909 F.3d 159
6th Cir.2018Background
- Petitioner Mariusz Tomaszczuk, a Polish national, entered the U.S. in 1999; his wife is an LPR and his son a U.S. citizen. DHS placed him in removal proceedings in 2016 for being present without admission.
- Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) on April 4, 2017.
- At the IJ hearing, evidence included five DUI convictions and one disorderly conduct conviction for public drunkenness; some convictions fell inside and some outside the ten‑year statutory period. Testimony and arrest BACs were cited as evidence of alcoholism.
- The IJ denied cancellation, finding Petitioner a "habitual drunkard" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) and also concluding he had been confined over the § 1101(f)(7) penal‑institution threshold; the BIA affirmed the habitual‑drunkard finding but disagreed on the § 1101(f)(7) confinement issue.
- Petitioner sought review in this Court, raising (1) a void‑for‑vagueness challenge to § 1101(f)(1), (2) an Equal Protection challenge, and (3) Due Process claims that the IJ/BIA considered irrelevant evidence and were biased. The Court denied the petition for review.
Issues
| Issue | Tomaszczuk's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether petitioner may raise a void‑for‑vagueness challenge to § 1101(f)(1) under Due Process | "Habitual drunkard" is vague; he lacked fair notice and statute is unconstitutional | Petitioner has no protected liberty interest in discretionary cancellation, so he cannot mount a vagueness challenge under Due Process | Denied: petitioner cannot raise the Due Process void‑for‑vagueness claim because aliens have no constitutional liberty interest in discretionary relief (Ashki control) |
| Whether § 1101(f)(1) violates Equal Protection (rational‑basis review) | The term is vague/overbroad and discriminates without rational relation | Congress rationally may deem conduct from habitual drunkenness inconsistent with "good moral character" | Denied: statute survives rational‑basis review; "habitual drunkard" rationally relates to lacking good moral character and targets conduct, not mere status |
| Proper interpretation of "habitual drunkard" (statutory construction question relevant to Equal Protection) | (Implied) may include alcoholism as status alone | Term should focus on conduct/harmful acts associated with drinking, not mere status of alcoholism | Court construes "habitual drunkard" to target harmful conduct associated with drinking (noscitur a sociis; distinction from "chronic alcoholic") |
| Whether IJ/BIA violated Due Process by considering evidence outside the 10‑year period or showing bias | IJ/BIA considered impermissible evidence and were biased | These are procedural errors that must be exhausted administratively; petitioner did not raise them before the BIA | Court lacks jurisdiction to review — claims were not exhausted before the BIA, so they are dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Coss, 677 F.3d 278 (6th Cir.) (standard for de novo review of statutory constitutionality)
- Ashki v. INS, 233 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2000) (no constitutional liberty interest in discretionary relief from deportation)
- Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2016) (discussed distinction where removability derives from the challenged statute)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (due process vagueness precedent discussed)
- United States v. Estrada, 876 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2017) (reaffirming Ashki on liberty interest in discretionary relief)
- FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (rational‑basis review principles)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (noscitur a sociis canon)
- Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (contextual statutory interpretation guidance)