Lucenti v. Laviero
176 A.3d 1
| Conn. | 2018Background
- On October 28, 2011 Dominick Lucenti was injured operating an excavator that allegedly had been "rigged" to run only at full throttle, causing a jerking motion that injured him.
- Lucenti sued owner Greg Laviero and Martin Laviero Contractors, alleging they knowingly directed the temporary repair/rigging, were warned it was dangerous, and thus acted with the subjective intent or belief that injury was substantially certain.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment invoking the Workers' Compensation Act exclusivity bar (Gen. Stat. § 31-284(a)); Laviero denied intending to injure anyone and testified he operated the excavator both before and after the incident.
- Plaintiff submitted affidavits: a former employee (Quick) said Laviero ordered the machine "rigged" and had been warned it was "too dangerous," and Lucenti stated he warned Laviero who replied he would not repair it because he planned to sell it; an unsigned mechanic’s statement purportedly corroborated rigging.
- Trial court granted summary judgment; the Appellate Court affirmed. The Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification to decide whether those facts raise a genuine issue under the "substantial certainty" exception to exclusivity.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court: warnings and evidence of a cavalier safety attitude did not, without more (e.g., prior similar accidents, concealment, persistent safety violations, disabling safety devices, coercion), create a genuine issue that defendants subjectively believed injury was substantially certain.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence that employer "rigged" excavator and was warned it was dangerous creates a genuine issue that employer subjectively believed injury was "substantially certain" (so exclusivity does not bar suit) | Lucenti: warnings from Quick and Lucenti plus mechanic's statement permit an inference (under Suarez I) that employer subjectively believed injury was substantially certain; requiring more would render exception meaningless | Laviero: exception requires subjective belief of substantial certainty; no evidence he intended injury, he denied such intent and personally used the machine before/after; warnings alone are insufficient | Held: Affirmed — warnings and cavalier attitude insufficient alone; plaintiff failed to raise genuine issue of material fact about employer's subjective belief that injury was substantially certain |
| Proper standard for "substantial certainty" exception | Lucenti: totality of circumstances may allow inference of subjective belief from warnings and surrounding facts | Defendants: Connecticut law requires actual subjective belief; courts narrowly construe exception to avoid undermining exclusivity | Held: Reiterated Connecticut’s subjective standard (Suarez I/II line) and applied it narrowly; objective warnings are relevant but not dispositive |
| Whether employer's personal use of the rigged machine negates inference of subjective belief | Lucenti: employer's use does not preclude inference of knowledge/indifference | Defendants: employer’s operation before/after incident supports absence of subjective belief that injury was substantially certain | Held: Employer’s operation is a significant fact supporting summary judgment here and, combined with lack of other indicia, defeats inference of subjective belief |
| Whether Connecticut should adopt New Jersey’s two‑prong (conduct/context) framework | Lucenti: urged broad reading of Suarez I allowing totality inferences | Defendants: caution against weakening exclusivity | Held: Court considered NJ approach useful but declined to adopt it now; left open for future cases |
Key Cases Cited
- Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99 (Conn. 1994) (recognizes "substantial certainty" exception and allows intent to be inferred from totality of circumstances)
- Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 242 Conn. 255 (Conn. 1997) (clarifies that plaintiff must show employer actually believed injury was substantially certain)
- Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215 (Conn. 1979) (origin of narrow intentional‑tort exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity)
- Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91 (Conn. 1985) (distinguishes reckless safety violations from intentional torts; substantial certainty required)
- Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc., 263 Conn. 231 (Conn. 2003) (warnings and regulatory violations, without more, do not establish employer subjective belief of substantial certainty)
- Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., 277 Conn. 113 (Conn. 2006) (reaffirms high bar for substantial‑certainty exception)
- Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161 (N.J. 1985) (New Jersey two‑prong substantial‑certainty analysis; factors like prior similar accidents, deception, persistent violations, disabling safety devices inform conduct inquiry)