Leona Mullins v. Oscar Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760

Background

On Aug. 20, 2011, Cincinnati officer Oscar Cyranek stopped and wrestled with 16‑year‑old Davon Mullins in a crowded downtown breezeway after reports of guns being thrown into an event; the encounter lasted ~2 minutes.
Cyranek grabbed Mullins’s wrists, pushed him to the ground, and checked his pants; Mullins struggled and called to a friend, Recardo Sims.
While Cyranek held Mullins, Mullins produced a handgun with a finger on the trigger and, after being told to drop it, threw the gun over Cyranek’s left shoulder about 10–15 feet behind Cyranek.
Within about five seconds of the gun being thrown, Cyranek rose and fired two shots; Mullins was later pronounced dead from a single gunshot wound to the torso.
The district court granted Cyranek summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding Cyranek’s use of deadly force was reasonable given the rapidly evolving, potentially deadly threat.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Cyranek’s use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment as excessive	Mullins argues Cyranek shot Davon after he had thrown away the gun and therefore no longer posed an immediate threat	Cyranek contends the events unfolded in split seconds and he reasonably believed Mullins still posed a grave threat when he fired	Held: No constitutional violation; a reasonable officer could have believed Mullins still posed an imminent threat, so force was reasonable
Whether firing two shots (including the second) was excessive	Second shot was unnecessary once the weapon had been discarded	Second shot was within the same brief time-frame in which a reasonable officer could perceive continued threat	Held: Second shot reasonable given the short interval and officer perception of threat
Whether Mullins’s being actually unarmed at the moment of the shot negates reasonableness	Mullins’s actual lack of the weapon shows no present danger, so shooting was excessive	Actual possession is irrelevant; what matters is the officer’s reasonable belief at the moment	Held: Actual lack of a weapon is irrelevant; reasonableness is judged by officer’s perception
Whether Cyranek is immune from state‑law claims (wrongful death, negligence, assault, battery)	State claims assert misconduct beyond federal claim and seek relief under Ohio law	Cyranek argues statutory immunity applies because his conduct was not malicious, in bad faith, or wanton/reckless	Held: Officer entitled to Ohio statutory immunity because his use of force was not objectively unreasonable

Key Cases Cited

Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235 (U.S. 2012) (qualified immunity standard; breathing room for reasonable mistakes)
Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (U.S. 2013) (qualified immunity protects reasonable but mistaken judgments)
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1986) (immunity where reasonable officers could disagree)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S. 2001) (two‑prong qualified immunity test)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (discretion to decide order of qualified immunity analysis)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1985) (deadly force only if probable cause to believe suspect poses serious threat)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (objective reasonableness standard for use of force)
Untalan v. City of Lorain, 430 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2005) (officer may use deadly force within seconds after perceiving sufficient danger)
Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2000) (qualified immunity where officer reasonably believed decedent armed and dangerous)
Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2009) (reasonableness of multiple shots at dangerous suspect)
Livermore v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2007) (totality of circumstances; deference to on‑the‑spot decisions)
Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1996) (caution against 20/20 hindsight in excessive‑force review)