McBride v. Cahoone
820 F. Supp. 2d 623
E.D. Pa.2011Background
- McBride pled guilty to identity theft on January 11, 2010 in Delaware County and received a Min/Max term of 3 to 23 months with 7 days credit and 83 days on electronic monitoring (EM) under APPS’ EM program.
- Before pleading, the court repeatedly assured McBride there would be no jail time if he accepted the offer, with EM as a custody alternative.
- McBride faced health and family-care concerns; EM hook-up appointments were repeatedly rescheduled due to medical issues, including MRI requirements that conflict with EM.
- A bench warrant was issued on March 16, 2010 after McBride missed a hook-up appointment, and he surrendered on May 2, 2010 to serve the remaining term in prison under the EM violation policy.
- McBride alleged he was denied a hearing before Judge Nilón about the EM violation, and he remained imprisoned without a hearing until serving the remaining minimum term.
- Chapter 7.18 of APPS’s Policy and Procedure Manual provided the EM rules; it did not grant a hearing for Min/Max EMP violators, leading to confinement in prison without process.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McBride had a protected liberty interest in home EM versus prison | McBride asserts a liberty interest in home confinement under several circuit decisions recognizing home detention as liberty. | Defendants argue McBride had no protected liberty interest in remaining on EM instead of prison for Min/Max; policy allows incarceration for violations. | McBride has a plausible liberty interest in home confinement versus prison. |
| Whether Heck v. Humphrey bars the §1983 claim | Claims challenge only procedures, not the fact or duration of confinement. | Heck bars claims that would imply invalidity of conviction or sentence. | Heck does not bar the §1983 claims because they concern procedures, not the sentence’s duration. |
| Standing to pursue prospective relief | Lyons-like standing exists due to an official EM policy causing imminent future injury. | Lyons-cut suggests lack of standing absent ongoing policy; injury not imminent. | McBride has standing to seek prospective relief based on an officially sanctioned EM policy. |
| Eleventh Amendment immunity for APPS | APPS should not be immune; seeks prospective relief for ongoing violations. | APPS is immune as a state entity; claims against APPS must be dismissed. | APPS is dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds; Raith remains in suit for prospective relief. |
| Immunity for Raith and Cahoone | Raith and Cahoone violated due process; seek prospective relief; no absolute immunity. | Probation officers enjoy qualified or quasi-judicial immunity for adjudicatory acts. | Cahoone did not act in a purely adjudicatory capacity; not shielded by quasi-judicial immunity. Raith not absolutely immune; Ex parte Young allows prospective relief against Raith for ongoing policy. |
Key Cases Cited
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (parole revocation due process protections required)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (probationers entitlement to due process in revocation hearings)
- Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143 (U.S. 1997) (liberty interest in pre-parolee home confinement)
- Kim v. Hurston, 182 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1999) (procedural due process in monitored confinement)
- Asquith v. Dep’t of Corrections, 186 F.3d 407 (3d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing institutional confinement from home confinement for due process)
- Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 2010) (liberty interest in confinement within home under electronic supervision)
- Commonwealth v. Stafford, 29 A.3d 800 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (discussion of EM/Min-Max vs. parole context)
- Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002) (Heck not applying when claims concern conditions of confinement)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1998) (procedural due process claims not necessarily barred by Heck)
- Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (U.S. 1983) (standing requires actual or imminent injury for prospective relief)
- Safir v. City of New York, 156 F.3d 340 (2d Cir. 1998) (standing where challenged methods are officially sanctioned policies)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (U.S. 1982) (qualified immunity framework)
- Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004) (establishing clearly established rights for qualified immunity analysis)
- McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 2005) (definitions of clearly established rights in qualified immunity)
- Schwartz v. Dennison, 518 F. Supp. 2d 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (policy-maker not entitled to immunity for unlawful policy)