292 F.3d 141 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
AMBRO, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) Antonio Torres, a former state prisoner who is no longer(cid:13) "in custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.S 2254 (the(cid:13) federal habeas corpus statute),1 appeals the District Court’s(cid:13) grant of summary judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 1983 action, which alleged, inter alia , that his due process(cid:13) rights were violated when he was sanctioned for violating(cid:13) prison rules. The sanctions imposed on Torres did not(cid:13) revoke any good-time credits or otherwise affect the fact or(cid:13) length of his confinement; he was placed in disciplinary(cid:13) detention for 15 days and administrative custody for 120(cid:13) days. Yet the District Court ruled that his due process(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. For habeas purposes, "custody" includes not only incarceration, but(cid:13) also other restraints on liberty, such as parole. See, e.g., Jones v.(cid:13) Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1963).(cid:13) 2(cid:13) claim was not cognizable under S 1983 because of the(cid:13) "favorable termination rule" announced in Heck v.(cid:13) Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and extended to prison(cid:13) disciplinary sanctions that alter the duration of a prisoner’s(cid:13) incarceration in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997).(cid:13) Under that rule, a S 1983 plaintiff cannot seek damages for(cid:13) harm caused by actions the unlawfulness of which would(cid:13) necessarily render the fact or length of his confinement(cid:13) invalid, unless he can prove that the conviction, sentence,(cid:13) or prison disciplinary sanction that resulted from those(cid:13) actions has been reversed, invalidated, or called into(cid:13) question by a grant of federal habeas corpus relief (in other(cid:13) words, terminated favorably to the plaintiff). Heck, 512 U.S.(cid:13) at 486-87; Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48.(cid:13) Torres’s appeal presents a question that neither the(cid:13) Supreme Court nor our Court has decided: whether(cid:13) someone no longer in custody (and thus unable to petition(cid:13) for a writ of habeas corpus) can seek damages under(cid:13) S 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional prison disciplinary(cid:13) sanction that did not affect the fact or length of his(cid:13) confinement. We hold that the favorable termination rule(cid:13) does not apply to claims that implicate only the conditions,(cid:13) and not the fact or duration, of a prisoner’s incarceration.(cid:13) We thus hold that the District Court erred in ruling that(cid:13) Torres’s due process claim is not cognizable underS 1983.(cid:13) Nonetheless, we affirm the District Court’s grant of(cid:13) summary judgment on a different ground. The sanctions(cid:13) imposed on Torres were within the scope of his sentence(cid:13) and, under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), and our(cid:13) recent decision in Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 2002), did not impinge a liberty interest protected by the(cid:13) Constitution’s Due Process Clause.(cid:13) I. Factual and Procedural History(cid:13) On July 14, 1993, Torres, a former inmate at New(cid:13) Jersey’s Bayside State Prison ("BSP"), appeared before the(cid:13) BSP Classification Committee (the "Committee") while still(cid:13) in prison. The Committee informed Torres that it had(cid:13) granted him "Full Minimum Status," which in this instance(cid:13) meant placement in a minimum security prison for a work(cid:13) 3(cid:13) detail. That minimum security prison, known as the Farm(cid:13) Unit, is located outside the walls surrounding the main(cid:13) prison at BSP.(cid:13) After leaving the Committee, Torres, a paranoid(cid:13) schizophrenic, entered a delusional state and became(cid:13) convinced that placement in the Farm Unit would harm(cid:13) him. He asked defendant Percy Garner, the prison guard(cid:13) escorting him from the Committee hearing, if he could(cid:13) return to the Committee and ask for reconsideration of his(cid:13) reassignment. After his request was denied, Torres(cid:13) informed Garner that if he was reassigned to the Farm Unit(cid:13) he would try to escape. Garner authored a disciplinary(cid:13) report based on Torres’s statement, charging him with(cid:13) violating New Jersey Administrative Code S 10A:4-(cid:13) 4.1(a)*.102 (attempting to plan an escape). As a result,(cid:13) Torres was placed in pre-hearing detention. He(cid:13) subsequently requested and received a consultation with(cid:13) defendant Lisa Little, the staff psychologist, who(cid:13) determined that he was mentally fit for the general prison(cid:13) population.(cid:13) On July 19, 1993, defendant Lance Meehan, a hearing(cid:13) officer, conducted a disciplinary hearing with regard to the(cid:13) escape charge against Torres. Meehan found Torres guilty(cid:13) of attempting to plan an escape, sentenced him to 15 days(cid:13) of disciplinary detention and 120 days of administrative(cid:13) segregation, and referred him for a psychological(cid:13) evaluation. Meehan did not revoke any of Torres’s good-(cid:13) time credits.(cid:13) Torres appealed Meehan’s decision to defendants E.(cid:13) Calvin Neubert and Conrad Dilks, the Prison(cid:13) Administrators, who affirmed it. Torres did not appeal to(cid:13) the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, as(cid:13) permitted under New Jersey Court Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). 2(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. Because of the strong state interest in internal prison administration,(cid:13) see, e.g., Pernsley v. Harris, 474 U.S. 965, 966-67 (1985) (Burger,(cid:13) Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari);(cid:13) Harris v. Pernsley, 758 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1985) (Adams, Hunter, Weis,(cid:13) Garth & Becker, JJ., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en(cid:13) banc), and because Torres failed to complete state appellate review(cid:13) procedures before bringing his S 1983 action, Judge Roth would abstain(cid:13) 4(cid:13) On December 12, 1993, Torres was released from(cid:13) custody. A year and a half later, he filed a pro se S 1983(cid:13) action in the United States District Court for the District of(cid:13) New Jersey, alleging that the defendants acted unlawfully(cid:13) in connection with the disciplinary decision.3 He(cid:13) subsequently retained counsel and filed an amended(cid:13) complaint on June 24, 1996. In that complaint, Torres(cid:13) alleged that William Fauver (the Commissioner of the New(cid:13) Jersey Department of Corrections), Meehan, Neubert, and(cid:13) Dilks violated his right to due process because he was(cid:13) found guilty of the disciplinary charge and sanctioned even(cid:13) though the charge was not supported by substantial(cid:13) evidence. He also alleged Eighth Amendment violations that(cid:13) are not pertinent here.(cid:13) On January 16, 1998, the defendants moved for(cid:13) summary judgment. On September 29, 1998, the District(cid:13) Court granted summary judgment in favor of Fauver,(cid:13) Meehan, Neubert, and Dilks on Torres’s due process claim,(cid:13) and denied Torres’s cross-motion for summary judgment(cid:13) against Meehan. The Court relied on Edwards v. Balisok,(cid:13) 520 U.S. 641 (1997), to find that Torres’s claim was not(cid:13) cognizable because its success necessarily would imply the(cid:13) invalidity of the disciplinary decision to place him in(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) from providing a federal forum for Torres’s due process claim. See(cid:13) Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32(cid:13) F.3d 785 (3d Cir. 1994). She does not, however, disagree with the panel’s(cid:13) analysis of the merits.(cid:13) Judges Ambro and Fuentes believe that the comity concerns(cid:13) underlying Younger abstention do not apply because the State willingly(cid:13) submitted to federal-court jurisdiction at every stage of this litigation,(cid:13) and never asked any federal court to abstain from adjudicating Torres’s(cid:13) claims. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 381 n.1(cid:13) (1992); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978); Winston v.(cid:13) Children and Youth Services of Delaware County, 948 F.2d 1380, 1384-(cid:13) 85 (3d Cir. 1991); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 314 n.5 (1989).(cid:13) 3. Because Torres filed the current lawsuit before Congress enacted the(cid:13) Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.(cid:13) 1321 (1996), the PLRA’s requirement that prisoners must exhaust(cid:13) available administrative remedies before challenging prison conditions(cid:13) under S 1983, see 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a), did not bar his suit.(cid:13) 5(cid:13) detention and administrative segregation. In addition, the(cid:13) Court dismissed Torres’s Eighth Amendment claims against(cid:13) all of the defendants except Neubert and Dilks. After(cid:13) further discovery, on June 29, 1999, the Court granted(cid:13) summary judgment in favor of Neubert and Dilks on the(cid:13) remaining claims. Torres filed a timely notice of appeal, and(cid:13) we subsequently appointed pro bono counsel for him.4(cid:13) Torres’s sole claim on appeal is that the District Court(cid:13) erred in concluding that the favorable termination rule bars(cid:13) a former prisoner from using S 1983 to challenge a prison(cid:13) disciplinary sanction that did not affect the length of his(cid:13) confinement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1291.(cid:13) II. Standard of Review(cid:13) We must review the record to determine whether the(cid:13) District Court properly concluded that there was no(cid:13) genuine issue of material fact and that the defendants were(cid:13) entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bushman v. Halm,(cid:13) 798 F.2d 651, 656 (3d Cir. 1986). We exercise plenary(cid:13) review over the District Court’s choice and interpretation of(cid:13) legal precepts as well as its application of those precepts to(cid:13) the historical facts. Orvosh v. Program of Group Ins. for(cid:13) Salaried Employees of Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 222 F.3d(cid:13) 123, 129 (3d Cir. 2000).(cid:13) III. Section 1983 and Prison Disciplinary Sanctions(cid:13) Whether Torres’s due process claim is cognizable under(cid:13) S 1983 raises two separate questions: whether the favorable(cid:13) termination rule applies to prison disciplinary sanctions(cid:13) that do not affect the fact or length of a prisoner’s(cid:13) confinement, and, more generally, whether the rule applies(cid:13) to persons who cannot seek habeas relief. Only if both(cid:13) questions are answered affirmatively does the favorable(cid:13) termination rule bar Torres’s claim; if the answer to either(cid:13) question is no, his claim is cognizable.(cid:13) With respect to the first question, the Supreme Court has(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. We acknowledge with appreciation the able and zealous pro bono(cid:13) representation of Torres by Philip N. Yannella, Esquire.(cid:13) 6(cid:13) consistently distinguished between claims that necessarily(cid:13) implicate the fact or duration of confinement (which it has(cid:13) repeatedly held are subject to the favorable termination(cid:13) rule) and claims that relate only to the conditions of(cid:13) incarceration (which it has not suggested are subject to the(cid:13) favorable termination rule). Edwards v. Balisok , 520 U.S.(cid:13) 641, 646-48 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-(cid:13) 87 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973).(cid:13) This line of cases instructs, and all but one of the circuit(cid:13) courts to consider the issue have held, that both current(cid:13) and former prisoners can use S 1983 to raise claims(cid:13) relating only to the conditions, and not the fact or duration,(cid:13) of their confinement without satisfying the favorable(cid:13) termination rule. Because Torres raises such a claim (and(cid:13) thus the answer to the first question above is no), we need(cid:13) not consider the second, broader question of whether the(cid:13) favorable termination rule applies to persons unable to(cid:13) petition for a writ of habeas corpus.5 (cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 5. In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), five Justices announced in(cid:13) dicta that they would hold that the favorable termination rule applies(cid:13) only to prisoners who can assert their claims in a habeas proceeding.(cid:13) The issue in Spencer was whether a prisoner’s habeas petition, which(cid:13) sought to invalidate an order revoking his parole, still presented an(cid:13) Article III case or controversy after his reincarceration ended. Eight(cid:13) Justices held that it did not. 523 U.S. at 7, 14-18. In an attempt to(cid:13) demonstrate an injury-in-fact, the prisoner argued that his habeas(cid:13) petition could not be moot because, if it were, Heck’s favorable(cid:13) termination rule would bar him from bringing a S 1983 action, and he(cid:13) would be left without any federal forum in which he could seek redress(cid:13) for the parole revocation. Id. at 17. The opinion of the Court dismissed(cid:13) the prisoner’s contention as "a great non sequitur, unless one believes(cid:13) (as we do not) that a S 1983 action for damages must always and(cid:13) everywhere be available." Id.(cid:13) However, five Justices--four in a concurrence, one in a dissent--(cid:13) expressly rejected the majority’s "great non sequitur" dictum and said(cid:13) that the favorable termination rule applies "only[to] inmates seeking(cid:13) S 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or confinement." Id. at(cid:13) 20-21 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by O’Connor, Ginsburg & Breyer,(cid:13) JJ.) (emphases added); id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing(cid:13) with Justice Souter’s position). Current and former prisoners who cannot(cid:13) seek habeas relief, they said, can bring a S 1983 claim without satisfying(cid:13) the favorable termination rule even if they are challenging the legality of(cid:13) their conviction or the fact or duration of their confinement. Id. at 21.(cid:13) 7(cid:13) A.(cid:13) In Preiser, the first case to address the overlap between(cid:13) S 1983 and the federal habeas laws, state prisoners(cid:13) deprived of good-time credits as a result of disciplinary(cid:13) proceedings sought restoration of the credits, which would(cid:13) have resulted in their immediate release, underS 1983. 411(cid:13) U.S. at 476-77. The Supreme Court held that in light of the(cid:13) specific federal remedy provided by 28 U.S.C. S 2254, the(cid:13) prisoners’ request for injunctive relief was not cognizable(cid:13) under the broad language of S 1983. Id. at 489-90, 500.(cid:13) The Court explained that "state prisoners attacking the(cid:13) validity of the fact or length of their confinement" must(cid:13) proceed in federal court under the habeas laws, which(cid:13) expressly require exhaustion of adequate state remedies,(cid:13) and may not use S 1983 to circumvent this requirement.6(cid:13) Id. at 489-90. However, the Court emphasized that "a(cid:13) S 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who(cid:13) is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his(cid:13) prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody." Id.(cid:13) at 499.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) Since Spencer, the Second and Seventh Circuits have adopted this(cid:13) position. DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 617-18 (7th Cir. 2000) (relying(cid:13) on Spencer to overrule Anderson v. County of Montgomery, 111 F.3d 494,(cid:13) 499 (7th Cir. 1997), which held that Heck barred a former prisoner from(cid:13) challenging his conviction in a S 1983 suit even if he could not seek(cid:13) habeas relief); Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding(cid:13) that Heck did not bar a plaintiff who was convicted and fined--but not(cid:13) imprisoned--from alleging selective prosecution under S 1983 because he(cid:13) was never in custody and thus could not seek habeas relief). But see(cid:13) Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 300-01 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)(cid:13) (holding that Heck barred a former prisoner from alleging under S 1983(cid:13) that he was improperly made to serve two sentences for the same offense(cid:13) because he was not given credit for his initial prison stay); Figueroa v.(cid:13) Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80-81 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that Heck barred the(cid:13) heirs of a prisoner who died in custody from challenging his conviction(cid:13) and imprisonment under S 1983).(cid:13) As noted, this case does not require us to consider the broader(cid:13) question of whether a S 1983 remedy must be available where habeas(cid:13) relief is not.(cid:13) 6. Section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state remedies. Patsy v. Bd.(cid:13) of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982).(cid:13) 8(cid:13) Damages are not available in habeas proceedings, so(cid:13) Preiser left open whether a prisoner can use aS 1983(cid:13) damages action to challenge the constitutionality of his(cid:13) conviction. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in(cid:13) Heck, where a state prisoner sought damages--but not(cid:13) speedier release--under S 1983, alleging that his conviction(cid:13) was obtained through unlawful investigatory practices and(cid:13) the destruction of exculpatory evidence. 512 U.S. at 479. It(cid:13) held that the prisoner had no cause of action underS 1983(cid:13) because the success of his suit would effectively invalidate(cid:13) his underlying conviction and sentence. Id. at 486-87, 490.(cid:13) The Court reasoned that the prisoner’s action was(cid:13) analogous to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution,(cid:13) an essential element of which is that the prosecution(cid:13) terminated in the accused’s favor. Id. at 484. This(cid:13) requirement eliminates the potential for conflicting(cid:13) resolutions arising from parallel civil and criminal(cid:13) proceedings, and prevents a prisoner from mounting a(cid:13) collateral attack on his conviction. Id. (citations omitted).(cid:13) The Heck Court concluded that the principle that civil(cid:13) tort actions cannot be used to undermine "outstanding(cid:13) criminal judgments applies to S 1983 damages actions that(cid:13) necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of(cid:13) his conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied(cid:13) to actions for malicious prosecution." Id. at 486. Heck thus(cid:13) adopted the favorable termination rule: if the success of a(cid:13) S 1983 damages suit "would necessarily imply the invalidity(cid:13) of his conviction or sentence," the plaintiff ’s claim is(cid:13) cognizable only if he can prove that his conviction or(cid:13) sentence was reversed, invalidated, or called into question(cid:13) by a grant of federal habeas corpus relief. Id. at 486-87(cid:13) (emphasis added).7 On the other hand, "if the district court(cid:13) determines that the plaintiff ’s action, even if successful,(cid:13) will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding(cid:13) criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 7. Stated from a statute-of-limitations perspective, "a S 1983 cause of(cid:13) action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or(cid:13) sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been(cid:13) invalidated." Id. at 489-90.(cid:13) 9(cid:13) be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to(cid:13) the suit." Id. at 487 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).8(cid:13) In Edwards, the Supreme Court applied Heck’s favorable(cid:13) termination rule to prison disciplinary sanctions that affect(cid:13) the duration of a prisoner’s incarceration. The case involved(cid:13) a state prisoner who lost 30 days of good-time credits and(cid:13) was placed in restrictive settings (isolation for 10 days,(cid:13) segregation for 20) after a hearing officer found him guilty(cid:13) of violating prison rules. 520 U.S. at 643. Alleging that the(cid:13) officer was biased against him and dishonestly suppressed(cid:13) exculpatory evidence, the prisoner sought declaratory relief(cid:13) and damages9 under S 1983. Id. at 643, 647. In contrast to(cid:13) Heck, where the prisoner directly attacked the(cid:13) constitutionality of his conviction, the prisoner in Edwards(cid:13) did not seek restoration of his good-time credits, and thus(cid:13) did not request relief that would alter the term of his(cid:13) confinement. Id. at 643-44. Nevertheless, the Court held(cid:13) that his claims were not cognizable under S 1983 because(cid:13) "[t]he principal procedural defect" he alleged (the bias of the(cid:13) hearing oficer) "would, if established, necessarily imply the(cid:13) invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits." Id. at(cid:13) 646-48. Importantly, nothing in Edwards indicates that the(cid:13) favorable termination rule would have applied if the(cid:13) prisoner’s sanction had not affected the duration of his(cid:13) confinement. Indeed, the Court carefully framed the(cid:13) question presented as "whether a claim for damages and(cid:13) declaratory relief brought by a state prisoner challenging(cid:13) the validity of the procedures used to deprive him of good-(cid:13) time credits is cognizable under S 1983." Id. at 643.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 8. Foreshadowing his Spencer opinion, see supra note 5, Justice Souter,(cid:13) joined by three other Justices, concurred in the judgment to caution that(cid:13) the Court’s broadly worded decision should not be read to impose a(cid:13) favorable termination requirement on persons who cannot seek habeas(cid:13) relief, lest those persons be rendered unable to redress a violation of(cid:13) their federal constitutional rights in any federal forum. Id. at 500-03.(cid:13) 9. The prisoner also requested an injunction designed to bar prison(cid:13) officials from suppressing evidence in the future, but the Supreme Court(cid:13) did not consider this issue because it was neither raised before it nor(cid:13) considered by the lower courts. Id. at 648-49.(cid:13) 10(cid:13) B.(cid:13) Other circuit courts’ decisions and a recent ruling by our(cid:13) Court show that the favorable termination rule does not(cid:13) apply to prison disciplinary sanctions that affect only the(cid:13) conditions, and not the fact or duration, of a prisoner’s(cid:13) confinement. In Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163 (D.C. Cir.(cid:13) 1997), the D.C. Circuit held that a prisoner could seek(cid:13) damages under S 1983 for allegedly being placed in(cid:13) administrative segregation without due process. 10 Id. at(cid:13) 167-68. The Court explained that "[t]he [Supreme] Court(cid:13) has never deviated from Preiser’s clear line between(cid:13) challenges to the fact or length of custody and challenges to(cid:13) the conditions of confinement." Id. at 168. It noted that(cid:13) Edwards "repeatedly characteriz[ed] the plaintiff ’s claim as(cid:13) one that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the(cid:13) deprivation of his good-time credits" and that Heck(cid:13) "observed that the damages action in that case was in effect(cid:13) an attack on the fact or length of confinement." Id. (internal(cid:13) quotation marks and citations omitted); see also(cid:13) Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1055-56 (D.C. Cir.(cid:13) 1998) (holding that a prisoner’s claim that prison officials(cid:13) miscalculated his parole eligibility date was cognizable(cid:13) under S 1983 because "D.C. parole decisions are entirely(cid:13) discretionary" and the success of the claim thus would not(cid:13) necessarily accelerate the prisoner’s release). 11(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 10. The plaintiff was a former prisoner, Brown, 131 F.3d at 165, but that(cid:13) did not factor into the D.C. Circuit’s analysis.(cid:13) 11. The D.C. Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court’s 1995 opinion(cid:13) in Sandin (which we discuss below) did not question a prisoner’s use of(cid:13) S 1983 to challenge disciplinary proceedings that affected only the(cid:13) conditions of his confinement. Brown, 131 F.3d at 168. However, the(cid:13) disciplinary sanction in Sandin was expunged, albeit before the prisoner(cid:13) brought his S 1983 action. 515 U.S. at 476. In addition, the D.C. Circuit(cid:13) reasoned that Heck was distinguishable because the former prisoner was(cid:13) challenging a decision that "bears little resemblance to a judicial(cid:13) proceeding." Brown, 131 F.3d at 168. Because decisions to place inmates(cid:13) in administrative segregation are subject to greatly relaxed procedural(cid:13) requirements, they "would almost certainly be accorded no collateral(cid:13) estoppel effect," and thus "hardly need[ ] to be insulated from collateral(cid:13) attack." Id. However, the same could be said of the disciplinary sanction(cid:13) in Edwards, which the D.C. Circuit did not distinguish on this point.(cid:13) 11(cid:13) Similarly, in Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.(cid:13) 1999), the Second Circuit held that a prisoner could seek(cid:13) damages and injunctive relief under S 1983 for being(cid:13) sentenced to "keeplock," a particularly strict form of(cid:13) administrative segregation, allegedly in violation of due(cid:13) process.12 Id. at 20-21. The Court agreed with the D.C.(cid:13) Circuit that Heck and Edwards do not bar a prisoner from(cid:13) using S 1983 to challenge a prison disciplinary sanction(cid:13) that did not affect the fact or length of his confinement. Id.(cid:13) at 27. The Second Circuit explained that Preiser "assumed"(cid:13) that prisoners could challenge being placed in disciplinary(cid:13) segregation under S 1983, and that neither Heck nor(cid:13) Edwards suggested that the favorable termination rule(cid:13) applies when the fact or duration of a prisoner’s(cid:13) incarceration is not implicated.13 Id.(cid:13) The Seventh Circuit joined the Second and D.C. Circuits(cid:13) in DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000), holding(cid:13) that a state prisoner could seek damages under S 1983 for(cid:13) being subjected to a disciplinary sanction that cost him his(cid:13) prison job, allegedly based on his race and in retaliation for(cid:13) activities protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 611,(cid:13) 613. The Court explained that, unlike Preiser , Heck, and(cid:13) Edwards, the prisoner’s claims did not relate to the fact or(cid:13) duration of his confinement.14Id. at 616-17; accord Sheldon(cid:13) v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 234 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating in(cid:13) dicta that "prisoners who challenge disciplinary rulings that(cid:13) do not lengthen their sentence are probably outside the(cid:13) habeas statute and able to seek damages under S 1983(cid:13) without showing favorable termination").(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 12. As in Brown, the Jenkins plaintiff was a former prisoner, 179 F.3d at(cid:13) 20, but the Second Circuit held that the same analysis applies(cid:13) regardless whether a S 1983 plaintiff remains in custody. Id. at 21.(cid:13) 13. While the Second Circuit also relied on the dicta in Spencer, it noted(cid:13) that its holding was fully supported by the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in(cid:13) Brown. Jenkins, 179 F.2d at 27.(cid:13) 14. DeWalt, relying in part on the dicta in Spencer, overruled Stone-Bey(cid:13) v. Barnes, 120 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 1997), which held that, under(cid:13) Heck and Edwards, the favorable termination rule applies to prison(cid:13) disciplinary sanctions even though they do not affect the fact or length(cid:13) of a prisoner’s confinement. DeWalt, 224 F.3d at 617-18.(cid:13) 12(cid:13) Most recently, we held in Leamer v. Fauver, No. 98-6007,(cid:13) 2002 WL 624068 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2002), that a sex(cid:13) offender incarcerated indefinitely at a specialized treatment(cid:13) center could bring a S 1983 suit alleging that state officials(cid:13) violated his constitutional rights by placing him on(cid:13) restrictive status and depriving him of therapy. 15 Id. at *7-9.(cid:13) We explained that the favorable termination rule applies(cid:13) only if a prisoner’s claim necessarily implicates the fact or(cid:13) duration of his confinement. Id. at *7. Although the(cid:13) disciplinary sanction prevented the offender from obtaining(cid:13) treatment that might expedite his release, it did not(cid:13) necessarily affect the length of his incarceration, and thus(cid:13) Heck and Edwards did not apply. Id. at *7-8.16(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 15. Our research reveals that only one circuit court continues to insist(cid:13) that the favorable termination rule applies to claims that implicate only(cid:13) the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement. In Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d(cid:13) 226 (6th Cir. 2000), the Sixth Circuit held that Heck and Edwards(cid:13) barred a prisoner from alleging under S 1983 that his Eighth Amendment(cid:13) rights were violated when he was put in detention and stripped of(cid:13) privileges for thirty days. Id. at 228, 230. Relying on its prior(cid:13) unpublished opinions, the Court failed to consider whether it mattered(cid:13) that the disciplinary measures at issue did not affect the duration of the(cid:13) prisoner’s incarceration. Id. at 228-29. The Sixth Circuit did not explain(cid:13) why it disagreed with every other court of appeals to address this issue.(cid:13) We believe that Huey’s extension of Heck and Edwards to claims that(cid:13) relate only to prison conditions is unwarranted. The Supreme Court has(cid:13) never questioned Preiser’s statement, see 411 U.S. at 499, that prisoners(cid:13) can challenge the conditions of their confinement under S 1983, and the(cid:13) primary concern underlying Heck and Edwards (the possibility that(cid:13) prisoners will use S 1983 to attack collaterally the fact or duration of(cid:13) their confinement) does not apply when the underlying disciplinary(cid:13) sanction relates only to the conditions of a prisoner’s incarceration.(cid:13) 16. Cf. Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that(cid:13) prisoners could use S 1983 to challenge being compelled to participate in(cid:13) a sex offender treatment program as a prerequisite for parole eligibility);(cid:13) Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078, 1087 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc)(cid:13) (holding that prisoners can contest parole procedures under S 1983(cid:13) where the success of their claims would not necessarily affect "the actual(cid:13) duration of [their] confinement").(cid:13) 13(cid:13) C.(cid:13) In this context, we hold that Torres’s due process claim(cid:13) is cognizable under S 1983. Preiser concluded that a(cid:13) prisoner may use S 1983 to attack "the conditions of his(cid:13) prison life," 411 U.S. at 499, and both Heck and Edwards(cid:13) adhered to "Preiser’s clear line between challenges to the(cid:13) fact or length of custody and challenges to the conditions of(cid:13) confinement." Brown, 131 F.3d at 168. The favorable(cid:13) termination rule does not apply when a prisoner’sS 1983(cid:13) claims can implicate only the conditions, and not the fact(cid:13) or duration, of his confinement. This is regardless whether(cid:13) he remains in custody, as in Leamer, 2002 WL 624068, at(cid:13) *7, and DeWalt, 224 F.3d at 616-17, or is no longer in(cid:13) custody, as in Jenkins, 179 F.3d at 27, and Brown, 131(cid:13) F.3d at 168. Torres’s claim challenges the procedures by(cid:13) which he was sentenced to disciplinary detention and(cid:13) administrative segregation. Because these punishments did(cid:13) not alter the length of his incarceration, the success of his(cid:13) claim would not "necessarily imply the invalidity of " the(cid:13) fact or duration of his confinement. Edwards, 520 U.S. at(cid:13) 646; Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Thus the District Court(cid:13) erred in concluding that the favorable termination rule(cid:13) barred Torres from proceeding under S 1983.(cid:13) IV. No Violation of Protected Liberty Interest (cid:13) Although Torres’s due process claim is cognizable under(cid:13) S 1983, to survive summary judgment he had to present(cid:13) evidence that he suffered a violation of a liberty interest(cid:13) protected by the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.(cid:13) Because he did not, we affirm.(cid:13) A protected liberty interest in avoiding prison disciplinary(cid:13) sanctions can arise either from the Due Process Clause(cid:13) itself or from state law. Asquith v. Dep’t of Corrections, 186(cid:13) F.3d 407, 409 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). No liberty(cid:13) interest traced from the Due Process Clause is implicated if(cid:13) "the conditions or degree of confinement to which a(cid:13) prisoner is subjected [are] within the sentence imposed(cid:13) upon him" and do not otherwise violate the Constitution.(cid:13) Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2002)(cid:13) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other(cid:13) 14(cid:13) words, where there is no state-created liberty interest, the(cid:13) Due Process Clause applies only if the restraints at issue(cid:13) exceed the prisoner’s sentence "in such an unexpected(cid:13) manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process(cid:13) Clause of [their] own force" and do not violate any other(cid:13) constitutional provision. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,(cid:13) 484 (1995). Because disciplinary detention and(cid:13) "administrative segregation [are] the sort[s] of confinement(cid:13) that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at(cid:13) some point in their incarceration," Torres’s transfer to "less(cid:13) amenable and more restrictive quarters" did not implicate a(cid:13) liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Hewitt(cid:13) v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); Fraise , 283 F.3d at(cid:13) 522.(cid:13) Nor was Torres deprived of any state-created liberty(cid:13) interest. In Sandin, the Supreme Court sharply curtailed(cid:13) the situations in which the negative implications of(cid:13) mandatory language in state laws or regulations can create(cid:13) a protected liberty interest in the prison context. The case(cid:13) involved a prisoner’s claim that Hawaii prison officials(cid:13) deprived him of due process when they charged him with(cid:13) misconduct and, following a hearing, placed him in(cid:13) disciplinary segregation in the "Special Holding Unit" for 30(cid:13) days. Id. at 475-76. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals(cid:13) concluded that because a prison regulation in Hawaii(cid:13) required that substantial evidence must support a(cid:13) misconduct charge, the prisoner was deprived of a(cid:13) protected liberty interest if he was put in segregation(cid:13) pursuant to a decision lacking such evidentiary support. Id.(cid:13) at 476-77. The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the(cid:13) focus must be on the nature of the deprivation, not merely(cid:13) on the language of state laws and regulations. Id. at 481-(cid:13) 84. The Court explained that mandatory language in a state(cid:13) law or regulation can create a protected liberty interest only(cid:13) if the alleged deprivation "imposes atypical and significant(cid:13) hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents(cid:13) of prison life." Id. at 484. The Court determined that(cid:13) because the plaintiff ’s confinement "mirrored those(cid:13) conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative(cid:13) segregation and protective custody," and because inmates(cid:13) in the general population at the plaintiff ’s prison(cid:13) experienced "significant amounts of ‘lockdown time,’ " the(cid:13) 15(cid:13) prisoner was not deprived of a protected liberty interest. Id.(cid:13) at 486.(cid:13) Sandin instructs that whether the restraint at issue(cid:13) "imposes atypical and significant hardship" depends on the(cid:13) particular state in which the plaintiff is incarcerated. Id. We(cid:13) recently held in Fraise that New Jersey prisoners were not(cid:13) deprived of a protected liberty interest when they were(cid:13) placed in the "Security Threat Group Management Unit"(cid:13) ("STGMU"), an especially harsh form of administrative(cid:13) detention "designed to isolate and rehabilitate gang(cid:13) members."17 283 F.3d at 509, 522-23. Prisoners placed in(cid:13) the STGMU were consigned to "maximum custody" until(cid:13) they completed a "three-phase behavior modification and(cid:13) education program," in which they learned, inter alia, non-(cid:13) violent methods of conflict resolution. Id. at 511. If a(cid:13) prisoner refused to renounce his affiliation with all(cid:13) "security threat groups," he would remain in the STGMU(cid:13) indefinitely. Id. at 511. Among other restrictions, inmates(cid:13) transferred to the STGMU were allowed just five hours per(cid:13) week outside their cells, were strip-searched every time(cid:13) they exited or reentered their cells, could shower or shave(cid:13) only every third day, were banned from regular prison(cid:13) programs, and were prohibited from corresponding with(cid:13) any other inmate. Id. at 523 n.1 (Rendell, J., dissenting).(cid:13) We held that these "additional restrictions" did "not impose(cid:13) an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the(cid:13) ordinary incidents of prison life," and thus did not implicate(cid:13) a protected liberty interest. Id. at 522-23 (citations omitted).18(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 17. Judge Rendell dissented on a different issue, but agreed with the(cid:13) majority’s analysis of the due process issue. Id. at 530 n.13 (Rendell, J.,(cid:13) dissenting).(cid:13) 18. Cf. Leamer, 2002 WL 624068, at *9-10 (holding that sex offender had(cid:13) a protected liberty interest in obtaining treatment that was "mandated(cid:13) and promised" by New Jersey’s "unique statutory scheme" for(cid:13) incarcerating sex offenders, was "an inherent and integral element of the(cid:13) scheme," and was "inextricably linked" to the duration of his(cid:13) confinement); Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding(cid:13) that a Pennsylvania prisoner who was kept in administrative custody for(cid:13) eight years and denied contact with any humans aside from corrections(cid:13) officers during that period--a form of "permanent solitary confinement"(cid:13) that the State conceded was virtually "unique" within its prison system--(cid:13) was deprived of a protected liberty interest).(cid:13) 16(cid:13) Under Sandin and Fraise, we cannot say that Torres has(cid:13) alleged "the type of atypical, significant deprivation in(cid:13) which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest."(cid:13) Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. "Sandin instructs that placement(cid:13) in administrative confinement will generally not create a(cid:13) liberty interest." Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d(cid:13) Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Torres was placed in(cid:13) disciplinary detention for 15 days and administrative(cid:13) segregation for 120 days in a State where prisoners have no(cid:13) protected liberty interest in being free of indefinite(cid:13) confinement in the STGMU. See Fraise, 283 F.3d at 522-(cid:13) 23; cf. Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-08 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1997) (holding that a Pennsylvania prisoner did not have a(cid:13) protected liberty interest in avoiding being placed in(cid:13) administrative custody for 15 months because such lengthy(cid:13) stays were not atypical in Pennsylvania’s penal system).(cid:13) Therefore, Torres was not deprived of a protected liberty(cid:13) interest, and we affirm the District Court’s grant of(cid:13) summary judgment for that reason.(cid:13) Conclusion(cid:13) Because Torres’s due process claim implicated only the(cid:13) conditions, and not the fact or duration, of his confinement,(cid:13) the District Court erred in ruling that the claim was not(cid:13) cognizable under S 1983. However, summary judgment was(cid:13) appropriate because Torres was not deprived of a protected(cid:13) liberty interest. We therefore affirm.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 17