951 F.3d 30
1st Cir.2020Background
- The Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (federally recognized in 2007) applied to the BIA for fee‑to‑trust status for ~170 acres in Mashpee (housing) and ~151 acres in Taunton (casino/resort). The BIA approved the taking into trust in 2015 and the Department proclaimed the land the Tribe's reservation.
- Local residents sued, arguing the BIA lacked statutory authority under § 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 5129 (definition of "Indian"). The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, concluding the BIA misread the statute, and remanded to the agency under a Rule 54(b) order.
- The Tribe appealed; the United States initially appealed but voluntarily dismissed its appeal. On remand the BIA in 2018 considered only whether the Tribe qualified under the IRA’s first definition and concluded it did not; it expressly left intact the 2015 analysis of the second definition.
- Appellees argued the appeal was moot or otherwise not appealable; the First Circuit held there was Article III jurisdiction and practical finality and therefore accepted the appeal.
- On the merits the court addressed whether the IRA’s second definition of "Indian" (the phrase "descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation") allows the BIA to treat the Tribe as eligible despite not being under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
- The First Circuit held the statutory text is plain: "such members" refers to the entire antecedent (members "now under Federal jurisdiction"), so the Tribe did not meet the IRA definition and the BIA exceeded its authority; the district court judgment was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiffs' Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction / Mootness: whether the appeal is reviewable after agency action and the United States dismissed its appeal | Appellees: BIA’s 2018 action mooted the appeal or made remand order nonappealable; dismissal of U.S. appeal removes appellate jurisdiction | Tribe/BIA: 2018 decision did not supplant 2015 decision; remand order has practical finality and is appealable | Court: Appeal is justiciable; Article III jurisdiction and practical finality exist; appeal proceeds |
| Meaning of IRA § 19 (25 U.S.C. § 5129) second definition: whether "such members" refers only to "members of any recognized Indian tribe" or to "members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction" | Appellees: "Such" must be read to include the full antecedent (including "now under Federal jurisdiction"), precluding the BIA’s expansion | Tribe/BIA: "Such" ambiguous; could refer only to "members of any recognized Indian tribe," which would allow descendants to qualify even if tribe not under federal jurisdiction in 1934; canons and remedial purpose favor Tribe | Court: Statute is unambiguous; "such members" refers to the full antecedent including "now under Federal jurisdiction"; BIA’s contrary reading is impermissible; affirm district court |
Key Cases Cited
- Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) ("now" limits § 19’s first definition to tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation)
- Mall Props., Inc. v. Marsh, 841 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1988) (appealability/remand efficiency considerations)
- Collord v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 154 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 1998) (factors for treating remand orders as final)
- Krstic, United States v., 558 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2009) (interpretive difficulties created by the word "such")
- Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002) (canons of construction do not apply where text is unambiguous)
- South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1986) (Indian‑canon cannot override clear statutory text)
- Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873 (2019) (redundancy is only a clue, not dispositive, in statutory interpretation)
- Ahlers, United States v., 305 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2002) (use of "such" referring to entire antecedent)
- Hogar Agua y Vida en el Desierto v. Suarez‑Medina, 36 F.3d 177 (1st Cir. 1994) ("such" can create latent ambiguity in context)