limitation under §1311, §1312, §1316, or §1345") gives courts of appeals exclusive first-review of the WOTUS Rule NAM: WOTUS is a definitional rule, not an effluent or other discharge-related limitation, so review belongs in district court Gov: WOTUS determines geographic scope of §1311 limits and thus is an "other limitation" under §1369(b)(1)(E) Held: No — WOTUS is neither an effluent limitation nor an "other limitation" promulgated "under §1311"; challenges belong in district court
Whether §1369(b)(1)(F) ("issuing or denying any permit under §1342") gives courts of appeals exclusive first-review of the WOTUS Rule NAM: WOTUS does not issue or deny NPDES permits; it is a rule defining jurisdiction and is reviewable in district court Gov: Crown Simpson permits a functional test; WOTUS is "functionally similar" to issuing/denying permits because it determines permitability Held: No — subparagraph (F) covers only actions that issue or deny permits; Crown Simpson is inapposite and does not support broad functional reading
Whether courts should adopt a functional/practical-effects test to expand §1369(b)(1) jurisdiction NAM: Statutory text controls; no expansion warranted Gov: Practical effects (or functional similarity) justify appellate original jurisdiction for national rules like WOTUS Held: Rejected — statute’s text and structure control; practical-effect test would render other statutory language superfluous
Whether policy considerations (efficiency, uniformity, presumption favoring appellate review) justify departing from plain text NAM: Policy arguments cannot override clear statutory language Gov: Efficiency and national uniformity favor direct appellate review; presumption favors appeals courts Held: Rejected — policy concerns insufficient to displace clear statutory text; Florida Power presumption inapplicable where statute is clear

Key Cases Cited

  • United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (upholding Corps’ interpretation that adjacent wetlands can be "waters of the United States")
  • Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (rejecting overly broad Corps jurisdiction over isolated waters)
  • Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (plurality opinion addressing limits of Corps jurisdiction over wetlands)
  • Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (per curiam) (EPA veto of state-issued permit treated as denial under §1369(b)(1)(F))
  • Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 568 U.S. 597 (describing §1369(b)(1) exclusive-appellate-review structure)
  • Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729 (presumption favoring appellate review of agency action where review provision ambiguous)
  • BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (interpretation begins and ends with unambiguous statutory text)
  • Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 ("under" draws meaning from context)
  • Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (describing NPDES permit function)
  • Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (standing and concrete interest for relief)
  • Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (legislative history cannot override clear statutory language)
  • Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (inclusions/exclusions in statute are intentional)
  • Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (must give effect to every word of a statute)
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