Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980

Mellouli, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Kansas to a misdemeanor for possessing drug paraphernalia (a sock) to "store or conceal a controlled substance"; the charging instrument did not identify the substance.
Kansas defines "controlled substance" by reference to its own schedules, which then included some substances not listed in the federal schedules of 21 U.S.C. §802.
ICE initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (removal for conviction of a law "relating to a controlled substance (as defined in §802)"); an Immigration Judge and the BIA ordered removal; the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
The BIA had treated paraphernalia offenses differently from possession/distribution: in Matter of Martinez‑Espinoza it held paraphernalia convictions "relate to" the drug trade generally and need not involve a §802 substance; in contrast, Matter of Paulus required correspondence between state and federal controlled‑substance schedules.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Mellouli’s conviction—under a state law that did not require proof of a federally defined drug—triggered removal under §1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

Issue	Mellouli's Argument	Government/BIA/Eighth Circuit Argument	Held
Whether a state conviction under a statute criminalizing conduct "relating to a controlled substance (as defined in §802)" renders an alien removable when the state statute does not require the controlled substance be one listed in §802	The categorical approach requires that an element of the offense necessarily involve a drug defined in §802; absent that, the conviction cannot trigger removal	The BIA/Eighth Circuit: paraphernalia offenses "relate to" the drug trade generally and are removable regardless of whether the state statute reaches non‑federal drugs; Government alternatively argued that broad overlap between state and federal schedules suffices	Held for Mellouli: §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) requires connection between an element of the conviction and a drug defined in §802; BIA’s Martinez‑Espinoza approach is not owed Chevron deference and is rejected; Government’s broad reading is impermissible

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (concerning syllabi not part of Court opinion)
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (agency deference framework)
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (statutes should be read as a coherent regulatory scheme)
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (discussing limits of categorical approach in immigration context)
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (context can favor a narrower reading of broad statutory language)
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (canons of statutory construction concerning Congress’ word choice)